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Recent postmodern work on cultural evaluation, such as Barbara 
Smith’s Contingencies of Value (1989), argues that cultural value 
cannot be treated as an inherent or objective quality of cultural 
products. Instead, cultural value must be understood as “value for”: 
relative, that is, to the identities and interests of particular cultural 
consumers and producers. Theorists (for instance, John Frow in his 
1995 study Cultural Studies and Cultural Value) have employed similar 
relativist logic in their analyses of the putative “structures” or 
institutions that supposedly give shape to Western culture-as-a-whole: 
“high” culture, “popular” culture, “mass” culture and so on. This “post-
axiological” strain of cultural theory undermines the real-world 
integrity of those categories by suggesting that they (the categories) are 
merely contingent effects of critical / evaluative discourse.  
 
Other archetypically “postmodern” arguments in literary and cultural 
studies have focused on charting or advocating both the demise of the 
modernist “great divide” between “high” and “low” culture, and its 
replacement, in cultural production and criticism, with more permissive 
and socially egalitarian modes of interplay between “high” and “low” 
culture. 
 
Some critics and critically aware cultural producers have treated these 
two projects as though they are complementary facets of a general 
“postmodern” turn. Yet contesting or reversing obsolete hierarchies of 
cultural value does not necessarily lead critics to contemplate the status 
of “high” / “low” categories themselves. A meaningful refusal of the 
logic of the modernist “great divide” would obligate critics and 
producers to reflect on the contingency of those categories and their 
own interests with respect to those categories.   
 
Juxtaposing an “encyclopaedic” modernist text renowned for its 
interspersion of “high” and “low” cultural elements (James Joyce’s 
Ulysses) with a postmodern text that seems knowingly to do the same 
(David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest), two case studies illustrate the 
inseparability of readings or narratives that are couched in “high”/ 
“low” terms from the particular interests of cultural producers and 





An obscure article published by Edward Mendelson in 1976, 
“Encyclopedic Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon,” provides an apt 
point of departure for this thesis; and an opportunity to explain the 
connection I propose between the terms that make up its title. 
Mendelson’s immoderate objective in his short essay is to “identify a 
genre that is of central importance in western literature, but one that has 
not yet fully been recognised” (1267); the criteria he adduces for the 
genre1 are singular: 
 
Each major national culture in the west, as it becomes aware of itself as 
a separate entity, produces an encyclopedic author, one whose work 
attends to the whole social and linguistic range of his nation, who 
makes use of all the literary styles and conventions known to his 
countrymen, whose dialect often becomes established as the national 
language, who takes his place as national poet or national classic, and 
who becomes the focus of a large and persistent exegetic and textual 
industry comparable to the industry founded on the Bible. […] The 
encyclopedic works they produce take on, after publication, a status 
their authors could not have anticipated. Only after an encyclopedic 
narrative has taken its place as a literary monument, surrounded by 
curators and guides, can it be recognized as a member of its small and 
exclusive genre. (1268) 
 
Though we might wish to distance ourselves from the chauvinist and 
nationalistic implications of this definition,2 and, as Mendelson 
grudgingly admits, no book or author can in fact succeed in 
representing an entire “national culture” (even if there were universal 
agreement on what the constituents of that culture would be), 
Mendelson’s musings are suggestive of the rhetoric of cultural 
                                                 
1
 “I know of only seven,” the author confesses, “Dante’s Commedia, Rabelais’ five 
books of Gargantua and Pantagruel, Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Goethe’s Faust, 
Melville’s Moby-Dick, Joyce’s Ulysses, and now, I believe, Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow” (1267).  
2
 Cheryl Herr is another critic who makes use of this term (Joyce’s Anatomy of 
Culture, 2); and Hugh Kenner invokes a similar idea in Stoic Comedians, the title of 
which refers to three writers (Flaubert, Joyce, Beckett) who are similarly resigned to 
the belief that “the field of possibilities available to [them] is large perhaps, or small 
perhaps, but closed” (xiii). 
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inclusiveness and cultural value that is common to the literary works 
this thesis considers: James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) and David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996).3 These enormous texts draw from, and 
draw together, discursive forms synonymous with diverse cultural 
strata—from forms typically referred to as “high” cultural (including 
for example the use of demanding, self-consciously “literary” language; 
or a range of alluded-to texts associated with, or metonymic of, the 
traditional university humanities curriculum), to “low” cultural texts 
and practices like “popular” literature, theatre, television and film. They 
both have the look, though perhaps only the former has the status 
(among university-educated westerners), of cultural monumentality. 
 
Noteworthy in the fragment of argument quoted above is Mendelson’s 
evident confusion about whether the elusive quality shared by 
specimens of the “encyclopedic” genre is, in fact, internal to the works 
themselves or a historically determined fact of their absorption into 
“high” cultural institutions. All the books he refers to have been 
thoroughly, and perhaps irreversibly, canonised, and bear the marks 
(scholarly annotations; mass reproduction as classics) of having been 
appreciatively consumed, analysed, fetishised by the literary academy. 
Readers coming to those books for the first time have no choice but to 
encounter them as monuments of Western culture: the books’ 
institutional status inevitably colours readers’ experience of them (this 
is the “canon effect” in action). But if “literary monumentality” is 
ultimately a label bestowed by institutions, Mendelson also suggests 
that the behaviour of institutions is to a large extent determined by 
particular qualities possessed by “encyclopedic” novels themselves, 
which texts seem to embody the logic of monumentality. 
 
                                                 
3
 Page references for Ulysses relate to Hans Walter Gabler’s corrected edition, 
Ulysses: The Corrected Text. London: The Bodley Head, 1986.   
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My main interest throughout this thesis is contemporary thought on 
cultural value: theorists who are interested in exploring the kinds of 
questions that perhaps lie behind Mendelson’s confusion. What can be 
said to distinguish recognisably “great,” “high cultural” texts from 
“culture at large”? Do certain texts or cultural products possess qualities 
that make them objectively “better” than others? In contrast to 
Mendelson’s search for “encyclopedic” novels’ essential characteristics, 
the theorists whose work I examine in my first substantive chapter do 
not allow the possibility of texts having meaning, characteristics, or 
value in isolation from the discourse communities and institutions in 
which they are imbedded. Throughout this thesis I accept the 
plausibility of relativist account of cultural value (the subject of Chapter 
2). 
 
Yet, without endorsing Mendelson’s claim for essential or generic 
similarities, over time and across cultures, between novels that claim to 
represent an extraordinary proportion of their authors’ respective 
cultures, it does seem fair to allow that such novels are peculiarly fertile 
starting places from which to explore questions of cultural value. For 
quite apart from the question of the value of those novels themselves, 
the notion of culturally all-inclusive representation—which critics like 
Mendelson usually elaborate as the representation/incorporation of both 
“high” and “low” culture—also lends itself to analysis from a 
perspective informed by recent literature on cultural value, which has 
subjected terms like “high,” “low,” “popular,” and “mass” culture to 
thorough critique. 
 
My interest in Ulysses and Infinite Jest thus stems primarily from the 
questions they might raise (and have raised) for critics concerned with 
questions about value—including the categories and hierarchies into 
which cultural institutions have traditionally divided cultural products. 
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This thesis does not, for the most part, undertake a literary “compare 
and contrast” exercise.  
 
The choice of two texts that are institutionally defined as modernist and 
postmodernist, respectively, adds a further level of complexity. For 
Andreas Huyssen (and the narrative is a critical commonplace), 
modernism “constituted itself through a conscious strategy of exclusion, 
an anxiety of contamination by its other: an increasingly consuming and 
engulfing mass culture” (vii); and conversely, “To a large extent, it is 
by the distance we have travelled from this “great divide” between mass 
culture and modernism that we can measure our own cultural 
postmodernity” (57). Is it possible to discern traces of this “great 
divide” or its erasure in the manner in which these “high” texts 
represent “mass” or “low” culture? The least subtle versions of this 
narrative certainly imply this to be the case. 
 
This narrative of the “great divide” being overtaken, in contemporary 
academic art and criticism, by a sensibility less inclined to position 
“mass” culture as other, might be linked with other institutional 
developments—the ascendancy of cultural studies, for instance, with its 
close attention to, or valorisation of, “popular culture.” Together, these 
are often thought of as heralding something of a new beginning for 
artists and critics: an avenue, perhaps, for contesting the equation of 
university-mediated culture with snobbishness or indefensible forms of 
social privilege. (The title of Huyssen’s study, After the Great Divide 
(my emphasis), perhaps suggests a measure of triumph or relief.) These 
moves, however, do not necessarily involve substantive reflection on 
the status of the categories (“high,” “low,” “popular,” “mass”) through 
which both past and present understandings of cultural value are 




By contrast, the arguments I consider in my first substantive chapter 
(“Cultural Value”), concerted attempts to move beyond the evaluative 
logic synonymous with, for instance, literary studies or art history as 
traditionally practised, seek to undermine the integrity of the categories 
themselves. But pointing out, with John Frow, that those categories “in 
theoretical terms lack all homogeneity” (Cultural Studies and Cultural 
Value 20)4 is not to suggest that they can be readily abandoned by 
literary producers or critics. However, throughout this thesis I argue for 
the intellectual utility of maintaining a self-conscious awareness of the 
status of these categories—particularly when assessing appeals to 
“high”/ “low” discourse. What particular needs, values, anxieties, and 
interests lie behind, or are masked by, appeals to a critical discourse 
that understands culture (or, simply, texts) through a single high/low 
structural opposition? 
 
My chapters that centre on Ulysses and Infinite Jest explore this 
question in contrasting ways. Chapter 3 does not perform any 
substantial reading of Joyce’s text; my subject is the work of the (self-
named) “Joyce industry”—Joyceans’ recent focus on the incorporation 
of “popular culture” in Joyce’s monumental work, and the meditations 
on cultural value that this leads them to. In Chapter 4 I treat David 
Foster Wallace himself as a knowing participant in similar debates, and 
take Infinite Jest’s invocation of “high”/ “low” terms to invite a 





                                                 
4
 All references to John Frow’s work are to Cultural Studies and Cultural Value, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
  
Cooke 11
2. Cultural Value 
 
 
This thesis is an exercise in understanding the consequences of the 
collision of literary and cultural studies. Partly this is a function of the 
texts I shall focus upon: there is a sense in which these fictions could be 
considered works of “cultural studies” themselves, with each text 
seeming to require discussion in terms of its representation of the social 
organisation of culture—culture’s stratifications or institutional 
characteristics. More fundamentally, though, I am interested in the 
changing assumptions about cultural value such a collision might be 
expected to result in.  
 
For literary and cultural studies, as usually understood, are based upon 
distinct definitions of “culture” that are not easily reconciled. On the 
one hand, literary study is implicitly founded upon the identification 
and study of inherently valuable cultural artefacts. Literary canon 
formation has traditionally been thought of as the assembly of a 
syllabus, thought complete in itself, of texts, verbal artworks, thought 
worthy of serious scholarly attention and, consequently, institution-
aided preservation; maintaining a hierarchy of cultural value is central 
to the discipline. Cultural studies, conversely, was founded on 
implicitly non-evaluative principles (even if, as John Frow argues, it 
has subsequently established its own cultural hierarchies). Steven 
Connor describes this disconnection as a friction between 
anthropological and critical senses of the word “culture”: “In the first 
definition, value is relative, dynamic and under transaction; in the 
second it is fixed, concentrated and affirmed as absolute. The 
anthropological account, which … identifies culture with the play of 
value, makes no attempt to impose evaluative hierarchies on its material 
… The critical definition of culture, on the other hand, is orientated 
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towards evaluation, which is to say, around selection, preference and 
judgements of quality” (Connor 234).  
 
Here Connor identifies an important tension: between an idea of culture 
(and thus value) as embodied in objects (the sense in which we speak of 
Ulysses as a “high cultural” work), and culture conceived as something 
located in the dynamics of human interaction, in “the play of value.” 
For Connor, adherents to the first definition treat cultural study as 
means of becoming “cultured,” and see critical practice as a process of 
immersion in valuable texts and practices; those who hold to an 
anthropological definition of culture, on this account, make no claims 
about the value of the culture(s) they study.  
 
While this opposition is put as one between different ways of 
approaching what is neutrally described as “material,” it is also obvious 
that anthropological and critical ways of reading are typically applied to 
different “material”: to cultural practices and products of unequal social 
status. The critical definition of culture is usually associated with (or 
applied to) materials from “high culture,” “legitimate culture” or 
“school culture”; anthropology typically takes as its object of study 
practices and texts that do not have the same legacy of being taken as 
self-evidently valuable – localised group customs and subcultures for 
example, or, in the case of cultural studies (which I related, above, to 
the anthropological definition of culture), “popular culture” and its 
various synonyms. Although it seems that, of logical necessity, the 
anthropological definition (as put here) would claim to undermine the 
critical definition (that is, by attributing critical “selection, preference 
and judgements of quality” to the relative, dynamic “play of value” 
disallowed by the second definition), the notion of cultural value as 
“fixed” and “absolute” can have the effect of structuring cultural study 
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so as to minimise the likelihood of cultural academics needing to 
confront this disjunction.  
 
This thesis explores some of the ways that recent criticism (and, 
perhaps, literature) has attempted to bring together these two definitions 
of culture and the fields of inquiry (types of texts) with which they are 
associated. Of these two tasks, the latter has caused the least difficulty 
for literary critics. Recognising that Ulysses incorporates much content 
that would not typically be treated as high cultural in its own right does 
not always lead critics to reconsider the abstract categories “culture” 
and “value” themselves. As arguments like Mendelson’s demonstrate, 
texts that disclose their authors’ mastery over a diverse field of cultural 
texts and practices—mastery of something approaching cultural studies’ 
inclusive understanding of culture—may be highly critically valued as a 
result. Tom LeClair’s exaltation of the American “systems novel,” or of 
“prodigious fictions,” is one recent argument to locate a literary work’s 
value in the degree of its cultural inclusiveness and encyclopaedic 
reach.5 
 
For other critics, describing texts like Infinite Jest and Ulysses as 
somehow representing conglomerations of “high” and “popular” culture 
raises more wide-reaching questions. What do these novels suggest 
about what holds these cultural “strata” apart, or logically prevents such 
a distinction? We see the beginnings of such a line of thought, for 
instance, in John Guillory’s account of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the 
novel, where “The literary language and its other, what Bakhtin calls 
heteroglossia, are defined relationally and contextually at the moment 
of their contact” (67): 
 
                                                 
5
 See Tom LeClair’s 1996 article in  Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, “The 




The novel, for Bakhtin, is the non-canonical genre, which means it 
never develops generic rules (canons) even as it accumulates a 
repertoire of works. The novel as noncanonical genre is privileged for 
Bakhtin as the genre which welcomes the heteroglossic: “The novel 
senses itself on the border between the completed, dominant literary 
language and the extraliterary languages that know heteroglossia” … 
What is important for Bakhtin in the valorization of the novel as genre 
is the recovery of a determinable mechanism of change in literary 
history from the vertiginous domain of social relations. (Cultural 
Capital 67) 
 
Thus, while both Ulysses and (to a lesser extent) Infinite Jest seem 
already to occupy a “literary” cultural position – in the sense that these 
are books one might now adduce if asked to provide examples of 
“literary novels” – they might interest Guillory (via his understanding 
of Bakhtin) in the way that, by representing so much of the “sub-
literary,” they draw attention to the provisional, relative status of 
“literary” as a category. 
 
This thesis is not concerned with Bakhtin’s theory of the novel, but 
more generally with the understandings of cultural value, and of “high” 
and “low” culture, disclosed by novels in their own right, and revealed 
by critics in their engagements with novels. Although I confine my 
attention to literary works that might, on some accounts, be put forward 
as possessing qualities that have traditionally been linked to critical 
affirmations of “absolute value,” throughout this thesis I instead accept 
the plausibility of a relativist account of cultural value, which it is the 
task of the remainder of this chapter to elaborate. This understanding of 
cultural value, it should be immediately noted, problematises the very 
terms (“high culture” and “low culture,” “popular culture” and so on) 
that I have used to describe the most pertinent common feature of the 
two novels under consideration. My use of speech marks around these 
phrases should thus be read as highlighting their provisional status. 
Indeed, a squeamishness over the use of these terms is common in 
much contemporary critical writing, largely irrespective of the extent to 
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which those critics accept the relativistic tenor of postmodern thought 
on the subject of cultural evaluation. While the phrase “high culture” is 
still commonly used to refer to a discrete set of cultural products, 
enclosing it in speech marks, denying the descriptive validity of a 
phrase that critics nevertheless seem reliant upon, is an equally common 
strategy.  
 
The centrality of high/low categories in this thesis makes this 
terminological confusion untenable. Both Ulysses and Infinite Jest seem 
to represent the relationship between “high culture” and “culture at 
large” or “low culture” in microcosm, and with each book, a case can 
be made for the author’s deliberate thematic treatment of this relation. 
Further underlining the centrality of high/low categories to this thesis is 
the disjunctive nature of the comparison I undertake: placing novels 
from either end of the twentieth century alongside one another raises 
further critical assumptions about the move from a modernist to a 
postmodernist sensibility, which is also commonly discussed in terms 
of the changing relationship between “high” culture and “mass” or 
“popular” culture. Before considering this periodising narrative, a more 
thorough investigation is required into contemporary thought on 
cultural value, and why it finds binaristic models of cultural production 




The terms high and low culture connote two self-enclosed groupings of 
cultural products differentiated by value, with an intrinsic connection 
between the social status of a text (its presence on the university 
curriculum, for instance) and its objective value (not economic value, in 
the usual sense, but value in itself, “for its own sake”). Historically, to 
refer to a work as “high cultural” was to identify its social status, but 
would also invoke (as it still does) a number of properties thought to be 
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exhibited by such works (structural complexity, a concern for form, and 
an avoidance of cliché are three examples); in the traditional language 
of literary criticism, these features could be called on as indicators of 
intrinsic value. In the same way, while a work’s “low cultural” status 
might be gleaned simply from the context of its circulation and 
consumption, its identity and disvalue could be justified by referring to 
its lack of structural complexity, its clichéd representations, and so on. 
Although the links between high and low culture and social class have 
always been pronounced, a focus on cultural works “in themselves,” 
without considering the socio-historical context in which works were 
consumed, meant that the implications of this could be overlooked or 
suppressed by defenders of high culture.  
 
To accept a high/low cultural distinction as natural and inevitable (and 
to use the terms without embarrassment) thus relies on allowing the 
possibility of speaking of the value of cultural forms, as if value was an 
objectively existing property of an object. As the subtitle of this section 
intimates, this thesis takes the impossibility of this enterprise as its 
starting point. For this reason, it is not my purpose here to thoroughly 
demonstrate the implausibility of inherentist accounts of cultural value; 
it is, however, important to give a brief taste of the logic with which the 
necessity of received high/low distinctions was traditionally asserted. 
For Pierre Bourdieu, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, John Frow, and Steven 
Connor, this is an outmoded axiological reasoning, classically stated in 
Kant’s aesthetic theories, and reproduced by the specialised disciplines 
that took his description of the “aesthetic experience” as a founding 
tenet (art history and literary criticism being two good examples). 
 
Axiological arguments, as Smith is the most ruthless to observe, 
typically begin by placing in question the legitimacy of established 
evaluative authority, for the purpose of reasserting it – not as de facto 
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authority, but as logically necessary. The problem becomes one of 
reconciling the real-world diversity of tastes with a reasoned argument 
for the rightness of one particular (high cultural) set of cultural 
preferences. Complicating this task is the disputed status of value 
judgements per se: cultural tastes do not sit easily as an object of 
philosophical inquiry, as the proverb de gustibus non disputandum 
(matters of taste are not open to argument) announces. Any argument 
for the validity of certain tastes over others must account for, and 
overcome, problems of personal fickleness and other contingencies that 
seem to lend support to the de gustibus view held by axiological 
sceptics. Arguments in favour of an objective “standard of taste,” Smith 
notes, are thus frequently based on a search for a set of conditions under 
which the apparent diversity of human interests and identities might, 
effectively, be refined out of existence. David Hume’s attempt to derive 
a “natural standard” against which tastes themselves could be evaluated 
(as correct or aberrant)6 is, for Smith, an exemplary instance of this 
kind of axiologic logic. Classical descriptions of the “aesthetic 
experience” were similarly geared towards defining “correct,” 
supposedly disinterested judgment.  
 
This understanding of aesthetic value as sui generis, a type of value 
that, unlike other manifest preferences, could not be attributed to 
particular interests, needs, or culturally specific values, has had a great 
impact on the study of literature. Steven Connor puts this well: “If the 
Kantian claim was that art and literature possessed a special and 
intrinsic kind of value which was not to be measured in anything but its 
                                                 
6
 Positing a “standard of taste” provides Hume with a way of explaining away the 
apparent diversity of value judgements: “Whoever would assert an equality of genius 
and elegance between Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison, would be thought 
to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high 
as Teneriffe, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, 
who give the preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to such a taste; 
and we pronounce, without scruple, the sentiment of these pretended critics to be 
absurd and ridiculous” (qtd by Smith 56). 
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own terms, then the claim of progressively more specialized disciplines 
such as literature, art history and even philosophy was that they alone 
could provide the competence to recognize and reproduce these forms 
of intrinsic value” (10). In the twentieth century, this “competence” 
manifested in the development of increasingly sophisticated scholarly 
discourses of interpretation and appreciation, designed to turn the 
critical enterprise of value recognition into a “progressive” discipline. 
Like the classical axiological arguments from which literary critics 
drew inspiration, New Criticism aimed to establish methods or 
conditions under which cultural evaluation could free itself from 
charges of subjectivism. The methodology of “close reading” was one 
way that criticism sought to do this, ostensibly enabling the value of 
canonical works to be “revealed” as scientifically as possible (scientific 
analysis being another supposed bastion of the value-free). Although 
values (of the benign, humanistic stripe, as Smith notes) were often said 
to be transmitted over the course of a humanities education, the value of 
the “materials of criticism” was the given on which the entire process 
was founded. 
 
While canonical culture is only one part of what is usually meant by 
“high culture,” the vociferousness of debate over the canon (a sense of 
which is implicit in the term “culture wars”) makes it an obvious place 
to begin an analysis of the problematisation of high/low categories in 
the twentieth century. The culture wars saw the “universal value” of 
what had been hitherto institutionally sanctioned come under attack; 
what could once be described unproblematically as a collective high-
watermark of “Western civilisation” was vilified on the basis of what it 
excluded. Literature departments had to respond to vehement demands 
that the canon be “opened” to include works by women, gays, ethnic 
minorities – not to mention cultural products whose value was thought 
to be compromised by their associations with mass or popular culture. 
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While John Guillory’s Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary 
Canon Formation dismisses the logic of many arguments mounted in 
favour of canon revision,7 his belief that the critique of the canon 
“amounts to a terminal crisis, more than sufficient evidence of the 
urgent need to reconceptualize the object of literary study” (Guillory 
265) still resonates strongly within a discipline whose founding 
assumptions have been decisively undermined.   
 
As described here, however, canon revision does not mount a direct 
challenge to the underlying logic of a high culture/low culture divide. 
For the idea of culture and value being embodied in a representative 
assortment of texts and practices is common to both the defenders of 
the canon and those who advocate its reformation (this observation 
forms the basis of Guillory’s dismissal of the “pluralist tradition” of 
canon critique). A more significant critique of the structure of these 
categories comes from a reconsideration of first principles, and a 
displacement of interest from “high” and “low” culture as discrete 
(though contested) groupings of texts, to discourses and practices of 
value. This move involves an integration of the two definitions of 
culture broached above – a willingness to submit socially exalted texts 
and behaviours to critique from a perspective that is indifferent to the 
maintenance of a privileged, “universally representative” domain of 
cultural value. 
 
                                                 
7
 Guillory’s main objection to these arguments is that they are premised on a flawed 
understanding of what canonical texts (or indeed any texts) “represent”. The 
perception that the canon represents “Western culture” or white middle-class 
hegemony is a misreading produced by the way certain texts have been 
institutionalised and taught, rather than anything inherent in the texts themselves. 
Revising the canon by including works by minority writers involves accepting the 
wrongheaded idea that texts are transparently representative of social groups or class 
experiences. Furthermore, the pluralist argument relies on a paradoxical assertion that 
the newly elevated texts will be of equal value to the existing canonical works, while 
at the same time wanting to view those texts as oppositional to or disruptive of the 
values transmitted by the canon. See Cultural Capital, Chapter 1. 
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Of foundational importance in this regard is the work of French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, whose understanding of the high/low 
divide stems from a reassessment of cultural evaluation itself. 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste forcefully 
argues against the Kantian ideal of aesthetic judgment as disinterested 
and autonomous. Instead, Bourdieu suggests, “aesthetic value,” 
traditional touchstone of defenders of a strict high/low divide, can be 
shown to obey a very interested social logic. 
 
In a move that prefigures the rise of cultural relativism in the 
humanities, Bourdieu sees institutionally legitimated modes of 
regarding cultural products (the “aesthetic disposition”) as “the area par 
excellence of the denial of the social” (11), and exposes this denial as 
“fully bound up with the struggle for social power” (Frow 28). While 
aware that the grounds on which different people manifest a preference 
for different cultural products usually remain implicit,8 Bourdieu and 
his collaborators, unfazed, seek to explain how, in John Frow’s words, 
“differences in cultural preference become socially functional” (Frow 
29). In a phrase reminiscent of that with which I stated the rift between 
cultural and literary studies, Bourdieu declares that the social operation 
of the “aesthetic disposition,” which is virtually synonymous in 
Distinction with “the Kantian aesthetic” (5), cannot be understood 
“unless “culture”, in the restricted, normative sense of ordinary usage, 
is reinserted into “culture” in the broad, anthropological sense and the 
elaborated taste for the most refined objects is brought back into 
relation with the elementary taste for the flavours of food” (1). The taste 
for “high art,” limited (as Bourdieu’s surveys demonstrate it to be) to 
                                                 
8
 This is one way in which Bourdieu’s argument might be questioned: his construction 
of how people respond to art works or cultural products is dependent on their making 
explicit something that is incredibly difficult to articulate. Indeed, John Frow takes the 
common strategy in cultural studies of divining “popular” reading strategies from the 
administration of survey material as one of the key problems afflicting theoretical 
accounts of “the popular”. See especially his comments on Michel de Certeau’s work, 
at 53-59.  
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those possessed of the discourses that make such cultural products 
meaningful, is demystified by Bourdieu as being “inseparable from a 
specific cultural competence” (4): a learnt behaviour that functions in 
effect as a marker of (actual or aspired to) social status. The sting in 
Bourdieu’s argument is that, because these learnt preferences manifest 
as “natural,” taste for cultural products also comes to be seen as 
justifying social inequality. Smith summarises Bourdieu thus: “the 
tastes of the dominant for those objects and practices are interpreted as 
evidence of their own natural superiority and cultural enlightenment 
and thus also their right to social and cultural power … [T]his doubly 
legitimating interpretation is accepted and reproduced not only by those 
who benefit most directly from it but by everyone, including those 
whose subordination it implicitly justifies” (Smith 76). 
 
What, then, are the hallmarks of “legitimate culture”? To begin 
answering this question, Bourdieu’s work usefully lays bare the 
(intuitively obvious) fact that not all sectors of society consume the full 
spectrum of publicly accessible cultural products, and offers a 
sociological explanation for this disparity. For example, although in 
theory every sector of French society could access public art galleries, 
Bourdieu’s surveys showed that galleries’ attendees were in fact largely 
made up of the monied and educated elite. Here we encounter the 
phrase “value for” for the first time. In Bourdieu’s schema it is used to 
explain this disparity in cultural consumption: he attributes to the 
artworks galleries display a demarcative function. Because such works, 
Bourdieu argues, demand to be interpreted in formal rather than 
functional terms, the experience of these works as valuable is available 
only for those who are schooled in the appropriate interpretive methods 
(or cultural history):  
 
A work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses 
the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded. The 
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conscious or unconscious implementation of explicit or implicit 
schemes of perception and appreciation which constitutes pictorial or 
musical culture is the hidden condition for recognizing the styles 
characteristic of a period, a school or an author, and, more generally, 
for the familiarity with the internal logic of works that aesthetic 
enjoyment presupposes. (2) 
 
Thus, “the ‘naïve’ spectator cannot attain a specific grasp of works of 
art which only have meaning or value—in relation to the specific 
history of an artistic tradition” (4). Such a spectator, typically “working 
class” according to Bourdieu’s interpretation of his own survey 
material, responds to artworks instead by making use of mere 
“everyday perception”; he or she is incapable of interpreting the 
artwork adequately (in such a way that will demonstrate, or generate, 
social distinction, a form of symbolic capital). Confronted with 
“legitimate” works, the working class audience experiences not value, 
but exclusion. The preferences of a “popular cultural” public reflect this 
lack: in the case of the novel, the “popular aesthetic” Bourdieu posits 
“refuses any sort of formal experimentation and all the effects which, 
by introducing a distance from the accepted conventions (as regards 
scenery, plot etc.), tend to distance the spectator, preventing him from 
getting involved and fully identifying with the characters” (4). The 
“aesthetic disposition” is thus synonymous with an awareness of formal 
conventions, which is what allows an object to be interpreted and 
valued as autotelic (“form rather than function” (3)); the “popular 
aesthetic,” conversely, adopts evaluative criteria that are innocent of 
such learnt codes.  
 
Ultimately, for Bourdieu, the aesthetic disposition is reducible to an 
expression of freedom from economic necessity, a symbolic 
confirmation of socio-economic status. Whatever pleasure is 
experienced on the part of the “legitimate” interpreter of “legitimate” 
culture is in the end inseparable from the pleasure that accrues in 
feeling socially distinguished. And, while the display of 
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“disinterestedness” thought by Bourdieu to generate or affirm cultural 
capital is most easily relatable to the interpretation and evaluation of 
artworks—forms of cultural expression that exist, supposedly, “for their 
own sake”—it can also manifest in the interpretation of any cultural 
product (even food) as “form rather than function”:  
 
[N]othing is more distinctive, more distinguished, than the capacity to 
confer aesthetic status on objects that are banal or even ‘common’ 
(because the ‘common’ people make them their own, especially for 
aesthetic purposes), or the ability to apply the principles of a ‘pure’ 
aesthetic to the most everyday choices of everyday life, e.g., in cooking, 
clothing or decoration, completely reversing the popular disposition 
which annexes aesthetics to ethics. (5) 
 
The “aesthetic disposition” thus equates to a generalised “capacity for 
sublimation” (6), which can be exhibited solely by consumers from the 
higher social classes, by virtue of their having acquired institutionally 
legitimised discourses of evaluation and appreciation. Indeed, this final 
point makes it clear that the key to Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural 
hierarchies is discourses (rather than cultural products in themselves), 
the uneven distribution of which predisposes cultural tastes to function 
in this classificatory way.  
 
That Bourdieu’s study is framed as a direct rejoinder to Kant makes the 
post-axiological thrust of his study especially clear. The interest 
traditional axiology had in defining conditions under which people’s 
particular, socially differentiated values could be factored out of 
evaluative theory is turned completely on its head. But Bourdieu’s 
argument is polemical in its attack on the “high aesthetic” disposition to 
an extent that, from a contemporary perspective, causes argumentative 
problems. Not least of these is that, by positioning “high art” solely as 
the domain in which the culturally powerful express their status, 
Bourdieu seems to disenable any possibility of such art performing a 
socially important role of critique and opposition—of it functioning, in 
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fact, to undermine the legitimacy of the “legitimate” classes. John Frow 
sees this as one instance of a more pervasive problem in Bourdieu’s 
argument: an essentialised understanding of what can count as a “high” 
or “popular” aesthetic. Most fundamentally, by portraying a legitimate 
aesthetic as one which involves a high degree of attention to “form,” 
and a popular aesthetic limited to ‘content’ and use value, Bourdieu’s 
argument relies on a form/content binary that critical theory has long 
found problematic (for one cannot be considered independent of the 
other).9 Moreover, Frow notes, by couching his definition of the 
“popular aesthetic” in negative terms (even while he proceeds as one of 
its most enthusiastic defenders), Bourdieu risks positing a cultural 
domain devoid of formal experimentation, and of intertextual rather 
than traditional mimetic practices of representation.10 Recent critical 
attention to texts traditionally referred to as “popular culture” stresses 
that this is plainly not the case. Although Bourdieu’s analysis is firmly 
post-axiological in intent, attributing both high and low cultural 
preferences to a social logic of group demarcation, there also seems to 
be an asymmetry in Bourdieu’s explanation of high and popular cultural 
pleasures: only “legitimate” tastes are discursively mediated (hence 
their apparently “artificial” character).11  
                                                 
9
 John Guillory has also drawn attention to the inadequacy of the form/content binary 
Bourdieu employs; he uses this observation, however, to defend the possibility of 
aesthetic pleasure as a category, independent of the play of social distinction: see 
Cultural Capital pp 325-336.  
10
 For Frow’s critique of Bourdieu, see Cultural Studies and Cultural Value, pp 27-47. 
11
 Frow also stresses that, for Bourdieu, only “legitimate” tastes are seen as “fully 
relational” (based on choice rather than limitation), which seems to equate the 
“popular aesthetic” with cultural disadvantage (this, Frow notes, only necessarily 
holds true from a self-privileging high cultural perspective). Barbara Herrnstein Smith 
alludes to the asymmetry noted by Frow, but is seemingly less troubled by the 
essentialised understanding of “high” and “popular” culture that it points to. Smith 
argues (in an endnote) that “[a]lthough he is not altogether evenhanded in the tone of 
his analyses, describing working-class practices rather sympathetically and reserving 
his most elaborate satire for the self-privileging grand bourgeois, hapless petit 
bourgeois, and ‘mis-recognitions’ of intellectuals and academics, Bourdieu neither 
privileges nor pathologizes any practices theoretically and accounts for all cultural 






Thus, while the institutional uptake of this sort of sociology of taste 
may have contributed to the rise of self-critique among cultural 
intellectuals (especially a sensitivity to the ideological effects of 
promulgating high cultural tastes), it does not on its own explain the 
recent trend in critical theory to refuse the descriptive validity of 
high/low categories themselves. A theoretically robust basis for this 
refusal has, however, been developed within the confines of the literary 
academy, as a consequence of extending post-structuralist thought on 
interpretation to evaluation. Such developments can be thought of as an 
extension of Bourdieu’s emphasis on discourse in structuring the 
interpretation and evaluation of cultural forms; Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith’s 1987 study Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives 
for Critical Theory remains the clearest statement of this understanding 
of evaluative behaviour.  
 
Smith’s stated aim in Contingencies of Value is to “outline an 
alternative conception of literary evaluation, one that is in accord with 
the view of literary value as variable and contingent but that also 
recognizes the considerable social force and significant social functions 
of all forms of evaluative behaviour” (13). While Smith discards the 
possibility of inherent value, her emphasis on evaluation as a 
necessarily social activity means that the relativist stance on questions 
of cultural value that she develops is not the same as a subjectivist one, 
which would equate to stating that “value is in the eye of the beholder.” 
(Such an argument would be irreconcilable with the many sociological 
accounts of cultural taste, notably that of Bourdieu.) Far from being 
another example of Bourdieu’s vilified “denial of the social,” then, 
Smith’s account of the phenomenon of shared value judgements, 
seeming “constancies of value” that might seem indicative of the 
inherent value of certain texts, depends on allowing that, despite 
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evaluation being a radically contingent practice, these contingencies 
will tend to coincide in ways that have a limited, but no less real, 
predictability. Thus, in her study Smith typically speaks of value for 
particular consumers or communities of consumers. The attribution of 
cultural value to an art object (and here Smith is writing primarily about 
literary art, taking the example of Shakespeare’s sonnets) is never a fait 
accompli of a work’s inherent properties; value must instead be thought 
of as a result of the complex interplay between variables: 
 
in accord with the changing interests and other values of a community, 
various potential meanings of a work will become more or less visible 
(or "realizable"), and the visibility––and hence value––of the work for 
that community will change accordingly. The problem here can be seen 
as the interlooping of two circles, the hermeneutic and the evaluative. 
Our interpretation of a work and our experience of its value are 
mutually dependent, and each depends upon what might be called the 
psychological "set" of our encounter with it: not the "setting" of the 
work or, in the narrow sense, its context, but rather the nature and 
potency of our own assumptions, expectations, capacities, and interests 
with respect to it––our "prejudices" if you like, but hardly to be 
distinguished from our identity (of who, in fact, we are) at the time of 
the encounter. Moreover, all three––the interpretation, the evaluation, 
and the "set"––operate and interact in the same fashion as the 
hermeneutic circle itself: that is, simultaneously causing and validating 
themselves and causing and validating each other. While these circles 
are no doubt logically vicious or at least epistemologically 
compromising, they are also, I believe, both psychologically inevitable 
and experientially benign. (10-11) 
 
Cultural value, then, (and for Smith the example par excellence is the 
idea of “literary value”) “is not the property of an object or of a subject 
but, rather, the product of the dynamics of a system” (15). More 
specifically, Smith understands cultural value to obey an economic 
logic: to speak of a cultural object’s value is to impose a moment of 
arrest upon a system that is in constant flux; norms of cultural practice 
change drastically over time, as can individuals’ prejudices.12 The 
system becomes still more complicated when it is remembered that 
                                                 
12
 Although as I have mentioned, Smith is careful to avoid the reductive position that 
finds value to be entirely the product of an individual’s capricious whims.   
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each of the inputs to this system (the “interpretation” and the auditor’s 
“identity”) are equally, and simultaneously, outputs: an individual’s 
interpretation of a cultural product is both what leads to an ascription of 
value and an effect of that ascription. Texts can thus be thought of as 
both totemic markers of distinction (an individual’s appreciation of 
certain texts does function as a marker of their social status), and as 
actively shaping both the apparent hierarchy of cultural products that 
they are received into (in the process of being read, interpreted and 
valued) and the very identity of the auditor. This idea of a “feedback 
loop” also helps explain why what can count as “literary” writing (for 
example), as defined by those in positions of cultural authority, may 
change over time. 
 
The economic model Smith proposes has many theoretical advantages. 
It can account convincingly for the apparent stability of a text’s value 
between auditors, over time and across cultures (Homer being one 
traditional example, in axiological arguments, of timeless value) by 
pointing to institutional processes whereby a work’s value is 
reproduced and sustained; a text’s “revaluation” may be explained, on 
the same economic logic, as contingent upon the emergence or 
disappearance of institutional values to which the text in question may 
be configured as responsive or unresponsive. Scaled down, the 
economic model provides a compelling account of individual cultural 
preferences: for Smith, “our experience of ‘the value of the work’ is 
equivalent to our experience of the work in relation to the total 
economy of our existence” (16). Because individual 
identities/economies are not uniformly shaped by institutions or 
collective social identities, cultural preferences are not solely 
attributable to class position, as Bourdieu’s analysis seems to imply. 
Smith points instead to the many possible versions of utility or 
advantage that have traditionally been masked by the operation of 
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aesthetic discourse (from “hedonic, practical, sentimental, ornamental” 
(33) interests, to the possibility that a general tendency to find pleasure 
in cognitively challenging tasks could be explained as a “by-product of 
our evolutionary development” (34)), concluding that the “essential 
value” of an artwork “consists in everything from which it is usually 
distinguished” (33). 
 
For Smith, then, the move from “value of” to “value for” is not a meek 
refusal to engage in evaluative debate; relativism is instead stripped of 
its pejorative sense (in traditional axiological arguments: “anything 
goes”) and comes to be understood as the only plausible explanation of 
evaluative behaviour per se.  
 
A little further explanation is needed of the interaction between cultural 
products and readers/consumers in Smith’s model. The best way to 
explain this is, once again, to give a sense of that which post-axiology 
aims to move beyond. Even if a doctrinaire New Critic would have 
conceded that cultural value is relative in the sense that “not everyone 
values literature as I do,” this would typically be put down to a failing 
on the part of other interpreters of the artwork—the idea that not 
everyone is possessed of the sensibility or the reading required to 
distinguish valuable art from dross. In this conception, the features of 
the artwork that are presumably generative of value (verbal complexity; 
the integrity and consonance of meaning and form) were assumed to 
remain constant, innate, awaiting learned explication. (This is also 
implicit, to some extent, in Bourdieu’s discussion of a high cultural 
public’s capacity to discuss a work’s inherent formal properties.) The 
“parable of Shakespeare’s sonnets” with which Smith opens her study 
exposes gaping holes in such an argument. If literary scholarship is to 
be thought of as the identification of various “traits” common to great 
works of literature, how can one account for the “extraordinarily 
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variable” reputation of the sonnets over the 400 years since they were 
published? The answer for Smith does not lie simply in the 
development of taste (and especially not in a progression towards the 
evaluative rigour of New Criticism and related endeavours), but in the 
intricate relationship of value to meaning. That Romantic critics, for 
instance, condemned the sonnets—now firmly entrenched in the literary 
canon as instantiations of high art—for their “labored perplexities and 
studied deformities,” or for being written in a verse form “incompatible 
with the English language” (4), indicates for Smith not only a change in 
tastes, but, more significantly, that the identification of the formal 
properties of a work, usually assumed to remain constant (an inert 
element of the written artefact), is itself historically variable. “The texts 
were the same,” Smith concedes, “but it seems clear that, in some 
sense, the poems weren’t” (4). Any effort to attribute value to stable 
features of prized works comes to look suspect: 
 
The attempt to locate invariance in the nature (or, latterly, the structure) 
of the works themselves is, I believe, no less misguided than the search 
for essential or objective value—and is, in fact, only another form of 
that search, though often presented in contradistinction to it as a matter 
for “empirical” or “inductive” investigation. It is misguided, however, 
not only because different features or properties will be valued 
differently by different audiences, and so on, but, more significantly, 
because the very perception of those presumed properties will itself 
vary. (15) 
 
This move, from thinking of intrinsic structures to viewer-specific 
structuration, is the key post-structuralist element in Smith’s thinking. 
Here cultural evaluation is categorically a discursive process, not in the 
mere sense that evaluations are typically worked out and expressed in 
language, but in the sense that this process in itself determines the 
perception (and hence value) of the work in question. This is the classic 
deconstruction of the traditional binary of production (what’s in the 
text) and reception (the active interpretive work done by readers). 
Throughout her work, Smith embraces a principle of undecidability: no 
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cultural product has a singular, essential meaning independent of 
subjective (or intersubjective) configuration; nor is there any way to 
delimit the possible interests or uses to which an artefact may be 
configured as responsive. Importantly, it is this line of thinking—a 
refusal of the possibility of treating cultural evaluation as anything 
other than a complex effect of discourse—that ought finally to allow us 
to move decisively away from thinking of high and low culture as 
coherent cultural domains. 
 
There is a need here to square this mode of self-critical, unapologetic 
relativism with the language of “cultural domains” – with attempts, that 
is, to think nebulous terms like “high culture,” “low culture,” “mass 
culture” and “popular culture” into graspable concept-hood. The 
“domain” metaphor is particularly important, suggesting bounded, 
definite structures that exist prior to, and independently of, evaluation. 
(We have moved, then, from the question of literary texts possessing 
intrinsic structure, to considering the status of “structures” discerned by 
cultural academics in what John Frow calls “the social organisation of 
culture.”) The emphasis so far on evaluative communities helps to gives 
real-world substance to this metaphor; a “domain” or “structure” here 
might refer to a recognisably distinct set of collectively held values and 
ways of reading, which influence the production and circumscribe the 
reception of certain cultural forms. As such, the metaphor is most 
precise when the communal boundaries in question can be very 
precisely defined (as might be the case for localised customs in feudal 
societies, for example). Turning to the example of contemporary 
“popular culture,” then, it will be readily apparent that the “domain” 
metaphor is stretched to the point of breaking: can a phenomenon 
whose audience, by any contemporary definition, cuts across classes, 
regions, demographics and nations, and which can, in common 
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parlance, encompass everything from The Simpsons to Andrew Lloyd 
Weber musicals, be theorised as any sort of unity?  
 
John Frow’s 1995 study Cultural Studies and Cultural Value analyses a 
wide range of attempts to do this, before answering in the negative. The 
central complication for all such attempts derives from the conditions 
under which popular cultural texts have been produced and consumed 
since the development of mass media “culture industries”. Under these 
conditions, the texts that are widely designated “popular culture” do not 
simply emanate from “the people,” but are produced and distributed by 
corporate media, which have an interest in ensuring the circulation of 
both commodities and ideologies. This model of cultural alienation lies 
behind some of modernism’s most vehement denunciations of popular 
culture: Andreas Huyssen observes that for Theodor Adorno, “The 
manipulative praxis of this culture industry—Adorno thought mainly of 
record, film, and radio production—subordinates all spiritual and 
intellectual creation to the profit motive” (Huyssen 144). However, the 
model of top-down manipulation can be easily reversed, or at least 
mitigated, by reasserting the audience’s agency—their active role in 
determining the meaning or value of a given text, structured in 
opposition to its intentional meaning. This has been the approach taken 
by many affirmative definitions of popular culture, most obviously 
those developed by practitioners of cultural studies. Here the focus 
shifts from texts in themselves to the uses those texts are put to, 
emphasising the (paradoxically) productive work of consumers.  
 
It is apparent that both of these positions claim to have hit upon the 
essence of “popular cultural” experience. Frow, however, consistently 
refuses this either/or scenario: 
 
There is no simple way (apart from straightforward reductionism) of 
squaring a methodological concentration on the productive working of 
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texts with a methodological concentration on the productive work of the 
system. They are not complementary, and the effect of this tension is a 
kind of necessary indeterminacy principle. Both positions are ‘correct’, 
but there is no way of reconciling them in a single perspective. (70) 
 
In line with Smith, Frow favours a far more complex understanding of 
textual evaluation, whereby text and audience each have the capacity to 
influence (even “reconfigure”) the other.13 Indeed, in the case of 
“popular culture,” where the “audience” I have spoken of is necessarily 
an expansive category (“the people” not being necessarily limited by 
specific location, demographic or class), one function of texts so 
targeted is to appeal to, and thus construct, that audience as a “popular” 
totality.  
 
This point, that “‘the people’ are constructed in being spoken for” (85), 
becomes a familiar refrain throughout Frow’s analysis of “the popular” 
as a category. Of more direct significance for Frow’s argument than the 
construction of “the people” by the popular media are the definitional 
efforts on the part of cultural intellectuals, which must inevitably, 
according to Frow, involve a “politically fraught” substitution of voices. 
Because “the popular” is never more than a discursive representation, 
formed from a particular, interested, social position, the problem of the 
“representation of a theoretical object” (60) is inseparable from the 
problem of “speaking, or claiming to speak, on behalf of someone else” 
(60). (Specifying the exact nature of the social position from which 
cultural intellectuals speak is thus one of Frow’s major theoretical 
interests in this book.) However sympathetic one might be to political 
arguments positing a “popular” cultural domain in necessary 
antagonism to an official or hegemonic culture (Bourdieu’s argument 
can be considered as one version of this sort of thinking), Frow 
considers all such arguments—as made by both conservative and leftist 
critics—to be vulnerable to the same criticism: however inclusively 
                                                 
13
 See especially Frow’s analysis of John Fiske’s arguments, pp 60-64. 
  
Cooke 33
described, positing a single structural opposition between two blocs 
functions to homogenise the actual diffusion of both cultural values 
and, indeed, entire economies of value, in contemporary, de-stratified14 
societies. “The untenable core of the concept of the popular (or of the 
“mass”-cultural),” Frow writes, “is its structural opposition to high 
culture: a binarism which at once unifies and differentiates each 
domain. The category of popular culture has a unitary form, however, 
only as long as it is derived from a singular entity, “the people”; 
otherwise it breaks down into a bundle of very heterogeneous forms and 
practices” (81-82). 
 
Frow’s eventual refusal of both “high” and “popular” culture (and their 
variant terms) as descriptively valid categories stems from an 
understanding of cultural domains as contingent rather than “real” 
structures, and from a disinclination to derive from his own competence 
in both “popular” and “high” cultural discourses an objective authority 
to describe “the social organisation of culture.” It is, for Frow, “no 
longer either possible or useful to understand cultural production in 
terms of a general economy of value, and thus … we can no longer 
imagine ourselves into a vantage point from which conflicting 
judgements of value could be reconciled” (131). The only given of 
cultural analysis is its contingency; the interpretation and evaluation of 
cultural oppositions depends entirely on one’s own position in relation 
to that “culture” (or indeed, “those ‘cultures’”). Frow thus sets himself 
the task of imagining “the dispersal of cultural authority” (22), 
recognising the possibility that, for many contemporary cultural 
                                                 
14
 “Whereas in highly stratified societies culture is closely tied to class structure, in 
most advanced capitalist societies the cultural system is no longer organized in a strict 
hierarchy and is no longer in the same manner tense with the play of power” (85). 
Although Frow frequently notes de-stratification of this type in describing 
“postmodern relations of cultural value,” it is important to stress that his refusal of 
high/low categories stems more from a theoretical refusal of objective evaluation than 
from the emergence of contemporary social structures.   
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consumers and producers, high cultural practices, including the cultural 
analyses of academics, will carry no prestige or authority whatsoever.  
 
In light of all this, what status can the terms “high” and “popular” 
culture now retain? It should be noted here that the arguments wielded 
by Frow and Smith are particularly salutary in stressing what does not 
follow from a relativist account of cultural value. Smith’s dismissal of 
the argument equating cultural relativism with the necessary demise of 
evaluative distinctions (she dubs this the “egalitarian fallacy”) is 
perhaps the most important of these provisos, and it is a version of this 
dismissal that allows Frow to recognise the continuing force exerted by 
the terms “high culture” and “popular culture,” both for cultural 
intellectuals and for cultural consumers at large, even as he dismisses 
the “expressive unity” (84) of the concepts. “[T]he category of value 
does not disappear with the collapse of a general economy” (131), Frow 
writes, but 
 
it continues to organize every local domain of the aesthetic and every 
aspect of daily life, from the ritualized discussions of movies or books 
or TV programmes through which relations of sociability are 
maintained, to the fine discriminations of taste in clothing or food or 
idiom that are made by every social class and every status subculture … 
There is no escape from the discourse of value, and no escape from the 
pressure and indeed the obligation to treat the world as though it were 
fully relational, fully interconnected. (131) 
 
While high/low terms are removed of their normative status as coherent 
“levels,” their continuing currency indicates, for Frow, that they are still 
widely retained, in a variety of settings and by a variety of publics, as 
discursive tools with which to organise (or map) relations of cultural 
value. Any of these high/low maps / evaluative hierarchies might 
purport to be all embracing; but there can be no reason to accept any 




Frow suggests the concept of regimes of value, a further involution of 
the (already complex) relationship between discourse and evaluation, as 
a way of acknowledging the continued importance of high/low 
categories, while resisting the “domain” metaphor’s simple grounding 
of “economies of value” within definite, bounded groups. “Regimes of 
value” are “semiotic institution[s] generating evaluative regularities 
under certain conditions of use, and in which particular empirical 
audiences or communities may be more or less fully imbricated” (144). 
There is no necessary imbrication, however; “high” and “popular” 
regimes (Frow retains the nomenclature),15 for instance, have “no 
directly expressive relation to social groups” (145), but are sustained 
and distributed by higher education institutions and the mass media, 
respectively.  
 
One consequence of this, for Frow, is that there is nothing surprising 
nor necessarily duplicitous in the “high” cultural academic’s move 
(common in cultural studies) to position themselves as fans of the 
popular cultural text they are analysing (a member of a “popular 
cultural” public); this merely highlights that “apparently identical texts 
and readers will function quite differently within different regimes” 
(145). This is not to suggest, however, that contemporary critics, by 
immersing themselves in cultural products and evaluative discourses 
that were not traditionally the provenance of universities, thereby free 
themselves of the problems associated with their institutional position.16  
                                                 
15
 “This is not to revert to a use of these categories as substantive or internally 
coherent categories; it is merely to accept the fact that the concepts of a ‘high’ and a 
‘popular’ regime continue to organize the cultural field and to produce ideological 
effects of cultural distinction” (Frow 150). 
16
 Frow emphasises this point by strenuously resisting any temptation to forget the 
imaginary status of “popular” and “high” culture, urging his readership (of cultural 
intellectuals) to accept 
 
the impossibility either of espousing, in any simple way, the norms of high 
culture, in so far as this represents that exercise of distinction which works to 




“[T]he distinction between culture and high culture is the product of our 
own culture, and so must itself be partly the expression of our own 
cultural needs, values and anxieties, rather than any kind of ‘value-free’ 
representation of the really existing state of things” (Connor 231). The 
project of post-axiology is to frame cultural analysis with a self-critical 
acknowledgement of the “needs, values and anxieties” or the “regimes 




After the Great Divide 
 
So far I have assembled a selective narrative of the progression, in 
criticism, from the self-privileging acceptance of a necessary high/low 
cultural divide, to its rejection, which I have associated with post-
axiology. One of the dangers of this sort of narrative is that it tends to 
imply universal agreement: a collective shedding, by cultural 
intellectuals, of the axiological logic of their predecessors. That Frow is 
able to highlight the repetition of essentialist modes of thinking among 
practitioners of cultural studies – who, as we have seen, typically state 
their evaluative assumptions in direct opposition to those of traditional 
literary criticism – should immediately qualify this impression. An 
analogy could be made with the emergence of postcolonial criticism, 
which, while drawing impetus from the political process of 
decolonisation, does not imply a definite end to colonialist thought or 
practices of representation. The use of the present tense in the epigraph 
to Frow’s final chapter is all-important: “The privileging of the self 
through the pathologizing of the Other remains the key move and 
                                                                                                                                   
espousing, in any simple way, the norms of “popular” culture to the extent that 
this involves, for the possessors of cultural capital, a fantasy of otherness and a 
politically dubious will to speak on behalf of this imaginary Other. (158-159) 
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defining objective of axiology” (Smith 38, qtd Frow 131, emphasis 
added). 
 
Similar dangers lurk in the deployment of another narrative of the 
gradual muddying of high/low categories – this time one based on 
developments in representational art. By this I am referring to the 
critical narrative placing Ulysses (1922) and Infinite Jest (1996) within 
distinct literary periods (modernism and postmodernism, respectively) 
and making claims, either from this categorisation or in support of it, 
about the ways in which each work represents (or enacts) the 
relationship between high culture and popular culture. R. B. Kershner, 
one of Joyce’s critics whose work I shall discuss in the next chapter, 
puts the problem this way: 
 
To say modernist art rejects popular culture while postmodernist art 
embraces it is, of course, to offer a reductive simplification of which 
few critics would be guilty. Nevertheless, much recent critical writing 
does suggest this kind of reductiveness; “high” modernism is thus 
politically demonized, made the whipping boy for a postmodernism 
newly conceived as somehow populist. (Joyce and Popular Culture 
7) 
 
Kershner’s approach to this, as the following chapter explains, is to 
seek to disprove the narrative by counter-example. My own approach, 
further to the preceding section of this chapter, is to consider the 
problems of structuring a narrative in and through categories that, as 
critical theory has long shown, lack all homogeneity. Before explaining 
what I take to be the key risks in working with these terms, it is 
important to give a somewhat less reductive account of the narrative 
that Kershner alludes to. 
 
Andreas Huyssen’s 1986 study After the Great Divide: Modernism, 
Mass Culture, Postmodernism is one distinguished example of a line of 
critical works that place great stress on understanding the evolving 
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relationship between high culture and mass culture as a way to give 
substance and meaning to the ubiquitous literary-critical categories, 
modernism and postmodernism. Indeed, as the title of his book 
suggests, Huyssen sees the Great Divide17 between high art and mass 
culture, posited and rigorously patrolled by the flag-bearers of 
modernism, as the feature of modernist artistic self-definition; the 
decline of this sense of absolute division is “more important for a 
theoretical and historical understanding of modernism and its aftermath 
than the alleged historical break which, in the eyes of so many critics, 
separates postmodernism from modernism” (viii). Whereas literary 
historians traditionally privileged modernism’s rejection of “the 
traditions of romantic idealism and of enlightenment realism and 
representation,” Huyssen maintains that mass culture was modernism’s 
more significant Other. “Mass culture has always been the hidden 
subtext of the modernist project” (47), a project which “constituted 
itself through a conscious strategy of exclusion, an anxiety of 
contamination by its other: an increasingly consuming and engulfing 
mass culture” (vii).  
 
Huyssen does not have to look hard to find evidence of modernist 
critics’ and artists’ hostile construction of mass culture. In his schema, 
Theodor Adorno becomes the leading theorist of modernism, standing 
for the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, whose views on “mass 
culture” are notorious (a notoriety aided by the fact that their complex 
ideas on the subject of mass culture are often reduced to simple 
hostility). For Adorno, high art could be described as the antithesis of 
mass culture, and the difference could be elaborated as that between the 
authentic and the inauthentic:  
                                                 
17
 Huyssen capitalises this phrase throughout his study, using it to designate any 
cultural discourse that aims to establish an absolute and necessary distinction between 
valid art and mass cultural practice. He commonly refers to the “discourse of the Great 




The authentic cultural object must retain and preserve whatever goes by 
the wayside in that process of increasing domination over nature which 
is reflected by expanding rationality and ever more rational forms of 
domination. Culture is the perennial protestation of the particular 
against the general, as long as the latter remains irreconcilable with the 
particular. (“The Culture Industry Reconsidered,” New German 
Critique, 6 (Fall 1975), p 6 quoted in Brantlinger 227)  
 
As Richard Brantlinger explains, “‘Particularity’ here denotes the 
opposite of ‘mass-ness,’ or of those processes of social rationalization 
which produce mass culture” (Brantlinger 227). Although the 
enlightenment of the “masses” was, for Adorno, the only hope in 
bringing about widespread political and cultural enlightenment, he and 
other Frankfurt theorists were pessimistic as to the possibility of this 
actually occurring, or of the proletariat coming to have revolutionary 
agency. (Walter Benjamin stands as the most prominent exception to 
this rule, especially in his sanguine essay “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction.”) Instead of this, mass culture or the 
“culture industry” seemed to Adorno to promise only continued top-
down domination of the many by the few. The pessimistic strain of 
Frankfurt School thought adopted an essentialist view of mass culture 
as a phenomenon geared to perpetuating fascistic cultural homogeneity, 
and disabling the possibility of popular resistance. 
 
Writing from a self-consciously postmodern vantage, Huyssen is aware, 
of course, that this other (“mass culture”), if thought of as an enclosed, 
devalued cultural domain, was an historical invention, attaining its 
specious totality only through the exclusionary judgments of high 
cultural practitioners.18 As John Carey puts this point, constructing as 
other a nebulous “mass” (and “their” culture) was effectively to deploy 
“a metaphor for the unknowable and invisible” (20); the construction of 
                                                 
18
 This point is belaboured by John Carey in the introduction to his study The 
Intellectuals and the Masses, which covers similar ground to Huyssen’s work in a 
more sensationalised tone. See especially page 20 and following. 
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a rigid high culture/low culture distinction, and modernism’s gendering 
of one side of this divide as feminine, tells us more about the prejudices 
of leading modernist artists than any real Great Divide in cultural 
production.19  Although comparisons of individual works of “high” and 
“mass” culture, by readers then and now, may suggest a great disparity 
in something akin to (subjectively assessed) literary quality, Huyssen 
sees that the idea of an objective Great Divide, an absolute distinction, 
manifest in cultural objects, between commodity and non-commodity 
art (as suggested by modernist theorists) is unsupportable. The strata of 
“disinterested” art vaunted by Adorno and others, one entirely removed 
from the workings of commodification, never existed. Huyssen 
ingeniously (and somewhat subversively) reads from Adorno’s early 
analysis of Richard Wagner the corrective principle, that “In the vortex 
of commodification there was never an outside” (42).  
 
Adorno is well known for his critique of the “culture industry”—the 
mass-produced and -consumed cultural products he saw, in 
contradistinction to formally ambitious, non-representational art forms, 
as being reducible to a vehicle for ideology (as Huyssen stresses, 
“culture industry” was, for Adorno, synonymous with fascism). But 
when in an early essay Adorno criticises Wagner—whose lengthy 
operas hardly originated, prima facie, as works of commodity art—for 
yielding to the demands of the marketplace (by concealing any trace of 
the means of the work’s production; or for his use of the leitmotiv, from 
which, he speculates, Hollywood’s simplistic formula of one-musical-
refrain-per-character would eventually evolve), it becomes clear to 
Huyssen that Wagner, self-styled high art practitioner, is being 
subjected to the same “culture industry” mode of critique. Adorno 
himself shows that “high” art’s separation from commodity art is 
always already compromised; it is permeated by the same (mass) 
                                                 
19
 See Huyssen’s chapter “Mass Culture as Woman,” pp. 44-62, especially 47. 
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cultural logic it seeks to distance itself from. Wagner’s music could be 
co-opted by Hitler’s fascism precisely because elements congruent with 
its populist appeal were latent in Wagner’s work. Adorno thereby 
suggests that “the social processes that give shape to mass culture 
cannot be kept out of art works of the highest ambition” (35).  
 
Thus, via a reading of Adorno “against the grain,” Huyssen questions 
the validity of traditional bases from which divisions of cultural 
production—into disinterested vs mass/commodity culture, or high 
culture vs low culture—have been constructed. He identifies two major 
problems with traditional accounts of modernism: (i) they have tended 
to downplay the importance of mass culture as the defining “other” in 
modernists’ self-definition, emphasising instead the pervasive hostility 
to 19th century high-artistic norms; and (ii), consequent upon (i), such 
accounts have not been capable of allowing the extent to which 
modernist works depend upon, and are infiltrated by, the same cultural 
developments (the development of a mass culture) that they seek to 
distance themselves from. Huyssen’s argument is thus one of many that 
serves to undermine Adorno’s model of cultural production, which 
Steven Connor aptly describes as positing “‘torn halves’ of art and mass 
culture” (Connor 235), by pointing out the ways in which these 
“halves” are co-implicated.  
 
But Huyssen’s is also a periodising argument, intent on constructing a 
schematic understanding of the relationship between modernism and 
postmodernism in art, on the basis of how thoroughly these movements 
posit clear limits between art and mass culture. Huyssen demonstrates 
that the evaluative stance adopted by the likes of Flaubert or Eliot 
toward mass culture is just that: an evaluative stance, saying nothing 
about the objective interrelation of cultural “levels”. By engaging in a 
“discourse of the Great Divide,” modernist artists and critics deployed a 
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defence mechanism against social reality (which reality is nevertheless 
detectable, to the present day critic, in modernist texts’ weighted 
high/low dialectic); this was an evaluative attitude directly 
contradicting the extent to which cultural “spheres” were (the logic is: 
always already) imbricated. In light of this, Huyssen’s characterisation 
of what constitutes “postmodernity” is interesting.  
 
Although Huyssen is wary of venturing a positive definition, 
postmodernism manifests, in his argument, as both a self-adopted 
critical stance, allowing him to retrospectively explode the modernists’ 
self-constructed myth of high-artistic autonomy, and an artistic 
movement similarly opposed to treating high art and mass culture as 
mutually exclusive realms. If modernism is seen as a reaction formation 
to the encroachment of mass culture, then “To a large extent, it is by the 
distance we have traveled from this “great divide” between mass culture 
and modernism that we can measure our own cultural postmodernity” 
(57).  
 
It also seems clear that the uses high art makes of certain forms of mass 
culture (and vice versa) have increasingly blurred the boundaries 
between the two; where modernism’s great wall once kept the 
barbarians out and safeguarded the culture within, there is now only 
slippery ground which may prove fertile for some and treacherous for 
others… At stake in this debate about the postmodern is the great divide 
between modern art and mass culture, which the art movements of the 
1960s intentionally began to dismantle in their practical critique of the 
high modernist canon and which the cultural neo-conservatives are 
trying to re-erect today. One of the few widely agreed upon features of 
postmodernism is its attempt to negotiate forms of high art with certain 
forms and genres of mass culture and the culture of everyday life. (57) 
 
It is difficult to reconcile the two central strands of Huyssen’s 
argument. On one hand, Huyssen’s agitation for the necessity of 
abandoning two-track models of culture clearly draws on relativist 
ideas. On the other hand, the terms Huyssen uses to stake out the “great 
divide”’s demise call into question the distance he has in fact travelled 
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from the arguments of his modernist antecedents. For every metaphor 
Huyssen uses in the excerpt above (and more widely throughout the 
book) tends to reinstate the objective (though waning) reality of a 
meaningful distinction between two discrete, internally coherent 
structures: high art and mass culture. Huyssen’s formulation is 
determinedly anti-conservative, but the question remains: can his 
suggestion that the “great divide between high art and mass culture” 
could be “intentionally dismantled” by a privileged few cultural 
producers (and, implicitly, cultural academics) be aligned with the 
(postmodern) arguments for abandoning the notion that “high” and 
“low”/ “mass” / “popular” culture are or ever were discrete cultural 
structures?      
 
I would suggest that Huyssen’s commitment to the relativist basis for 
declaring “the great divide” to be outmoded is tempered by his 
commitment to the continuance, after modernism, of an authoritative 
mode of cultural criticism that purports, like his Frankfurt School 
forbears, to diagnose and evaluate what is happening in 
European/American culture as a totality. Retaining the terms “mass” 
and “high” culture as points of reference is necessary for such a critic: 
an impossibly expansive object of study (“culture”) is divided into 
manageable pieces, meaningful opposites for the art-consuming public20 
that are, for that public, becoming less oppositional, less mutually 
exclusive. Using these categories, Huyssen is able to offer insightful 
suggestions about what, for a high-culture- educated eye, most clearly 
distinguishes contemporary “progressive” art (especially in its 
relationship with “culture at large”) from its modernist equivalent. 
 
But Huyssen is not inclined to dwell at length on the sorts of 
contingencies italicised in the previous paragraph. Moreover, it is clear, 
                                                 
20
 Barbara Smith might use the phrase “canonical audience”. 
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on the rare occasions when Huyssen’s writing on postmodern cultural 
production becomes prescriptive, that he remains committed to some 
sort of meaningful distinction between “progressive” culture and sheer 
“mass” culture, and to the idea that contemporary artists have a role to 
play in bolstering that distinction. For Huyssen, “Capitalist culture 
industry inevitably produces a minimum of art and a maximum of trash 
and kitsch” (152); and for artists, though the obligation to integrate “art 
into the material life process” (156) persists, being “progressive” still 
necessitates an attempt to avoid “the aesthetization of commodities […] 
which totally subjugate[s] the aesthetic to the interest of capital” (158).  
 
It is not the task of this thesis to argue against Huyssen. It does, 
however, seem useful to point out that it will always be difficult for 
such university-culture-centric narratives as Huyssen’s to fully 
acknowledge the “dispersal of cultural authority” that follows from 
post-axiological accounts of cultural value. Historically real “high”/ 
“low” categories will persist in and through critical discourse that treats 
“high” / “low” terms as meaningful opposites—as an effect of critical 
discourse. It does not follow from an awareness of the “illusory” basis 
of those categories that it might be possible or desirable to find a way of 
doing without them; indeed, my own subject matter, itself “university-
culture-centric,” means that the use of high/low discourse remains, for 
me, to some extent valuable and descriptively necessary (part and 
parcel of the literary discourses I shall focus on). It does follow, though, 
that contemporary deployments of “high”/ “low” discourse (however 
vestigial or problematised) might be subjected to the same sort of 
analysis as is commonly applied to modernist writers (and this can be 
self-conscious, self-implicating)—leading to a consideration of the 















This chapter takes James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) as its central text. 
More accurately, Ulysses is the departure point for the various critical 
arguments I shall discuss, and which are my real focus: attempts to 
position Joyce’s work in relation to high/low cultural categories. A 
narrative account of modernism’s “discourse of the great divide” 
figures prominently in these arguments, most notably in considerations 
of the evaluative attitude to “popular culture” disclosed by Joyce’s 
oeuvre. I do not seek to offer any final resolution to that question; this 
chapter has no interest in “discover[ing] grounds for the justification of 
critical judgments or practices” (Smith 28). 
 
Instead, the following is best considered as an attempt to follow 
Barbara Smith’s suggested “alternative project” for evaluative 
investigation: I aim to “account for the features of literary and aesthetic 
judgments in relation to the multiple social, political, circumstantial, 
and other constraints and conditions to which they are responsive” 
(Smith 28). What distinguishes my project from the numerous 
“metacommentaries” of Joyce criticism21 is its narrow focus on the sort 
of criticism where questions of value—of cultural categories and 
hierarchies—are explicitly raised. Because, as Barbara Smith stresses, 
the literary academy’s core work of interpretative criticism (which 
characterises the vast majority of critical responses to Joyce) has, for 
the greater part of the twentieth century, been premised on the “exile of 
                                                 
21
 I shall refer to Joseph Brooker’s metacommentary throughout this chapter. Justin 
Beplate’s review article “No mistakes: are Joyce’s failings merely failures of 
discovery?” in the Times Literary Supplement considers the rise of the 
“metacommentary” in Joycean criticism. The sheer amount of critical material 
published by the “Joyce industry” means that such metacommentaries have become 
increasingly indispensable for professional critics.  
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evaluation,” a deliberate refusal to engage with “one of the most 
venerable, central, theoretically significant, and pragmatically 
inescapable set of problems relating to literature” (17), my focus is 
practically confined to two moments in which the relationship of 
Ulysses (now institutionally established as “high” cultural) to “culture 
at large” has been called into question. 
 
The first of these moments comes in the book’s early reception, when 
critical readers located within modernism’s self-definition sought to 
establish the work’s aesthetic value, the essential qualities that would 
establish its absolute distinction from the devalued cultural forms that it 
incorporated (represented) and, for some readers, resembled. The 
second moment comes much later, in an era when Joyce’s work has 
emphatically attained the consecrated status his earliest supporters 
hoped for: Ulysses has been legitimised as cultural capital by becoming 
an object of study and professional expertise within the university. In 
this context, the problematic of value is, to some extent, reversed: I 
consider the results of recent efforts on the part of the “Joyce industry” 
to attend to recent, post-axiological thought on cultural value, and as a 
consequence, ostensibly move from traditional literary studies towards 
cultural studies.  
 
This move is not problematic in itself, for as John Frow writes, “The 
opposition set up here between cultural and literary studies is a phoney 
one. Cultural studies is a way of contextualizing texts, of any kind – of 
analysing the social relations of textuality; and there’s no reason why it 
shouldn’t include literary texts and literary regimes amongst its proper 
objects of knowledge” (“Literature, Culture, Mirrors” 2). However, 
insofar as this move involves a refusal to engage in discourses of value, 
there are significant barriers to the adoption of such an approach within 
a critical “industry” that specialises in one institutionally privileged 
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oeuvre. Steven Connor, as we have seen, draws a marked distinction 
between critical and anthropological definitions of “culture” and 
suggests that “If it is rare to find these two alternative accounts of 
culture in their pure or ideal form, it is also the case that there is a 
certain, residually stubborn opposition between them” (234). The 
following aims to explore this opposition, highlighting the persistence 
within Joyce studies of traditional evaluative habits which belie the 
numerous claims, made by scholars interested in describing the 
relationship between “Joyce and popular culture,” to have moved 
definitively beyond modernist assumptions about value, or to be 
unencumbered by discourses of “the great divide.”  
 
One further introductory remark is required. As a general proposition, it 
is uncontroversial to suggest that a cultural product’s social status has 
little if anything to do with what it represents. However, in each of the 
moments of Ulysses’ reception I consider, questions of the book’s 
relationship to “popular culture” (as a broad category) operate in 
tandem with characterisations of the book’s incorporation and 
juxtaposition of high and low cultural elements – its representation of 
other texts. Recently, one prominent Joyce critic has suggested that, 
together, “mass” and “popular” culture constitute the book’s “primary 
world of allusion” (Wicke 2004, 235). The constant presence in Ulysses 
of popular song (the refrain “Those lovely seaside girls,” for instance, 
which resurfaces throughout the book), advertisements (“What is home 
without Plumtree’s Potted Meat? Incomplete. With it an abode of bliss” 
(61), Bloom’s politically charged ad for Alexander Keyes’ wine shop), 
mass market fiction (the Titbits number Bloom reads, the erotic novel, 
Sweets of Sin, that he (pointedly) buys for Molly), and innumerable 
other cultural products that, from the evaluative perspective of the 
literary academy, can be grouped together as “non-literary,” makes it 
easy to agree with this estimate (although there are surely numerous 
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other contenders). Ulysses’ evident juxtaposition of texts that are 
institutionally defined as either “high” or “low” cultural makes it 
infinitely reconfigurable (as Smith would say) in accordance with 
readers’ existing high/low assumptions; and it is in this act of 
configuration that critics’ evaluative assumptions are most plainly 
revealed. 
 
Modernism, Canonicity, and High-ness 
 
The account of cultural value I put forward in chapter two stipulates 
that value is never simply a function of properties that a text displays; 
and in the case of a work like Ulysses, which contemporary readers 
usually encounter as a set university text, this situation is particularly 
glaring. For today’s readers, the “complexity” of Ulysses (which is 
partially a function of what I have been calling its “encyclopaedism”) 
does not simply, in an Adornean sense, signify its difference from 
‘culture at large,’ for that differentiation has already been performed—
its “transubstantiation” into high cultural capital already determined. 
Ulysses’ institutional entrenchment determines, rather than reflects, its 
value and symbolic prominence. As Barbara Smith writes, “the 
canonical work begins increasingly not merely to survive within but to 
shape and create the culture in which its value is produced and 
transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the conditions of its 
own flourishing” (50).  
 
This means, too, that I may now speak of Ulysses as a “high” cultural 
work in a pragmatic sense, rather than an inherentist one: axiological 
arguments justifying Ulysses’ supreme artistic merit now seem both 
redundant and passe. Yet Ulysses’ notoriety as a high cultural 
monument is such that it is synonymous, for many, with axiological 
discourses of cultural elitism, the idea being that Ulysses somehow 
embodies the logic of cultural distinction. Because this idea has been 
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vehemently contested in recent Joyce criticism, it is worth specifying its 
two most prominent versions.  
 
The first justification of this view takes Ulysses itself as, in effect, a 
discourse of value; an active and historically time-limited “warding off” 
of devalued modes of representation. Here the work of the Frankfurt 
school becomes important.  
 
Although Walter Benjamin’s focus in his famous essay “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936) are the plastic arts 
and film, not print media, he does at one stage pause to offer a 
“comparative look at the historical situation of contemporary literature” 
(225). “With the increasing extension of the press,” Benjamin suggests, 
“an increasing number of readers became writers”—so much so that 
“the distinction between author and public is about to lose its basic 
character” (ibid.). Where limited access once ensured that the authority 
of print carried its own prohibitive aura, “Literary licence is now 
founded on polytechnic rather than specialized training and thus 
becomes common property.”22 Benjamin’s famously utopian argument 
for the liberative potential of mass art represents one strand of the 
Frankfurt School’s response to the rise of mass cultural production. 
Literary modernism, on the other hand, is usually understood, along 
with the pessimistic Frankfurt School arguments, as a “reaction 
formation” to this historical situation, producing works antithetical to 
                                                 
22
 Benjamin’s sanguine analysis of film hinges on a recognition of its potential to 
become a uniquely democratic medium, consequent on its ability to foster a 
“progressive” rather than “reactionary” response in a mass audience. Film had the 
potential, even more so than the democratized press, to dissolve the status divide that 
ensured mass indifference or hostility to aesthetic products (a problem befalling 
progressive artists who worked in more traditional media, like Picasso). “The greater 
the decrease in the social significance of an art form, the sharper the distinction 
between criticism and enjoyment by the public. The conventional is uncritically 
enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion. With regard to the screen, the 
critical and the receptive attitudes of the public coincide” (227). Hence, art produced 
for mass reproduction could more readily become political, and so held greater 
potential to transform everyday life. 
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mass consumption (in their prohibitive difficulty) so as to reinscribe 
authentic “literary licence” as the preserve of a cultural elite. For good 
reason, Ulysses, Joyce’s “usylessly unreadable Blue Book of Eccles” 
(FW 179) is often thought of as an eminent example of such 
deliberately “unconsumable” literature, a work which, on its 
publication, implicitly marked both its author and its readership off 
from the cultural homogenisation mass printing and literacy seemed to 
promise.  
 
As we have seen, this conception of modernism has been compellingly 
put by Andreas Huyssen in After the Great Divide, which takes Adorno 
as modernism’s premier theorist, the critical spearhead of a “reaction 
formation which operated on the level of form and artistic material” 
(57). Adorno’s aesthetic is based on an understanding that 
“progressive” art’s tenability is contingent on its capacity to resist co-
option by the “culture industry”; the artists Adorno praised were those 
who deployed formal opacity as a declaration of autonomy—as a 
barrier, however temporary, to the political appropriation of cultural 
expression. Indeed, it is the sense of historical flux in Adorno’s 
“dialectic of enlightenment” that most clearly distinguishes it from 
other essentialist understandings of culture as divided into unitary and 
oppositional high/low blocks. For positioning “high culture” as a 
“reaction formation” involves conceding that what can function as 
oppositional will change over time; formalist experiments may be co-
opted by the culture industry, losing their capacity to shock, becoming 
obsolescent.  
 
On this logic, it is important to note, “high culture” is not the same as 
“canonised culture”—indeed, a work’s absorption into the academy, its 
legitimation, is complicit in the inevitable demise of a work’s 
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provocativeness.23 Yet, turning to the second reason why cultural “high-
ness” is, in the case of Ulysses, commonly treated as a textual property 
rather than an historically determined fact of reception and 
reproduction, this distinction readily gives way to a simplified idea of 
high culture as “that which has value for cultural institutions.” Thus, 
while Adorno certainly did not see bourgeois “cultural legitimacy” as 
the goal to which modernist art should aspire, his ideas can be seen as 
broadly congruent with Bourdieu’s descriptions of the axiologies of 
“legitimate” consumers. (In both instances, for example, the cultural 
status of an art object is said to be inscribed at the level of form rather 
than content).24 What may have served a demarcative purpose in the 
early twentieth-century (keeping “the masses” out) plays out rather 
differently today: Ulysses’ linguistic complexity and “encyclopaedic” 
breadth of reference now mark it as a book seemingly custom-built for 
the literary academy. This calls to mind Joyce’s famous dictum, quoted 
after the title page of Don Gifford’s Ulysses Annotated: “I’ve put in so 
many enigmas and puzzles that it will keep the professors busy for 
centuries arguing over what I meant, and that’s the only way of insuring 
one’s immortality” (quoted by Gifford). (Although, as Joseph Brooker 
points out, this comment is probably apocryphal, its perseverance in 
lore is testament to a widespread perception that this is something that 
Joyce could or ought to have said.) 
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 As Richard Brantlinger emphasises, for Adorno, “high culture” is premised on a 
relentless forward momentum: “[P]ast culture is … the source of present injustice” 
(224). Frow also notes more generally that “[w]ithin a modernist aesthetic the old and 
the low become equated” (18). 
24
 This similarity is especially evident in Bourdieu’s consideration of post-
Impressionist art. After Impressionism in the visual arts, Bourdieu suggests, the 
“legitimate” cultural producer “asserts the primacy of the mode of representation over 
the object of representation” (Distinction 3). We might compare Huyssen’s list of 
literary modernism’s widely-agreed attributes: “the rejection of all classical systems of 
representation, the effacement of “content,” the erasure of subjectivity and authorial 
voice, the repudiation of likeness and verisimilitude, the exorcism of any demand for 




That Ulysses’ “high-ness” now seems so overdetermined goes some 
way to explaining why recent critics have taken the prominent place 
given to “low” culture (the debased, the particular, the local) in Joyce’s 
vast novel as the book’s most “paradoxical” quality, somehow jarring 
with its status as the epitome of high international modernism. 
Ruminations on this paradox often lead to an opposition between 
(“high”) form and (“low”) content, enacted most clearly, perhaps, in 
what Mark Currie calls the “myth-fact paradox” (59): “the movement 
that allows the wealth of authenticating detail in Ulysses to achieve an 
extreme of naturalism while functioning simultaneously in an 
intertextual system which assigns symbolic or metanarrative value to 
that authenticating detail” (59). While the affinities of this type of logic 
with traditional discourses of value (form vs content) are obvious, the 
absence of genuine evaluative conflict within the literary academy 
means that such observations are now unlikely to be made in explicitly 
evaluative terms.25  
 
Historically, however, when Ulysses’ cultural status still seemed a 
subject worth disputing, the binary was invoked with some urgency by 
Joyce’s supporters, who in many cases found the myth-fact paradox to 
be a convenient enactment of just this separation. Joseph Brooker’s 
study Joyce’s Critics: Transitions in Reading and Culture notes that 
initially, arguments vaunting Ulysses’ supreme artistic merit were often 
made in the face of legal moves to have the book banned, on the 
grounds of its “obscene” content. Brooker helpfully divides early 
responses to Ulysses into two categories, using criteria borrowed from 
Stephen Dedalus’s “disquisition on aesthetics” (Brooker 21) in A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man:  
                                                 
25
 Few would deny that, however flawed current writers find Bourdieu’s description of 
an “aesthetic disposition,” and however artificial contemporary thinkers agree it is to 
pretend that form and content can be readily separated, this binary remains widely 
invoked by cultural consumers, especially when justifying why a particular cultural 




“The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. 
Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to 
abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic emotions. The arts 
which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper 
arts. The esthetic emotion (I use the general term) is therefore static. 
The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing” (Portrait 
172).  
 
Could Ulysses itself be an example of such “improper art”? Citing 
representative examples, such as the review of Ulysses by “Aramis” in 
Sporting Times (dubbing Joyce a “perverted lunatic who has made a 
speciality of the literature of the latrine” and Ulysses a “stupid 
glorification of mere filth” (Brooker 26)), Brooker’s description of the 
early response to Ulysses provides contemporary readers with an 
important reminder of the urgency with which debates over Joyce’s 
“artistic merit” were once carried out, before they retreated, for better or 
worse, to the more innocuous setting of the university. Early readers 
frequently called attention to the particular “bodily” effects the book 
seemed to produce; and, as Brooker describes them, the obscenity trials 
that delayed the mass distribution of Ulysses (while at the same time 
greatly increasing its notoriety) really did engage in a level of argument 
that sought to establish what bodily effects Joyce’s work might be 
capable of generating in the “typical reader” (19-22). Legal arguments 
hinged on a binaristic analysis of form and content: in the first legal 
challenge to the publication of Ulysses in the United States, arguments 
that the obscene content of “Nausicaa” (in which Leopold Bloom 
masturbates while espying Gerty MacDowell’s exposed knickers) was 
mitigated by its artful form failed to impress the presiding judge. (His 
refusal to allow the passages in question to be read aloud in the 
presence of women, among whom were the editors of the magazine that 





Concluding his introduction to Distinction, Bourdieu takes obvious 
delight in quoting a theatre review that seems to lay bare the mechanics 
of cultural consecration, which process “confer[s] on the objects, 
persons and situations it touches, a sort of ontological promotion akin to 
a transubstantiation” (6): “‘What struck me most is this: nothing could 
be obscene on the stage of our premier theatre, and the ballerinas of the 
Opera, even as naked dancers, sylphs, sprites or Bacchae, retain an 
inviolable purity.’”26 The critic here posits an aesthetic domain that is 
immune to charges of obscenity; to make such allegations would be to 
commit a category error. The same style of argument, Brooker notes, 
“positing an uncrossable border between literary and other discourses” 
(19), eventually prevailed in the Woolsey trial of 1933, legalising 
Ulysses for sale in the United States. What the Bourdieu example 
suggests about this turnaround is that whether a text is considered 
“obscene” or not will depend on extrinsic, institutional factors. The 
priority of aesthetic form over content is not simply a quality of the 
aesthetic object, but of the viewing subject; the form/content binary can 
be invoked so as to vindicate the perception of an object as “legitimate” 
that is, more importantly, a function of its perceived social status. 
 
The most famous statement of the myth-fact paradox, T. S. Eliot’s 
essay “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” (1923), can be seen as an attempt to 
bulwark this social status. If the evaluative logic of high cultural 
consumers stipulated that the preeminence of form could be put forward 
                                                 
26
 Bourdieu brings this into telling contrast with a disdainful review of a more 
‘commercial’ production: 
‘There are obscene postures: the stimulated intercourse which offends the eye. 
Clearly, it is impossible to approve, although the interpolation of such gestures 
in dance routines does give them a symbolic and aesthetic quality which is 
absent from the intimate scenes the cinema daily flaunts before its spectators’ 
eyes … As for the nude scene, what can one say, except that it is brief and 
theatrically not very effective? I will not say it is chaste or innocent, for 
nothing commercial can be so described. Let us say it is not shocking, and that 
the chief objection is that it serves as a box-office gimmick…. In Hair, the 
nakedness fails to be symbolic.’ (Distinction 6) 
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as a guarantor of inherent value, then any suggestion that a work failed 
to fulfil this requirement would demand refutation. Hugh Kenner 
reminds us that these were the circumstances behind Eliot’s essay: he 
meant to counter “Richard Aldington’s finding that Ulysses was 
chaotic” (Joyce’s Voices 1). Eliot proposes that, faced by a world 
progressively losing its supposed “form” (and a cultural terrain 
becoming ever more dominated by the “formless” energies of mass 
culture), Ulysses is an attempt to arrest this cultural entropy. Indeed, 
“entropy” seems an apt term, for Joyce’s discovery, according to Eliot, 
“has the importance of a scientific discovery”:   
 
No one else has built a novel upon such a foundation before: it has 
never before been necessary. I am not begging the question in calling 
Ulysses a ‘novel’; and if you call it an epic it will not matter. If it is not 
a novel, that is simply because the novel is a form which will no longer 
serve; it is because the novel, instead of being a form, was simply the 
expression of an age which had not sufficiently lost all form to feel the 
need of something stricter […] In using the myth, in manipulating a 
continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity, Mr Joyce is 
pursuing a method which others must pursue after him […] It is simply 
a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance 
to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary 
history. (Eliot, 270)  
 
The process of legitimating Ulysses (for sale, and eventually for 
academic study) thus involved making claims for the work’s value in 
spite of its content, extricating it from the low cultural milieu that the 
work represents. Stuart Gilbert’s intricate “authorized” account of 
Ulysses’ structural indebtedness to the Odyssey, first published in 1930 
(and cited in the Woolsey trial) took the ‘taming’ of the ‘obscene’ text 
as its explicit goal. In the updated preface to his study, published in 
1963, Gilbert reflected that, “[W]e who admired Ulysses for its 
structural, enduring qualities and not for the occasional presence in it of 
words and descriptive passages which shocked our elders, were on the 
defensive, and the pedant’s cloak is often a convenient protection 




Here, describing the interplay of high and low culture within Ulysses 
(as form and content, respectively) is fully bound up with asserting the 
value of Ulysses. If there is a sense of high/low conflict in the 
arguments made by Eliot and Gilbert, it is a conflict that their work 
seeks to resolve: stressing Ulysses’ classical parallels became a way of 
asserting its ‘high-ness’—that it could (and ought to) be consumed as a 
work of “legitimate” culture. Such readings are premised on a clear-cut, 
inherent opposition between high art and low culture, which their 
criticism is designed to assert, while at the same time (as Bourdieu 
would point out) establishing their own credentials as “legitimate” 
consumers (the select group capable of admiring Ulysses exclusively 
for its “structural, enduring qualities”). Modernists like Eliot 
“emphasized time and again that it was their mission to salvage the 
purity of high art from the encroachments of urbanization, 
massification, technological modernization, in short, of modern mass 
culture” (Huyssen 163); modernist readings of Ulysses attributed to the 
book a similar purpose. Whether these arguments are considered in 
light of the modernist pas-de-deux with mass culture, or more generally 
as arguments in favour of Ulysses’ inclusion within a canon of 
intrinsically valuable cultural products, it is obvious that they are 
unapologetically axiological in nature. For reasons I set out in my 
previous chapter, the understanding of “high”/“low” terms (as 
categories used to understand “culture” as a totality) that these 





I turn now to the contemporary context in which Ulysses is read, 
interpreted, and valued. Steven Connor writes that “‘James Joyce’ … 
now names a peripatetic global institution, a whole hermeneutic culture, 
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a vast and ever-expanding enterprise of exposition and interpretation” 
(Connor 1996, 2; quoted by Brooker, 3). “Evaluation” is a notable 
absence from Connor’s list of the Joyce industry’s activities, for reasons 
I have already explained;27 but for one group of Joyce’s recent critics, 
questions about value, about Joyce’s work’s relationship with the 
“mass” or “popular” culture it represents, have arisen in the course of 
their interpretive vocation. Of particular interest here are the recent uses 
Joycean critics have made of various forms of high/low critical 
discourse.  
 
Ulysses’ incorporation of discourses associated with the mass media 
and popular entertainment (for example, as specific allusions (Molly’s 
fondness for the mass market novels of Paul de Kock, for example) and 
as the stylistic foundation of various episodes) has recently occupied a 
raft of Joyceans. Cheryl Herr examines the place of newspapers, 
popular theatre, and sermons in Joyce’s work as “institutional 
discourses”; Jennifer Wicke and Garry Leonard discuss the status and 
role of advertisements (the cultural products Leopold Bloom is most 
professionally competent/confident in dissecting and evaluating); R. B. 
Kershner considers the relationship between Joyce’s fiction (pre-
Ulysses) and “popular literature.” Each of these critics is interested in 
loosely similar questions to those that occupied T. S. Eliot in his early 
response to Ulysses: How can we account for such attention to “low” 
culture, in a work that has become, and was intended to become, 
entrenched as a work of “high” or canonical culture? What sort of 
evaluative intention might be inferred to lie behind Joyce’s efforts to 
incorporate and aestheticise the whole of Western culture as at 1904?   
                                                 
27
 This is not to suggest, of course, that merely interpretive criticism has no evaluative 
implications. As Wayne Booth points out in The Company We Keep: An Ethics of 
Fiction, “even those critics who work hard to purge themselves of all but the most 
abstract formal interests turn out to have an ethical program in mind—a belief that a 
given way of reading, or a given kind of genuine literature, is what will do us most 




In asking such questions, Joycean critics have declared their allegiance 
to ideas about culture and value that derive from the burgeoning 
academic discipline of cultural studies. Such ideas are presented in 
direct opposition to the modernist certainties wielded by Eliot and his 
contemporaries. The discourse of “the great divide” and its 
dismantlement sits alongside these ideas, and is the backdrop for the 
Joycean criticism I shall survey. The remainder of this chapter 
examines the effects of this putative “evaluative seachange” within the 
academy. These changes can be witnessed in both 
descriptive/interpretive criticism (subjecting Joyce’s representational 
strategies to cultural-studies-inflected critique) and in the more self-
conscious musings of the “Joyce industry”: considerations of critics’ 
and Joyce’s texts’ place(s) in the contemporary “social organisation of 
culture.” First, I shall briefly introduce two arguments from the Joycean 
literature that typify the critical discourse being applied in these 
despatches.  
 
In his introduction to the book Joyce and Popular Culture (1996), R. B. 
Kershner suggests that “[u]ntil fairly recently the idea of a book 
devoted to James Joyce’s relationship to popular culture would have 
struck most readers as unlikely,” and, moreover, hopes “that it still 
sounds a note of paradox or at least surprise” (Kershner 1). As implied 
by the book’s title, that “note of paradox” hinges on the anticipated dual 
recognition of 1) the canonical, and therefore “high cultural” status of 
Joyce’s works; and 2) the prominent representation of “popular 
cultural” texts within those works. It is worthwhile observing here that, 
as the nature of what is represented is incidental to the cultural status of 
a representational artwork, the “paradox” Kershner hopes to draw says 
more about the contemporary currency, within literary academia, of the 
terms “high” and “popular” than it does about any inherently 
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paradoxical quality of Joyce’s writing. This aside, what I first want to 
draw attention to in Kershner’s introduction is the way he positions the 
arguments in the book within the cultural studies tradition, and more 
importantly, the way he understands that tradition with respect to 
cultural value. 
 
Kershner points to the development of cultural studies as the impetus 
behind the “recent spate of work attempting to describe the relationship 
between modernism, postmodernism, and popular culture” (2), a trend 
that has clearly affected the specialised field of Joyce studies in which 
he works. The first gesture towards defining cultural studies comes by 
way of referring to what it, as a movement, sought to move beyond: the 
(very different) critiques of mass culture offered by the Frankfurt 
School and Leavisite New Criticism, respectively. These are held up, in 
implicit contrast to the type of criticism performed in the book, as 
overtly evaluative regimes. Eliot’s essay on Ulysses is found to sit 
comfortably with these conservatisms; Kershner suggests that its 
influence had an appreciable effect on the interpretation of Joyce’s 
work with respect to popular culture, leading “critics to assume that 
Joyce’s references to popular culture throughout his work were a mode 
of ironic documentation, like Flaubert’s citations of Emma Bovary’s 
reading” (8).    
 
Kershner’s essay traces the move away from this evaluative, and hence 
(as applied to Joyce) “ironic” reading paradigm, pointing to a multitude 
of intellectual developments, held together less by argument than 
chronology. Moving from Stuart Hall and Marshall McLuhan in the 
1960s, to the Barthes of Mythologies in the 1970s, before citing Jim 
Hall’s Uncommon Cultures: Popular Culture and Post-Modernism as a 
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statement of the new orthodoxy,28 the narrative takes the decreasing 
legitimacy of “evaluation” in cultural analysis as its unifying thread. 
Hence, Kershner suggests, the era in which cultural theorists analysed 
“popular” or “mass culture” primarily to point out its deficiencies has 
passed; the hierarchical model of culture such analyses were premised 
upon has been replaced by a consensus that “high cultural” production 
is “part of a continuous cultural fabric” (1), which includes those 
previously devalued genres and traditions. Kershner takes these insights 
to pave the way for criticism that delves seriously into Joyce’s multi-
faceted use of “popular cultural” materials throughout his oeuvre 
(although, as an aside, it is far from clear that literary critics were ever 
institutionally debarred from doing so). Judging by the essays in 
Kershner’s edited collection, “popular culture” here includes (but is 
probably not limited to) mass market fiction, film, advertising, 
pornography, music-hall, and journalism. As with all attempts to define 
“popular culture,” the decision to group such heterogeneous texts and 
practices together under a single banner says more about the evaluative 
assumptions of this Joycean community than any “natural” connection 
between those texts/practices.  
 
The second work I would like to briefly mention, to give a sense of the 
critical idiom that seems to have emerged, in Joyce studies, from the 
confluence of literary and cultural studies, is Cheryl Herr’s Joyce’s 
Anatomy of Culture (1986).29  
 
                                                 
28
 This orthodoxy consists in a recognition “that all cultural production must be seen 
as a set of power relations that produce particular forms of subjectivity, but that the 
nature, function, and uses of mass culture can no longer be conceived in a monolithic 
manner” (Collins, quoted by Kershner, 5). While this is broadly accurate, it is unclear 
why the current prevalence of this idea should necessitate a revised reading of Joyce’s 
oeuvre. 
29
 Joseph Brooker points out that, in its combination of research into particular 
allusions with a more general interest in cultural theory, Herr’s study proved to be 
“[o]ne of the most proleptic works of the 1980s” (Brooker 180). 
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The opening gambit of Herr’s book seeks to distinguish the Anatomy 
project from the many traditional literary studies (such as those 
published by Don Gifford and Richard Ellmann) that take the 
identification and explication of Joyce’s allusions as their main focus. 
Herr declares her interest to be more in “the relationship among 
allusion, narrative form, and cultural operations” (3), which leads to a 
reading of Ulysses as “a model of cultural processes” (6)—a text that 
offers a nuanced account of the way that Dublin’s cultural institutions 
“competed for discursive power over the demotic mind” (4). (The 
“allusions” she speaks of are not, usually, to other “texts” in the usual 
sense, but to institutions and real-world circumstances.) If Herr’s work 
is inflected by “cultural studies” ideas, it also seems that, for Herr, so 
too is Ulysses. For although Herr denies that Joyce’s works “explicitly 
advance a theory of culture” (12), the effect of her study quite clearly is 
to position Joyce’s oeuvre as such a theoretical intervention. Herr treats 
Ulysses as a “text of the culture” (a phrase that comes from Juri 
Lotman),30 a systematic representation of the devolvement and effects 
of institutional ideologies; her assertion (in language inflected by New 
Historicism) that she treats of “the parallel texts of Joyce and of Irish 
history” (12) must surely be qualified. It would seemingly be more 
accurate to say that Herr takes Joyce’s oeuvre and contemporary 
cultural theory as parallel texts, each confirming and extending what the 
other has to say about the object-text (Irish history).31 
 
                                                 
30
 Herr quotes Cesare Segre’s description of a “text of the culture,” which can be seen 
as another version of the idea (or ideal) of an “encyclopaedic” novel: “A necessary 
property of a text of the culture is its universality. Its picture of the world is correlative 
to the whole world and, in principle, embraces everything. Asking what there is 
outside such a framework is, from the point of view of a given culture, as absurd as if 
the question were to be posed of the entire universe” (qtd by Herr, 8). 
31
 The following formulation, in the context of Herr’s analysis of the Irish press circa 
1904, will serve as an example: “Although Foucault’s argument in The History of 
Sexuality has come under critical fire, the fundamental notion that censorship both 
represses and stimulates discourse is more than borne out in Irish culture, and Joyce’s 
works echo the deployments of power that Foucault details” (90-91). 
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As with Kershner’s essay, Herr’s examination, via Joyce, of the way 
Dublin’s institutions (the press, the pulpit, and the dramatic stage) 
structured the perception of its “cultural field,” is premised upon 
adopting the inclusive, anthropological definition of culture associated 
with cultural studies. “Culture,” for Herr, is a set of “operations” or “a 
mechanism which produces itself in texts—works of literature, 
newspapers, sermons, and the like” (14). Once more, on this descriptive 
account of culture, traditional academic evaluation does not enter the 
picture: “it is clear that (even though for convenience I continue to use 
the term “popular culture”) to distinguish between low and high culture 
is less than accurate and especially inappropriate in studying Joyce, 
who did not discriminate in his works between the value of an allusion 
to the popular and a reference to a work of higher social status” (15). 
 
What is the connection between Kershner’s and Herr’s work and the 
arguments they claim as their theoretical foundation? What Herr and 
Kershner plainly share with the writers I discussed in chapter two is a 
belief that there are problems with high/low categories as they have 
traditionally been applied in literary criticism. Beyond this, the 
connections are less plain—indeed, the connections both Joycean critics 
claim between their endeavours and post-axiological thought on 
cultural value are fraught with problems. I intend these brief samples of 
argument simply to introduce the critical idiom that seems to be in the 
ascendancy among at least one sub-group of Joyce’s current 
professional critics, and raise some preliminary questions about the 
ways that recent thought about cultural value has been put to work by 
the Joyce industry. 
 
My main issue with arguments of this ilk is that, although both 
Kershner and Herr offer statements to the effect that high/low 
categories can no longer be seen as valid or useful concepts with which 
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to analyse culture (in general) or Joyce’s works (in particular), both 
critics use the terms “high” and “popular” (or “mass”) culture in ways 
that seem to undercut this premise. For example, both Herr and 
Kershner continue to refer to “high” and “popular” culture as though 
these were real-world cultural domains or groups of texts, even as they 
raise incipient doubts about the basis of such a distinction. Kershner, in 
particular, confidently predicts that readers will find the title Joyce and 
Popular Culture paradoxical, which prediction points to a widespread 
view that Joyce / “high culture” and “popular culture” remain mutually 
exclusive categories (or at least produce a frisson of irony or disjunction 
when placed, somehow, side by side).     
 
Contra the two Joyceans’ more dogmatic statements of everything-is-
equivalent relativism, post-axiological arguments do not announce an 
end to evaluative distinctions per se, but merely point to a need to 
understand evaluative hierarchies, cultural domains and so forth as the 
product of evaluative discourses and regimes.32 (A side effect of this, 
for Barbara Smith, is that the study of those discourses/regimes comes 
to be seen as a more interesting / revealing / valuable avenue of inquiry 
than literary criticism’s traditional inquests into the value of particular 
cultural products.) Kershner’s and Herr’s various statements seeking to 
describe “culture” in evaluatively neutral terms (whereby the distinction 
between “popular” and “high” culture simply no longer matters) would, 
if taken to their logical endpoint, compel critics to abandon evaluative 
inquiry as Smith defines it (it would become redundant). 
 
                                                 
32
 Even if critics now adopt an inclusive definition of ‘culture,’ recent thought on 
cultural value stipulates that there is no position from which cultural production can 
be objectively evaluated (and judging all cultural production to be of “equal value” 
would itself merely be one, particularly disingenuous, evaluation). As Steven Connor 
writes, “The non-evaluative or the value-free will always be a particular suburb in the 




The categories, though, plainly continue to have meaning for these 
Joycean critics. In one sense this is simply inevitable: John Frow notes 
that, regardless of the post-axiological critique of high/low categories, 
“the concepts of a ‘high’ and a ‘popular’ regime continue to organize 
the cultural field and to produce ideological effects of cultural 
distinction” (Frow 150). Furthermore, in this context, the concepts 
provide the very grounds for the debate being staged (and “high”/“low” 
discourse remains of central importance).  
 
A further reason for retaining the categories might stem from the 
importance these academics (and the institutions that support them) 
place on critical novelty – demonstrating the ‘inexhaustible richness’ of 
Joyce’s work by arguing against the readings of their predecessors. 
Construing those predecessors’ lack of lengthy scholarly attention to the 
place of popular fiction, advertising, etc, in Joyce’s novel as a 
deliberate, ideologically driven decision based on a distaste for 
“popular culture” provides much scope to blend scholarly 
fastidiousness with ostensibly argument-driven criticism. This is 
particularly evident in Kershner’s writing: his account of the 
development of cultural studies is adduced as a way around the 
institutional prejudices that afflicted New Critical engagements with 
“popular culture,” rather than simply a new set of assumptions that will 
themselves inflect critical interpretation and evaluation. The effect of 
this is to imbue the collection Joyce and Popular Culture with a 
revisionary gleam: if Ulysses, and literary critics, were once thought of 
as hostile to “popular culture,” then, with Joyce’s place within a 
“continuous fabric of culture” firmly in mind, contemporary Joycean 
critics, suggests Kershner, are in a position to expose the erroneousness 
of that evaluation, and in the process, to more accurately infer the 




This emphasis on authorial intention, on locating evidence of Joyce’s 
attitude to “popular culture” within Joyce’s oeuvre, is where these 
Joyceans’ commitment to the “cultural studies” theory they draw on can 
most clearly be seen as superficial. In the previous section, I associated 
the view that Ulysses, as a modernist text, is necessarily “hostile” to 
“popular” or “mass” culture, with the institutional processes that have 
seen Ulysses entrenched in the university curriculum as “high” cultural: 
“hostility” as non-essential (that is, springing from, and/or contributing 
to, the work’s overdetermined “highness”). Cultural studies-inflected 
arguments could, then, be vital tools for Kershner and Herr, given their 
intention to argue against modernist understandings of Ulysses’ 
essential/necessary place in the cultural field. The starting point for this 
project would be to declare, with John Guillory, that “Literary works 
must … be seen as the vector of ideological notions which do not inhere 
in the works themselves but in the context of their institutional 
presentation” (ix).  
 
Instead, however, recent Joycean criticism has tended to accept that 
Ulysses’ evaluative set towards “popular culture” or “mass culture” is 
an inherent property of the work itself. The stripe of criticism typified 
by Kershner and Herr has found Joyce’s evaluative attitude to “popular 
culture” to be remarkably congruent with cultural studies’ celebration 
of “the popular”: indeed, in many cases Joyce’s work itself comes to be 
seen as a work of “cultural studies.” The evident need Joycean critics 
feel to discern evaluation (or non-evaluation) of “popular culture” 
within the Joycean text can be understood as contingent upon the 
critical discourse being brought to bear – one in which modernism and 
postmodernism, high and low culture, are the key binaries through 
which understandings of Joyce’s relationship to the cultural milieu he 




Irony and evaluation 
 
In After the Great Divide, Huyssen provides numerous case studies, 
readings of film and literature, that aim to trace the processes of cultural 
demarcation (defining the spheres of legitimate and illegitimate culture) 
in modernist aesthetic products. Through irony and performative 
distancing (making their work “unconsumable”), Huyssen suggests, 
modernist authors sought to reify and other a “mass cultural” domain.  
 
Does this mean that every representation by modernist writers of 
“popular” or “mass” cultural texts, practices, or ways of reading was 
intentionally ironic? Neither Huyssen nor other writers who understand 
modernist culture primarily as a “reaction formation” to mass culture 
would make so sweeping a generalisation. However, beginning from 
the default position that modernist texts’ incorporation of popular 
cultural texts is a form of “ironic documentation” (in Kershner’s 
words), many Joycean critics have recently published criticism 
condemning this premise. Joyce’s complex treatment of popular 
cultural texts, they suggest, cannot be understood as sheer intentional 
irony. It is not hard to agree with this proposition; indeed, Huyssen 
himself (briefly) acknowledges, in his chapter “Mass Culture as 
Woman,” that Joyce seems at best to be a partial fit within the account 
of modernism he is advancing.33 What interests me here, though, are the 
(problematic) approaches Joycean critics have taken to arguing this 
point. 
 
John Carey’s book The Intellectuals and the Masses is an apt place to 
begin in this, as it re-poses the problem of moving from the generalised 
understandings of literary modernism to the particular case of Joyce. 
Carey’s work covers similar ground to Huyssen’s, albeit in a more 
sensationalised tone, and like Huyssen finds Joyce’s treatment of 
                                                 
33
 See the chapter “Mass Culture as Woman,” especially p 46. 
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“mass” or “popular” culture to be, prima facie, difficult to square with 
the general understanding of modernism vis-a-vis mass culture that he 
subscribes to. For if intercultural (or inter- cultural strata) antagonism is 
detectable at the level of representation, by what (or whom) an author 
portrays, and by the author’s implied attitude towards their fictional 
subject, then Leopold Bloom, early twentieth-century literature’s “most 
sympathetic portrayal of mass man,” a notable exception to the 
“dismal” norm (Carey 19), is at the very least an interesting case:   
 
Can we say, then, that in Ulysses mass man is redeemed? Is Joyce the 
one intellectual who atones for Nietzschean contempt of the masses, 
and raises mass man, or a representative of mass man, to the status of 
epic hero? To a degree, yes. One effect of Ulysses is to show that mass 
man matters, that he has an inner life as complex as an intellectual’s, 
that it is worthwhile to record his personal details on a prodigious scale. 
(20)  
 
But Carey’s identification of Bloom as “mass man” carries its own 
freight. For Carey, episodes like “Aeolus,” in which Bloom is 
“pointedly embroil[ed]” in “newsprint and advertising, which were, for 
intellectuals, among the most odious features of mass culture” (20) are 
indicative of Joyce’s intention (however sympathetic) to mark Bloom 
with a synecdochic function. This established, the nature of Joyce’s 
portrayal of Bloom becomes irrelevant, for the reification of “the 
masses” has already occurred in the act of representing a character who 
is “distinctly not a literary intellectual” (19):  
 
Bloom himself would never and could never have read Ulysses or a 
book like Ulysses. The complexity of the novel, its avant-garde 
technique, its obscurity, rigorously exclude people like Bloom from its 
readership. More than almost any other twentieth-century novel, it is for 
intellectuals only. This means that there is a duplicity in Joyce’s 
masterpiece. The proliferation of sympathetic imagining, which creates 
the illusion of the reader’s solidarity with Bloom, operates in 
conjunction with a distancing, ironizing momentum which preserves 
the reader’s – and author’s – superiority to the created life. The novel 
embraces mass man but also rejects him. Mass man – Bloom – is 
expelled from the circle of the intelligentsia, who are incited to 




The terms Carey uses here are, of course, those proposed by the 
discourse of literary modernism/postmodernism. It is this discourse that 
organises Carey’s brief reading of Ulysses into such clear oppositions: 
mass man vs intellectuals; Bloom vs (in Huyssen’s term) the 
impassibilite of the text.  
 
We might note that in order to claim Bloom as “mass man” and Joyce 
as an “intellectual,” Carey’s sifting of evidence—his reading practice—
has become very selective. Why should Bloom simply stand for “mass 
man”, rather than any of the other possible identities Joyce provides for 
his protagonist? Does this not slight the many ways in which Bloom is 
portrayed as a pariah, consistently falling outside the borders of group 
membership, whether of Irish nationhood, religion, or class, erected and 
patrolled by the Dublin milieu he inhabits? Bloom’s status as a 
producer of mass culture (advertisements) might be seen to further 
complicate his status within the field of cultural consumers. Similar 
objections could be made with regard to claiming Joyce for the 
“intellectuals,” for in Carey’s argument, this term clearly designates a 
set of class interests as much as it does an educational pedigree. Carey 
in fact cites Virginia Woolf’s dismissal of Ulysses in classist terms as 
the work of a “self-taught working man” (20),34 before claiming Joyce 
for the modernist vanguard. Overall then, despite his study’s reliance on 
a late twentieth-century scepticism in analysing modernist artists’ 
identity politics (Carey stresses that the “mass,” in contrast to what 
Eliot et al would have had their readers believe, was in fact a “fiction,” 
a “linguistic device” (i)), Carey’s adherence to the discourse proposed 
by the title of his study (another variant of the “discourse of the great 
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 On the “self-taught” Joyce, Woolf continues: “we all know how distressing they 
are, how egotistic, insistent, raw, striking and ultimately nauseating … I’m reminded 




divide”) has the effect of compressing this complex web of possible 
identities into a single, evaluatively charged opposition.   
 
This is not to dismiss Carey’s central point (which is telling), that 
although Ulysses takes the Dublin quotidian as the subject of its 
“created life,” it is written in such a way as to render it an unlikely 
candidate for mass consumption. Carey is right that “Bloom himself 
would never and could never have read Ulysses or a book like Ulysses.” 
This is not to claim Ulysses as inherently the preserve of the cultural 
elite (i.e. in 1922, now, and for all time), or to question the “mass” 
appetite for formal experiment; it simply acknowledges that twentieth 
century cultural history has played out in such a way that Ulysses 
presents (still) as a significant departure from the norm of readily 
consumable texts (which category has probably become broader as 
access to higher education has expanded). Whether this amounts to 
“duplicity” is an interesting question. It seems that, for Carey, 
representing non-intellectuals in a book that, in its narrative discourse, 
is overtly for intellectuals, ought to lead to a presumption of irony, an 
attitude of “superiority to the created life,” consequent less on authorial 
intention than an inequality in cultural capital. Carey’s claim that 
Ulysses is an example of modernist irony is thus based on accepting 
that irony does inhere in Joyce’s portrayal of “mass man” and, by 
extension, mass culture.  
 
Something is amiss here in this inherentist assertion of irony. Before 
considering this matter further, though, I want to contrast Carey’s 
assertions with those of another Joyce critic, assertions that also flow 
from a reading based on the contrast between “high” literary context 
and “low” created life. The context here is the “Nausicaa” episode of 
Ulysses, which features another character of considerable interest to the 
Joyce/popular culture academics – Gerty Macdowell. The events 
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depicted in this episode, as the sun sets on Joyce’s representation of 16 
June 1904, have been read by many critics as suggestively drawing 
together ideas associated with mass cultural consumption, 
interpellation, and gender politics. 
 
“Nausicaa” follows from “Cyclops,” Bloom’s encounter with 
xenophobic nationalism in Barney Kiernan’s pub, circumstances that, if 
not described by an unnamed “I,” are filtered through language often 
redolent of nationalistic reportage or chronicle. The scene is set for 
“Nausicaa” in language that similarly alerts those attendant to 
narratorial shifts in Ulysses that there is, once more, no unambiguously 
“authorial” presence in the text; readers are confronted with yet another 
variant in the text’s seeming commitment to exhausting every extant 
mode of written expression:   
 
The summer evening had begun to fold the world in its mysterious 
embrace. Far away in the west the sun was setting and the last glow of 
all too fleeting day lingered lovingly on sea and strand, on the proud 
promontory of dear old Howth guarding as ever the waters of the bay, 
on the weedgrown rocks along Sandymount shore and, last but not 
least, on the quiet church whence there streamed forth at times upon the 
stillness the voice of prayer to her who is in her pure radiance a beacon 
ever to the stormtossed heart of man, Mary, star of the sea. (284) 
 
The scene is soon focused on “three girl friends … seated on the rocks”, 
which, the narrative voice informs us, is a “favourite nook to have a 
cosy chat beside the sparkling waves and discuss matters feminine” 
(284). Cissy Caffrey and Edy Boardman’s attention is firmly locked on 
the Caffrey twins, two boys named Tommy and Jacky, and their baby 
brother. Gerty MacDowell, the girls’ companion and the central 
character in “Nausicaa” (apart from the ever-present Bloom) is not 
described at all until an altercation between the boys forces Caffrey and 
Boardman to exercise their “motherwit” (285). A teasing suggestion 
that “Gerty is Tommy’s sweetheart” prompts in Gerty an inner 
monologue that has often been read as self-deluded and tragic; the long 
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series of assertions through which readers learn of her inner 
consciousness is inflected both by mass market publications (from 
which she derives the ideal of “winsome Irish girlhood” that she strives 
to see in herself), and by the demographic realities of 1904 Dublin, 
where the chances of a young woman marrying well had diminished to 
almost nil.35 Gerty’s reading habits present a way of overcoming these 
grim realities: both her strict adherence to the dictates of the “Lady’s 
Pictorial” (287) and the romantic narratives she imaginatively 
implicates herself in (first with schoolboy Reggy Wylie, later with 
Bloom) suggest elements of escapist fantasy. 
 
This combination fits very neatly with Huyssen’s paradigm of the 
“great divide” in action. For in defining their low cultural Other, 
Huyssen suggests, modernist artists defined their own cultural domain 
as a thoroughly masculine one; the typical woman is portrayed as an 
“avid consumer of pulp,” while the male producer/consumer of 
“genuine art” is at all times “objective, ironic, and in control of his 
aesthetic means” (46). This divide is not, of course, merely observable 
in the different ways modernist writers construct male and female 
characters, but is a performative divide between the male writer’s 
judgement (an aesthetic control on display in the text itself) and that of 
his female subject, whose cultural choices (usually works of mass 
culture) the modernist work, by making use of a complex, severe mode 
of writing antithetical to mass consumption, implicitly devalues. This is 
the very “ironising momentum” Carey identifies. Huyssen’s primary 
example of this strategy in action is Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, in 
which “woman (Madame Bovary) is positioned as reader of inferior 
literature—subjective, emotional and passive—while man (Flaubert) 
emerges as writer of genuine, authentic literature” (46); the 
“impassibilité” of his writing is seen as an act of masculine self-
                                                 
35
 See Jennifer Wicke, “Joyce and Consumer Culture,” p 243. 
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assertion. Huyssen thus suggests that the mass cultural is represented 
(and personified, feminised) in the modernist text as an act of masculine 
self-assertion: “Warding something off, protecting against something 
out there seems … to be a basic gesture of the modernist aesthetic” 
(47).36 
 
Can we confidently declare Joyce’s representation of Gerty Macdowell 
to be, in the sense proposed by Huyssen, evaluative? Considering the 
following passage, in which Gerty MacDowell is introduced in clichéd 
language borrowed from her reading diet, there would seem, to my eyes 
at least, to be plenty of material available to sustain such a reading:   
 
Gerty MacDowell who was seated near her companions, lost in thought, 
gazing far away into the distance was, in very truth, as fair a specimen 
of winsome Irish girlhood as one could wish to see. Her figure was 
slight and graceful, inclining even to fragility but those iron jelloids she 
had been taking of late had done her a world of good much better than 
the Widow Welch’s female pills and she was much better of those 
discharges she used to get and that tired feeling. The waxen pallor of 
her face was almost spiritual in its ivorylike purity though her rosebud 
mouth was a genuine Cupid’s bow, Greekly perfect. Her hands were of 
finely veined alabaster with tapering fingers and as white as lemonjuice 
and queen of ointments could make them though it was not true that she 
used to wear kid gloves in bed or take a milk footbath either. (286) 
 
The dynamics of Joyce’s writing here have been well described by 
critics. Hugh Kenner understands the narrative discourse of the first half 
of “Nausicaa” as “Gerty Macdowell’s very self and voice, caught up 
into the narrative machinery” (17),37 and sees Joyce’s narrative 
                                                 
36
 But does the text necessarily judge Emma Bovary? Hugh Kenner cites the response 
(in the book’s obscenity trial) of Imperial Attorney, Mons. Ernest Pinard, discomfited 
by the fact that judgement is not, seemingly, brought to bear upon “this woman”: 
“There is not one character in the book who might condemn her. If you find in it one 
good character, if you find in it one single principle by virtue of which the adulteress 
is stigmatized, I am wrong” (Joyce’s Voices 10).  
37
 Hugh Kenner’s understanding of literary modernism, expounded in all his books 
(most notably for my purposes, The Stoic Comedians, Ulysses, and Joyce’s Voices) 
centres on its antagonism to classical realism, most clearly evident in its commitment 
to “Objectivity” – rendering concrete detail without an authorial narrator passing 
judgment on characters or events. Kenner’s close reading of Joyce’s narrative 
technique is geared to establishing this difference: in Joyce’s Voices, Kenner prefaces 
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technique here as exemplary of a broad modernist shift away from 
direct authorial pronouncements on characters (of the type found in 
classical realism), which strategy was replaced by what we would now 
term free-indirect discourse: “[T]he normally neutral narrative 
vocabulary is pervaded by a little cloud of idioms which a character 
might use if he were managing the narrative” (17). David Lodge’s 
consideration of Joyce’s narrative technique follows Kenner’s lead, but 
augments description with evaluation, suggesting that Joyce’s narrative 
method is honed so as to “convey a sensibility pathetically limited to 
the concepts and values disseminated by [Lady’s Pictorial]” (After 
Bakhtin 36). Lodge clearly does not simply “read off” the fact that 
Gerty MacDowell’s reading diet is “pathetically limited,” but makes an 
evaluative inference based on his understanding of literary 
modernism.38  
 
What could “cultural studies” possibly add to this mix? Jennifer 
Wicke’s contribution to the 2004 edition of The Cambridge Companion 
to James Joyce, “Joyce and Consumer Culture,” offers a “revisionary” 
reading of the importance of mass commodities in Joyce’s writing, in 
which a consideration of Gerty MacDowell occupies a central position. 
“[M]any analyses of her character,” Wicke notes, “disdain her or pity 
her for her so-called entrapment in what they see as an inevitably 
oppressive web of consumerist images of female beauty, fashion, and 
romantic fantasy” (243). Wicke quickly links this “castigation” with a 
                                                                                                                                   
his close attention to Joyce’s uncompromising “Objectivity” with an explanation of 
the marked difference in narratorial strategies between Dickens (in Oliver Twist) and 
the Flaubert of Madam Bovary. Whereas Dickens “stamp[s] his sarcasms on every 
phrase” (6), Flaubert’s Objectivity “eschews nudges” (8). Objectivity is also closely 
related to the modernist penchant for drawing attention, self-reflexively, to the process 
of signification, highlighting that reality effects were the product of “Multiple 
illusion”, “mirror on mirror mirroring all the show” (11).  
38
 Although, from the evidence readers are presented with, the idea of deprivation 
would seem to be implicit: “[H]ad she only received the benefit of a good education 
Gerty MacDowell might easily have held her own beside any lady in the land … and 
[had] patrician suitors at her feet” (286). 
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particular (and implicitly outmoded) view of the commodity, and offers 
in its place the revelation that although Gerty might be “penetrated” by 
an advertising lexicon” (244), she in fact “recontextualizes” this 
lexicon, and the mass produced accoutrements she cherishes, so as to 
stage a (limited) overcoming of her apparently hopeless situation. What 
interests here is not the analysis in itself, which contests moralistic 
readings of “Nausicaa” by simply offering another in its place, but the 
way that Wicke presents her findings as the natural product of an 
evaluative sea-change within the literary academy.  
 
Wicke’s entire critical oeuvre is framed as a response to this move. Her 
first book (the argument of which underpins her later essay), 
Advertising Fictions: Literature, Advertisement, and Social Reading 
(1988) was published in a series entitled The Social Foundations of 
Aesthetic Forms; it divides its attention between the work of literary 
heavyweights (Dickens, Henry James, and Joyce) and the development 
of the modern discourse of advertising, aiming to prosecute a series of 
“mutually interpenetrating readings” that stress both the novel genre’s 
indebtedness (not sheer hostility) to advertising discourse, and, in 
effect, the “literariness” of advertising. With Marshall McLuhan, she 
dismisses the Leavisite theory that advertising and popular culture 
retarded the “emotional vocabulary” of the masses (9); on the contrary, 
Wicke claims, advertising is not reducible to a single purpose (whether 
that be seen as impelling consumption, or disseminating ideology) but 
can float free from its commercial origin, and, in the social milieu it 
enters, be put to multiple, unpredictable uses. (At times Wicke seems 
simply to reverse the Leavisite formula, seeing ads as augmenting the 
emotional vocabulary of “the masses” emotional vocabulary.) Wicke 
finds that this theory maps onto Ulysses with astonishing ease; she can 
point out, for example, that numerous characters are “constellated in 




When applied to Ulysses in the later essay, Wicke’s cultural-studies-
inflected criticism becomes focused on the dubious task of 
demonstrating that Joyce’s treatment of Gerty Macdowell is, in fact, 
unironic. Despite acknowledging that her interest in “commodity 
culture” is the result of “critical fashions,” her argument rests on a 
series of appeals to authorial intention: Joyce’s works are “spaces with 
privileged access to mass culture” (235); “Joyce and by extension his 
writings understand things about the mysteries of mass culture and of 
how consuming works that we still haven’t completely figured out” 
(236); “Joyce by no means deplores commodity culture, just as he does 
not repudiate mass culture” (236). Thus, Gerty “is not taken advantage 
of by a misogynist Bloom across the strand, she takes advantage of the 
possibilities for escape and fulfilment, meagre as they are, categorized 
for her by the allure of the consumer goods she both incorporates and 
also rearranges” (244-45). 
 
Both Wicke and Carey, then, offer partial readings of Ulysses that take 
the modernist “discourse of the great divide” as their backdrop. Irony is 
an important concept for both of these critics: in the absence of 
explicitly evaluative statements, it is the one “mode of the unsaid” that 
necessarily has an evaluative dimension.  
 
Linda Hutcheon’s recent consideration of the vast body of literature on 
irony adopts a stance that stresses the active role of the interpreter (as 
opposed to the “ironist”) in giving rise to irony: “The interpreter as 
agent performs an act – attributes both meanings and motives – and 
does so in a particular situation and context, for a particular purpose, 
and with particular means. Attributing irony involves, then, both 
semantic and evaluative inferences. Irony’s appraising edge is never 
absent and, indeed, is what makes irony work differently from other 
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forms [such as metaphor and metonymy] which it might structurally 
seem to resemble” (12). Irony may thus be intentional or unintentional; 
but the active role of the interpreter means that the identification of 
irony cannot be thought of  “simply as one of decoding or 
reconstructing some “real” meaning” (11)—indeed, “identification” is, 
in this context, an inapt term (in describing the play of irony, Hutcheon 
prefers to say that irony “happens”). For irony, as Hutcheon 
understands it, will like all interpretation depend on the identity of the 
interpreter at the time of the encounter with a text or speech act: “irony 
happens because what could be called “discursive communities” 
already exist and provide the context for both the deployment and 
attribution of irony. We all belong simultaneously to many such 
communities of discourse, and each of these has its own restrictive … 
but also enabling communication conventions” (18). Intentional irony is 
possible for precisely the reasons offered by Barbara Smith in pointing 
out that the contingency of value judgments does not make them 
meaningless or “subjective”: contingencies, or “discursive 
communities,” will tend to coincide, or at least partially overlap.39  
 
This position points up obvious problems in both Carey’s and Wicke’s 
respective attempts to implicate Joyce’s work in, or distance it from, the 
modernist “discourse of the great divide”. The definitive performance 
of cultural evaluation both critics seek is not a property of the text itself, 
as they both claim, but is instead a product of the evaluative discourse 
being brought to bear: irony happens or fails to happen for those critics 
in accordance with their own particular interests, agendas, identities. 
Carey’s book is framed as something of an exposé of modernist artists’ 
                                                 
39
 “It has been said … that there are books about irony … and books about 
interpretation … but for me the two cannot be separated: irony isn’t irony until it is 
interpreted as such – at least by the intending ironist, if not the intended receiver. 
Someone attributes irony; someone makes irony happen. For the examples offered 
here, that “someone” is me, but your reading is likely to be quite different, either in its 
general decision about the attribution of irony or in its specific sense of where and 
how the irony comes into play” (6). 
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“disturbing” attitudes towards “mass culture”; artists must conform to 
this type to qualify for inclusion in the study. Wicke, by contrast, sees 
in Joyce’s work a reflection of her own cultural studies-derived beliefs 
– namely those (critically) characterised by John Frow (quoting Simon 
Frith) in the essay “Cultural Studies and the Neoliberal Imagination”: 
cultural studies’ tendency      
 
to accept the Frankfurt reading of cultural production and to look for 
the redeeming features of commodity culture in the act of consumption 
… In British subcultural theory, this reworking took on the particular 
form of identifying certain social groups with what we might call 
“positive mass consumption.” … The value of cultural goods could 
therefore be equated with the value of the groups consuming them—
youth, the working class, women, and so forth. (qtd 426) 
 
Going further, we can ask whether the play of “popular culture”/ 
“mass” culture / “commodity culture” (etc) and “high” culture, located 
by both critics within the novel, can be thought of adequately as a 
property of the text itself? I have suggested that the necessity felt by 
Wicke and Carey to read Ulysses in terms of a “high” / “mass” binary is 
better thought of as the product of the critical discourse that proposes 
this opposition, rather than anything intrinsic to Ulysses. These readings 
are necessarily affected by contemporary understandings of the terms 
“high” and “popular”/ “mass” culture—both Carey and Wicke 
explicitly acknowledge this. When we consider that both Carey and 
Wicke are literary intellectuals, those who are, in the contemporary 
milieu, perhaps most readily identified with the “high” side of this 
discursively constructed divide, it is tempting to speculate as to how 
these literary readings might be intended to work, rhetorically, in the 
present. 
 
For it seems that, in both of these instances, Ulysses is simply the totem 
around which these critics seek to display their own ‘enlightened’ 
understandings of cultural value. Carey’s book sees an Oxford 
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intellectual flay the wrong-headed modernists for their misguided 
attitudes to the “masses”; the difference between “intellectuals” then 
and now is underscored by the fact that Carey’s book is designedly 
middle-brow, written for a wide audience. Wicke, by contrast, identifies 
with Joyce, but to a similar end: when she suggests that “Joyce does not 
repudiate mass culture,” is the unconcealed subtext not: “I do not 





If the “reintegration of culture and Culture” announced by the 
ascendancy of cultural studies has provided the “Joyce industry” with 
new theoretical grounds from which to launch novel readings of Joyce’s 
oeuvre, it has also raised disquieting questions for that “industry”. For if 
one accepts that “high cultural” texts, or those works embodied as such 
in the university curriculum, are not inherently more valuable than 
works institutionally defined as “popular culture” – and, moreover, that 
traditional cultural hierarchies are the stuff of class protectionism 
(among other things) – then where does this place those who specialise 
in the study of canonical authors? 
 
John Guillory’s point that extant canonical texts cannot, in themselves, 
be understood as representing the interests of a discrete section of 
society provides a ready defence from the type of attack on the canon 
obliquely referred to above. That Joyce’s work is now canonical, “high” 
culture, modernist (etc) has more to do with processes of institutional 
transmission/reproduction than with the text itself.  
 
As I have argued, though, in the case of a text like Ulysses, where there 
is much (as Carey suggests) to suggest inherent elitism, ‘hostility to 
mass culture’, and so on – and, perhaps, an equal amount to suggest the 
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opposite – it is tempting for critics to stage debates about the cultural 
value and values of the book as if the text itself was the central 
protagonist.  
 
One example of this attempt to strip away institutional processes and 
get at the “real” text comes in a recent review article in the Times 
Literary Supplement by Joyce scholar Justin Beplate. As emblematic of 
the mood within Joyce studies, Beplate cites Patrick Kavanagh’s poem 
“Who Killed James Joyce?” which, on his account, “indicts the shallow 
careerism of American academic culture – the “Harvard thesis”, “Yale 
man”, and “broadcast Symposium” – for cutting Joyce off from his 
cultural roots and coffining him with all the pomp of a state funeral” 
(4). (For its part, then, the “Joyce industry” acknowledges its complicity 
in, and discomfort with, the “canon effect” through which Ulysses’ 
“high-ness” has become entrenched and essentialised.) Beplate 
continues: “Ironically enough, […] universal deference is one of the big 
problems facing Joyce studies today, for if bringing him within the pale 
of the literary canon makes him both grist for the academic mill and 
safe for the tourist trade, it also diminishes the immediacy of his 
challenge to us as readers” (3). Here Joyce’s “high”-ness, in the 
Adornean sense of irreducible challenge, is implicitly defended, while 
canonical “high”-ness (the appropriation of Joyce’s works as 
“legitimate” cultural capital) is seen as an obstacle to be overcome if his 
works are to be read and valued appropriately.40     
 
The activity that seems to most unite the contemporary “Joyce 
industry” is reasserting Joyce’s provocativeness, drawing attention to 
Ulysses’ humour and energy, its “chaotic” quality that Eliot and others 
sought to downplay. Brooker’s account of the rise of “theory” among 
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 I note here that this view has affinities with John Guillory’s defence of aesthetic 
pleasure in Cultural Capital, which I discussed briefly above (note 8 supra).  
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Joyceans focuses on a shift in academic criteria of value: 
“poststructuralism finds in Joyce a countermodernism: the stasis 
promoted by Eliot, Gilbert, and [Harry] Levin is dissolved into mobility 
and kinesis” (178). The recent turn to history, politics, and Irishness in 
Joyce studies,41 announcing the demise of approaches to the study of 
literature that stress the self-enclosed monumentality of literary art, may 
be viewed in a similar light.  For if all of these moves reflect 
broadening interpretive methods and assumptions within the literary 
academy, I would suggest that they can also be seen (especially in their 
explicit opposition to modernist reading practices) as implicitly 
responding to those recent developments in critical theory, detailed in 
my previous chapter, which question the evaluative and ideological 
implications of literary (canonical) study itself. Literary critics now 
clamour to position themselves “after the great divide.” 
 
This provides the backdrop for the final argument I would like to 
consider at length – one that, revealingly, places cultural-historical 
questions about Joyce’s relationship/evaluative set towards “popular” 
culture alongside a consideration of where this places contemporary 
critics and readers of Joyce. I refer to prominent scholar Derek 
Attridge’s contribution to Kershner’s collection, Joyce and Popular 
Culture.  
 
Like the present chapter, Attridge’s essay “Theoretical Approaches to 
Popular Culture”42 is occasioned by “the development of new ways of 
talking about the issues involved in the notions of “popular” and “elite” 
culture” (23), and seeks to draw out the implications of cultural studies 
arguments for the activity of Joycean criticism. Because “discussions of 
                                                 
41
 See Marjorie Howes’ and Derek Attridge’s introduction to the collection 
Semicolonial Joyce for a detailed summary of this “turn” in criticism. 1-17. 
42
 This essay was reprinted in Attridge’s recently published book Joyce Effects, under 
the title “Popular Joyce?”  pp 30-34.   
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popular culture in this century have tended to entail discussions of 
modernism” (23-24), Joyce’s works can be seen as central documents in 
the development of such arguments, which in turn have interesting 
implications, Attridge suggests, when applied to the widespread 
perception of Joyce’s works as “arcane, obscure, and of interest only to 
students of English literature” (23). After noting briefly that disparate 
relations to “mass culture” among early 20th century artists are often 
brushed over in generalised accounts of modernism, Attridge turns to a 
discussion of one of the elements of Ulysses most frequently cited in 
assertions that the book is designedly forbidding:  
 
It is clearly true that some writing has a built-in resistance to wide 
appeal; it depends on the detection of learned references and esoteric 
allusions, the ability to process highly complex syntax and unusual 
vocabulary, the possession of an extraordinary verbal memory. (24)   
 
“[A]t first blush” (24), Attridge agrees, Joyce’s works would seem to 
fall into this category. However, the real congruence of Joyce’s writing 
with cultural studies arguments, as Attridge understands those 
arguments, is in the work’s refusal to privilege the “learned” reference: 
 
the distinguishing feature of Joyce’s use of recherché material is that it 
does not constitute the key or the core of the work; it is only taken to be 
such by those who assume that the more learned or “high-cultural” the 
reference the more central its place in the work’s scheme. In Ulysses 
and the Wake, the shards of elite culture mingle with the orts of popular 
culture, and there is no principle of hierarchy to govern them. The 
reader of Finnegans Wake who is unfamiliar with “Humpty Dumpty” 
loses as much as the reader unfamiliar with the Scienza Nuova. And if 
you don’t know either, there is still plenty more to get your teeth into. 
(24) 
 
For Attridge, then, the appreciation of Joyce’s works does not depend 
on the reader’s capacity to identify (“high cultural”) learned allusions. 
This proposition alone would be sensible enough, in the sense that 
today’s first-time reader of Joyce would not be directly familiar with 
most of the real-world cultural products Joyce’s texts refer to (the link 
between “high cultural” and “esoteric” is thus not as straightforward as 
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he claims it to be). But Attridge’s claim is complicated by an idea that, 
by dint of the sheer multitude of references Joyce assembles, “Joyce 
builds a principle of accessibility into his work; or, to put it another 
way, there is a whole series of minority audiences, each of which has 
access to special knowledge that will illuminate one aspect of his 
writing, but no one of which occupies a privileged position vis-à-vis the 
text’s meaning” (24).  
 
Poststructuralist thought generally understands interpretation to involve 
the interplay of a text with a reader’s existing values and assumptions 
about texts—a (potentially) unique set of cultural competences that are 
the accretive consequence of prior textual encounters, the ‘already 
read’. At the most general level, Attridge’s argument is simply a 
rehearsal of this orthodox perspective on the contingency of evaluation. 
Yet welding this line exclusively to an argument about allusion, as if 
the constitution of a text’s audience depended on the nature of the other 
texts incorporated by that work, leads to some unlikely conclusions 
(which Attridge himself recognises as such). Finnegans Wake becomes 
uniquely suited for mass consumption, the epitome of the ‘open work’, 
allowing “any reader to recognize familiar items and begin to construct 
a narrative chain or a thematic network out of them” (25).  
 
This proposition is not, he concedes, borne out in the real world of 
readers and books, for reasons having to do with what he sees as a more 
universal assumption about reading any text: “the fundamental 
presupposition that reading is an attempt at textual mastery” (25). These 
sentiments, which culminate in Attridge recommending that readers 
“shed a number of ingrained preconceptions about what it is to read—
expectations and assumptions about linearity, transparency, directness 
of plot, singularity of meaning, and so on” (25), derive from an 
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engagement with French thinkers (especially Derrida),43 and their work 
to expose any totalising interpretation as simply a moment of textual 
arrest, the product of an impulse to fix relations between signifiers 
which are in fact always in motion. What Attridge recommends, then, is 
not an end to interpretation per se, but to the idea that an interpretation 
of a Joycean text that brings considerable learning to bear is any more 
valid, or exhaustive, than one by a reader who makes the most of 
whatever content manifests to him or her as familiar:  
 
The reader who does not have access to the learned tomes produced by 
the Joyce industry and has not internalized the cultural encyclopaedia 
constantly raided by Joyce is not thereby an inferior interpreter, failing 
in the face of an elite cultural product, but is one reader among 
millions, just as capable as any other—in principle—of careful and 
responsive attention to the words and of the understanding and 
enjoyment that follows, though always differently, from such attention. 
(25) 
 
“popular” access to Joyce’s works is at the same time the goal 
Attridge’s admittedly “utopian thinking” aspires to, and the 
precondition for that utopia to come into being. Compounding this 
circularity, the best way to achieve “freedom from totalizing 
interpretive assumptions” (25) is to read Joyce’s work, “to undergo the 
training that Joyce offers in nonmasterful reading” (26).44  
 
It is worthwhile isolating how Attridge is using the term “popular” here. 
Its primary meaning seems to stem from its opposition to “high,” 
“elite,” “canonical.” Texts can be “popular”; it is Joyce’s interspersion 
of those texts with other texts of more “elite” provenance that Attridge 
                                                 
43
 Attridge has published interviews with Derrida, and co-edited the collection of 
essays Post-structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French (1984). 
44
 Attridge stresses that this training “is not an experience available only to an elite, 
whether this be construed as an elite of class, of education, or of intelligence. […] 
There is no intrinsic reason why the pleasurable labor of the “difficult” text should not 
be open to the majority of the population” (26). This is true—however, it is also true 




initially focuses on. Then we have Attridge’s singular take on what 
makes texts Joycean, and therefore valuable (their ability to teach us 
nonmasterful reading): what does this have to do with the “popular”? 
The following suggests a tangled connection:  
 
The techniques that [Joyce], above all, introduced into Western verbal 
“high culture” have now permeated much wider reaches of the cultural 
domain – along with the iconoclastic approach and the destabilizing 
humor that they serve. It’s not too far-fetched to claim that the most 
interesting and most worthwhile productions of popular culture are, in 
the very specific sense I’ve been arguing for, “Joycean.” So it may be 
that the generation growing up with postmodern music and video will 
find Joyce more accessible than their parents did – at least if the aura 
that surrounds his work can be punctured by the kind of irreverence and 
exuberance that he himself displayed so brilliantly. … Joyce is already 
part of what is most valuable in popular culture; our task is not to deny 
or smother that congruence, but to learn from it and build on it. (26) 
 
Joycean techniques are thus imbricated with the “popular”; and both 
Joyce’s work and “popular” culture are hostile (in a good way) to the 
ideologies associated with the creation of elite, inaccessible, canonical 
monuments. In one step, Attridge removes the problematic taint of 
“high”-ness from both Joyce and Joycean academics, both of whom are 
recast, in the name of the “popular,” as agents of cultural progress. 
 
The unlikely conclusions Attridge reaches result from the binaries he 
works with – readable vs unreadable, “high” vs “popular” – as if a text, 
in itself, must fit one or other of these categories. What Attridge 
wilfully misses is that regardless of what allusions or representations 
Ulysses, for example, contains, the mode of literacy possessed by those 
predisposed to esteem Ulysses as a valuable cultural text is, as Bourdieu 
(and Carey) would stress, transmitted overwhelmingly through 
institutions of higher education. It is true that the congruence of 
Joycean techniques with cultural forms now elsewhere found in 
“postmodern music and video” may work in favour of Ulysses 
continuing to be valued and esteemed by new generations of the 
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university-educated (whose sensibilities are also shaped by, and shape, 
the development of this “popular” culture). But this is very different 
from what Attridge proposes: that the cloak of monumentality that has 
been foisted on Ulysses might now be removed, and the text’s essential 
congruence with “popular” culture revealed. Attridge attempts to 
contest an essentialist idea of what follows from Ulysses’ “high” 
cultural status with an equally essentialist “popular Joyce,” 
simultaneously populist and disruptive.    
 
As I outlined in chapter two, John Frow stresses that there is no whole, 
coherent domain of “popular culture”, and from this premise, suggests 
that scholarly writings on the differences or congruencies between 
“high” and “popular” culture can be seen as equally question begging. 
More than this, though, the discourse of high vs popular culture masks, 
for Frow, the place of intellectuals in the cultural field. A cultural 
intellectual’s representation of “the popular” is seen by Frow as the 
“representation of a theoretical object” (60), an act which Frow ties 
firmly to the problem of intellectuals “speaking, or claiming to speak, 
on behalf of someone else” (60).  
 
Frow’s plea for intellectuals to implicate themselves—the particular 
“regimes of value” associated with intellectual work—in debates that 
are usually staged in broad “high”/ “popular” terms, is directed squarely 
at cultural studies academics reading “popular cultural” texts, but is also 
relevant in this context: 
 
our attention must be turned away from that mythical popular subject 
immediate to observation, and focused instead on the relation between 
two different kinds of practice: a ‘first-order’ practice everyday culture, 
and the ‘second-order’ practice of analysis of it conducted by a reader 
endowed with significant cultural capital. I define this here, and for my 
present purposes, as a relation between intellectuals and their others—
whoever those ‘others’ may be, and recognizing that these two groups, 
and those two kinds of practice, often and perhaps necessarily overlap 
(‘first-order’ practices are also reflexive; intellectuals are themselves 
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those ‘others’). It is the politics of this relation that must frame any 
reading of cultural texts ‘in themselves’. (87) 
 
This sort of self-conscious refusal to separate “high” and “popular” 
culture from the (intellectual, institutional) vantage point that brings the 
categories into being would destabilise much of the “Joyce and popular 
culture” scholarship traversed throughout this chapter. The claims of 
Attridge, Kershner, Wicke, and others, to be writing, somehow, on the 
side of “the popular”, while at the same time writing from an 
institutionally privileged vantage about a canonical text, are readily 
deflated. So too are claims that Joyce’s work is definitively part of or 
separable from, or pro- or anti-, “popular” culture. What is masked by 
these sorts of arguments, all premised on “the essential coherence of 
cultural ‘levels’” (Frow 86), is a complex collection of variables that 
are not tractable in terms of a single high/low opposition. For 
attempting to chart the relationship of “high” and “popular” culture in 
Ulysses is to invoke the text’s difficulty; its (institutionally determined) 
canonicity and modernism; the discourse of ‘the great divide’; and 
contemporary discourses of “high” and “popular” culture—all of this 
without considering the text “in itself.” Indeed, while it may limit the 
scope for novel interpretive criticism, refusing to allow the possibility 
of considering the text’s “high” or “popular” qualities—or the text’s 
take on the relationship between those domains—in isolation from 
those discourses and institutional processes I have mentioned, would 
provide the best chance for literary critics to escape the modernist 
tendency to treat “high” and “low” culture as definite, real-world 
structures—or in Huyssen’s words, to demonstrate their “distance from 
the great divide”.  
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This chapter is concerned with another “encyclopaedic” novel—David 
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996)—and another era of cultural 
production—so-called “postmodernism”—in which it is broadly agreed 
that high culture, popular culture, and the relationship between these 
imaginary monoliths, have been irreversibly altered. Such a view of the 
postmodern derives its force from numerous cultural developments, 
including the apparent ascendancy of axiological scepticism in 
universities (disallowing the easy division of culture according to 
intrinsic value or disvalue), and the all-encompassing expansion of 
mass cultural industries, which has conclusively thwarted the modernist 
fantasy of maintaining a non-commodity domain of high-cultural 
production. Moreover, many critics treat the prevalence in 
“postmodern” fiction (and throughout contemporary art) of 
representational strategies that somehow blur the line between “high” 
and “popular” genres and traditions as an announcement of the end of 
modernism’s anxious attempts to exclude and declaim the mass 
cultural. Combining these various threads, one simplistic narrative of 
the shift from modernism to postmodernism reads as follows: Whereas 
modernism aimed to bolster and sustain the category of inherent 
aesthetic value, complete with the sense of social exclusivity that the 
phrase now connotes, postmodernism accepts that “high” culture and 
aesthetic experience are fully bound up with other modes of cultural 
production and experience from which they were traditionally 
distinguished. 
 
With reference to Infinite Jest, this chapter explores some of the pitfalls 
of this all-inclusive narrative of the dismantlement of a “great divide.” 
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In particular, I question the common association of a postmodern 
literary discourse—the overt fusion of “high” and “low” cultural 
traditions—with the demise of two-track, inherentist models of cultural 
evaluation. One does not necessarily follow from the other. As I 
mentioned in chapter two, that literary discourse’s continued reliance 
on high/low terms suggests affinities with modernist ideas about 
cultural value; postmodern relativism/postaxiology would be more 
inclined to turn its attention to examining the power relations and 
evaluative discourses that, for particular viewers, give the terms their 
meaning and relevance. 
 
Infinite Jest—an enormous novel, 1077 densely typed pages long—is a 
particularly fertile text with which to consider the use of high/low 
discourse in an overtly postmodern literary setting. This is especially 
true in light of what has already been said on the subject of Ulysses, for 
many of the features of Ulysses that have complicated literary scholars’ 
descriptions of that novel in terms of its drawing together of “high” and 
“low” culture are echoed in Wallace’s work. Infinite Jest attempts to 
occupy a cultural position that has affinities both with Ulysses’ place in 
the contemporary cultural marketplace, and with the cachet Ulysses 
achieved, for a small but culturally powerful audience, following its 
original publication. Infinite Jest makes use of a wide range of cultural 
forms and existing texts (including Ulysses), declaring itself to be the 
work of an author of prodigious cultural range (au fait, as Joyce was, 
with canonical extremes of “high” and “low” culture). In addition, 
Wallace’s magnum opus is, on a thematic level, overtly concerned with 
the idea of cultural consecration (and with cultural evaluation more 
generally).  
 
My focus in this chapter will be on Wallace’s own exploration of ideas 
about cultural value—especially his evident understanding of “high” 
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and “popular” culture—in the context of postmodern literary culture. 
First though, by way of introduction to Wallace’s writing, describing 
Infinite Jest’s ambiguous place in the contemporary cultural 
marketplace will provide a précis of pragmatic reasons why the 
straightforward application of “high” and “popular” categories is no 
longer possible in a contemporary context.45  
 
“High Culture” or “Mass Entertainment”?  
 
Infinite Jest is the sort of book that would, in bygone days, have been 
labelled “high cultural” by cultural academics. Numerous aspects of the 
book seem designed to announce its aspired-to status as prodigious 
cultural achievement or literary monument; asserting its place in a 
“high cultural” tradition. Infinite Jest’s daunting size plays an important 
part in this rhetoric of value-assertion, as does its title, which, as well as 
suggesting some sort of maximum (of value? or fun?) is an allusion to 
Hamlet, a text that, like Ulysses, has become so intimately associated 
with the literary canon that it could be said to stand metonymically for 
“high culture.” (The phrase comes from the graveyard scene, when 
Hamlet famously holds up the skull of the king’s jester: “Alas, poor 
Yorick! I knew him, Horatio; a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent 
fancy” (Act 5, Sc. 1, 156-7).) The book is demanding to read; for its 
intended audience, it is enjoyably “complex.” Much of the early 
response to Infinite Jest hastened to position Wallace as an author who, 
in the canonical tradition of Thomas Pynchon and William Gaddis (and 
Wallace’s literary lineage is often traced back to James Joyce himself), 
disclosed a polymathic “high cultural” ambition to out-do his 
contemporaries. 
 
                                                 
45
 A better way of putting this might be to say that aspects of contemporary cultural 
production seem to lay bare the fact that high/low categories were always imaginary: 
socially/discursively constructed, rather than coherent “real world” blocs. 
  
Cooke 91
Yet considering the way Wallace’s “high cultural” book arrived in the 
marketplace quickly exposes the redundancy, in a contemporary 
context, of the traditional blanket distinction between the “high” and 
“mass” cultural. In a recent profile of Wallace’s editor, Michael Pietsch, 
in New York Magazine, Pietsch explained the tactics used to ensure 
Infinite Jest achieved “best-seller” status (an achievement that, 
according to the profile,  proved to be “the decisive step of [Pietsch’s] 
career” as well as Wallace’s). Making the book amenable to “mass” 
distribution did not mean playing down the book’s size and difficulty; 
quite the opposite: 
Enlisting the help of young writers like his author Rick Moody, Pietsch 
set out to incite envy among Wallace's peers. "The trick was getting 
other writers to recognize that this was the guy to beat," Pietsch says. 
Then he ruminated on overcoming reader reluctance. "I can show you 
the place," Pietsch recalls, "up on the hill by my house where I first 
thought of making this a challenge: Are you reader enough?" 
The dare worked. Infinite Jest made David Foster Wallace as close to a 
household name as a jittery, bandanna-headed, run-off-at-the-mouth 
former philosophy student could ever hope to get. 
"It was great for Little, Brown," Pietsch says, interpreting his success 
first in company terms. "It impressed a lot of booksellers and agents; 
personally, it was some of the best fun I've had." 
Little, Brown is the “quality-book imprint”46 of Time Warner, one of the 
corporations most routinely demonised in castigations of the modern 
culture industries. Wallace’s readers constitute a target market for a 
global publishing conglomerate—readers of “quality books”—whose 
triggers of cultural value that corporation will attempt to predict and 
cater to. As John Frow writes, high culture is “now fully absorbed 
within commodity production” (23); if we retain the term at all, “high 
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culture” is now best thought of as merely a niche market, not unlike 
“many, increasingly differentiated, low cultural products” (23).47   
 
In 2006 Infinite Jest was re-released in a special 10th anniversary 
edition, a marketing gesture that again demonstrates the inadequacy of 
traditional “high”/ “low” categories to describe the cultural position 
Wallace’s literary fiction seeks to occupy. On one hand, the 
commemorative edition, complete with introductory essay by American 
writer and publisher Dave Eggers, echoes the format adopted by, for 
example, Penguin Classics, and is a similar attempt to ensure the work 
is reproduced as one whose cultural value is no longer questionable. 
But the way Eggers vaunts Wallace’s “singular” achievement is 
instructive: 
 
Here’s a question once posed to me, by a large baseball cap-wearing 
English major at a medium-sized western college: Is it our duty to read 
Infinite Jest? This is a good question, and one that many people, 
particularly literary-minded people, ask themselves. The answer is: 
maybe. Sort of. Probably, in some way. If we think it’s our duty to read 
this book, it’s because we’re interested in genius. We’re interested in 
epic writerly ambition. 
 
The vernacular appeal to the book’s likely audience is cast very much 
as a recommendation to a niche market, rather than a diagnosis of 
essential value (contrast Eliot’s essay on Ulysses). Eggers does not 
refrain from using the term “genius” or “duty” but, tellingly, he goes on 
to compare Wallace’s achievement to other prodigious achievements in 
pop music, folk art, film. For the English majors and “literary-minded” 
people Eggers is targeting, the broad-brush hierarchies often associated 
with commemorative assessments of cultural achievement seem to be 
only of nostalgic relevance. 
 
                                                 
47
 Frow also argues that “High culture … is no longer ‘the dominant culture’ but is 
rather a pocket within commodity culture. Its primary relationship is not to the ruling 
class but to the intelligentsia, and to the education system which is the locus of their 
power and the generative point for most high cultural practices” (86). 
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As a commodity/artefact then, Infinite Jest might be held up as an 
exemplar for why “high” / “low” terms, in their traditional sense, are 
(or should be) obsolescent. “Postmodern” conditions of cultural 
production may echo past cultural configurations (the “quality imprint” 
could be seen as an example of this), but attempts now to establish 
“high” and “low” culture as real, separable categories are readily 
deflated or deconstructed.  
 
This situation or “social organisation of culture,” in John Frow’s 
phrase, could be described without close reference to contemporary 
texts or representations themselves. But contemporary, critically aware 
fiction is often read as acknowledging this situation – most commonly, 
at least according to conventional descriptions of “postmodern”’ 
literature, by performing such deconstructions, blending high/low 
genres and so forth. It is in this sense that I first wish to consider 
Infinite Jest as a novel, at the level of representation.  
 
Infinite Jest as a “Text of the Culture” 
 
The phrase used by several Joycean critics in describing Ulysses—a 
“text of the culture”—seems, at first gloss, readily applicable to Infinite 
Jest. Wallace’s sprawling work discloses a similar ambition to represent 
characters, dialects/idioms, institutions, and behaviours of cultural 
consumption and production from diverse social settings. Wallace treats 
(at great length) of professional sports, literary academia, mass-media 
advertising, avant-garde film production, home entertainment. 
‘Upscale’ households, drug addicts, pharmacological analysis, and 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings share page space with representations 
of high-school rivalries and eccentric family dramas. Also in keeping 
with the discourse of cultural all-inclusiveness beloved by Joycean 
critics, Infinite Jest, like Ulysses, contains a great number of disparate 
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allusions—from popular music and sitcoms (Beatles song lyrics, for 
example; M*A*S*H) to Hamlet and The Brothers Karamazov. One 
early review announced Wallace’s novel as an “astonishing and vast 
epic of contemporary American culture”—precisely the sort of response 
it seems Wallace’s work goes out of its way to elicit.48  
 
But Wallace’s book does not attempt, as Ulysses does (in one respect), 
to exhaustively represent a real-world cultural milieu. Instead, Wallace 
imagines an absurdist and non-realistic United States near future, 
deformed, in the best tradition of the dystopian novel, by the 
exaggerated effects of what the author identifies as worrying cultural 
trends. Chief among these is the archetypically postmodern theme of 
rampant consumerism: Wallace depicts a society in which, as 
sociologist Mark Lyon says of “postmodern”’ society in general, 
“consumer lifestyles and mass consumption dominate the waking lives 
of its members” (Lyon 56). 
 
The North American continent has been politically transformed into the 
O.N.A.N. (Organization of North American Nations), a triumvirate of 
“interdependent” nations including Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico. The United States is presided over by a farcically childish and 
impetuous President—retired Las Vegas entertainer Johnny Gentle—
whose “Clean Up America” party sweeps into power by promising a 
tidy solution to late-capitalist America’s waste problems. (The solution: 
turn a substantial proportion of New England into a giant waste dump, 
                                                 
48
 It is worth noting here that, in the tradition of the “encyclopaedic novel” or “text of 
the culture,” Infinite Jest’s rhetorical claim to take the whole of U.S. culture as its 
subject matter is bolstered by its juxtaposition of extremes. That is, an impossible 
claim to all-inclusiveness is made plausible by the prominence of culturally exalted 
and base (high/low) elements (Hamlet vs M*A*S*H, for instance). Rather than mere 
disparate (unrelated) cultural forms/behaviours, these can be rationalised (by readers 
familiar with such appeals) as two poles between which every other cultural text or 
behaviour might logically be accommodated. An impression of all-inclusiveness is 
thus generated by the symbolic distance between the book’s cultural limits. 
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and then, in a gesture of continental “interdependence,” forcibly gift 
that territory to Canada. We can rest assured that the pun on “continent” 
is intended; the US’s new territorial arrangement is merely a way of 
managing its excretions.) Corporate advertising has reached new levels 
of ubiquity, and the resourceful administration’s new source of revenue 
is to auction off naming rights to each successive year, discarding the 
Gregorian calendar in favour of “Subsidized Time” (hence “Year of the 
Depend Adult Undergarment,” or “Year of the Trial-Size Dove Bar”). 
Even America’s most sacred democratic symbol is co-opted as a 
corporate envoy: 
 
NNYC’s harbor’s Liberty Island’s gigantic Lady has the sun for a 
crown and holds what looks like a huge photo album under one arm, 
and the other arm holds aloft a product. The product is changed each 1 
Jan. by brave men with pitons and cranes. (367)  
 
The O.N.A.N. is assuredly a “bread and circuses” polity (and the phrase 
is invoked several times in the book). Despite obvious differences 
between characters’ social standing and educational attainment, each of 
Infinite Jest’s enormous cast of characters gravitates towards 
discomfort-numbing entertainments, exemplified by television (or its 
futuristic equivalent) and, more troublingly, pharmaceuticals. 
Conventional television has been replaced by “Interlace,” a distribution 
network that provides “entertainments” to the O.N.A.N.’s “Teleputers.” 
The genteel, non-commodity basis on which “high cultural” production 
was traditionally founded is thoroughly eroded in Wallace’s O.N.A.N., 
with all modes of cultural participation typically described as acts of 
consumption, ingestion, digestion. 
 
However, Wallace does not imagine a future wherein the distinction 
between high and low culture has ceased to be drawn, or where cultural 
tastes have ceased to be reliable markers of social status. If Infinite Jest 
is to be thought of as a “text of the culture,” then the culture it portrays 
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is one founded on a dramatic high/low binarism, a divide that we see is 
perpetuated by the unequal access to cultural capital (via institutions of 
“higher learning”). Wallace’s vision of a future metropolitan Boston 
takes as its focus twin extremes of wealth and pauperism: the culturally 
privileged (students, or former students, of various academies) and a 
culturally excluded underclass. This owes much to the demographics of 
real-world Boston, but in Infinite Jest the divide takes an exaggerated 
form, figuratively expressed in the steep gradient separating the book’s 
two key locations, Enfield Tennis Academy (E.T.A.) and Ennet House, 
the latter being a halfway house for recovering drug addicts. E.T.A. sits 
imposingly atop “far and away the biggest hill in Enfield MA. The 
hillside is fenced, off-limits, densely wooded and without sanctioned 
path” (197); Enfield House, meanwhile, sits contiguous to this steep 
hillside, in the elite school’s shadow. The somewhat farcical cultural 
elitism—the “high-ness”—of E.T.A is writ large (it is “the only 
athletic-focus-type school in North America that still adheres to the 
trivium and quadrivium of the hard-ass classical L.A.S. tradition” 
(188)), an extreme of rarefaction that finds its apparent opposite in the 
experiential depths lived through by residents of Ennet House. 
 
In the first instance, Infinite Jest’s high/low divide might be treated 
simply as a socio-economic one: Ennet House and ETA serve clienteles 
that typically hail from different class backgrounds. Early in the book, 
Infinite Jest’s rapid juxtaposition of seemingly disconnected scenes, 
which give fragments of various characters’ back stories, including 
abject details of the pre-recovery lives of “low” characters (who later 
resurface at Ennet House), is well suited to conveying this disparity. 
The third-person narrative voice Wallace uses throughout Infinite Jest is 
a particularly effective means through which to mark characters socio-
linguistically as “high” or “low” cultural; the extensive use of free-
indirect discourse allows Wallace to inflect his essayistic, garrulous 
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style with characters’ distinctive idioms. Early sections of the book 
switch freely between this mode and fragments of first-person 
testimony. An example is “Clenette,” one of Infinite Jest’s many 
peripheral characters, whose voice is heard fleetingly:  
 
Wardine say her momma aint treat her right. Reginald he come round to 
my blacktop at my building where me and Delores Epps jump double 
dutch and he say, Clenette, Wardine be down at my crib cry say her 
momma aint treat her right, and I go on with Reginald to his building 
where he live at, and Wardine be sit deep far back in a closet in 
Reginald crib, and she be cry. (37)49 
 
As with Joyce’s representations of the inner lives of low-culture 
consuming, educationally limited Dubliners in Ulysses, this is not 
merely a representation of how Clenette thinks or speaks, but of how 
she might herself be imagined to transcribe her testimony into text. The 
missing apostrophe in “aint” is just as significant as a marker of social 
status (and here race) as the idiomatic construction “she be cry”.  
 
Such solecisms are especially noticeable in Infinite Jest because they 
are so often commented on in the text: Wallace endows many “high” 
cultural characters with an exaggerated attentiveness to grammatical 
propriety. Avril Incandenza, for instance, matriarch of the book’s most 
important family and an administrator at ETA, holds a PhD in 
“prescriptive grammar” and, along with numerous other academicians, 
revels in demonstrating her linguistic authority. Avril’s son Hal 
Incandenza, perhaps the leading contender for ‘main character’ in this 
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 “Clenette” is not heard from again until she is described from the perspective of the 
academy: “A couple of the black girls who work kitchen and custodial day-shifts can 
be seen against the shadowy tree-line, making their way down the steep hillside’s 
unauthorized path back down to the halfway-house thing for wretched people who 
come up here to work short-time. The girls’ bright cheap jackets are vivid in the 
shadow and trees’ tangle. The girls are having to hold hands against the grade, 
walking sideways and digging heavily in at each step” (633). Again, the narrator 
(whose voice is here inflected with the evaluative set of the “high” academy) does not 
miss the opportunity to emphasise the thematically significant steepness of the grade, 
or to stress that the academians’ indifference to the women’s plight is matched by a 
distaste for their “bright cheap” apparel. 
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densely populated novel, takes after his mother in an appropriately 
extreme way: by the Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment, he has 
read, and has full photographic recall of, the entire Oxford English 
Dictionary. The contrast between the “high” and “low” idioms used by 
various characters (impeccable syntax and diction vs crude slang and 
illiteracy) becomes one of the most obvious ways that Wallace stakes 
out an ostensible “great divide” between Infinite Jest’s two main 
settings. 
 
Other points of high/low contrast may be quickly noted. Whereas 
E.T.A. (high culture) is dedicated to the pursuit of sporting and 
academic excellence, Ennet House (low culture) is an institution of last 
resort, where residents are “deprogrammed” by submitting to the 
authority of the institution and the AA recovery programme. E.T.A. 
students receive a (high cultural) humanities-style education based on 
the study of culturally valuable texts; Ennet House residents are 
encouraged to live their newly sober lives according to the clichéd (low 
cultural) commandments of Alcoholics Anonymous. Wallace’s 
descriptions of encounters between characters who seem to have a 
“natural” association with either institution, and their cultural Others, 
make the role of E.T.A. and Ennet House as bastions of (ostensibly) 
high and low culture especially evident. Take, for example, the severe 
aversion of (high cultural) academic and recovering alcoholic, Geoffrey 
Day, to the AA mantras he is expected to imbibe at Ennet House. “‘So 
then at forty-six years of age I came here to learn to live by clichés’” 
(270), Day opines to a fellow resident: 
 
‘One of the exercises is being grateful that life is so much easier now. I 
used sometimes to think. I used to think in long compound sentences 
with subordinate clauses and even the odd polysyllable. Now I find I 
needn’t. Now I live by the dictates of macramé samplers ordered from 
the back-page ad of an old Reader’s Digest or Saturday Evening Post. 
Easy does it. Remember to remember. But for the grace of capital-g 
God. Turn it over. Terse, hard-boiled. Monosyllabic. Good old Norman 
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Rockwell-Paul Harvey wisdom. I walk around with my arms out 
straight in front of me and recite these clichés. In a monotone. No 
inflection necessary. Could that be one? Could that be added to the 
cliché-pool? “No inflection necessary”? Too many syllables, probably.’ 
(271) 
 
Here Wallace’s academic character swiftly links AA affirmation rituals 
with thoughtless passivity, and finds a material counterpart to this 
cultural behaviour in Reader’s Digest home décor. One is reminded of 
the broad links Bourdieu draws between (among other things) taste for 
food, sporting preferences, and mode of relation to aesthetic texts, all 
under the banner of a “popular” or “legitimate” aesthetic. Wallace’s 
invocation of high/low cultural discourses clearly adopts a similarly 
expansive view of how cultural preferences produce and reinforce 
social inequality. 
 
Wallace’s intention in drawing attention to such cultural products and 
behaviours seems broadly congruent with that of Bourdieu, or John 
Frow: he is clearly interested in the complicities that may be established 
between “high” and “low” culture, in demonstrating the impossibility of 
an inherent distinction. Wallace takes a number of approaches to this 
task, including, at a broad level, demonstrating that the socially 
constructed line between wretched and exalted that so dominates the 
Enfield community is permeable. Thus, notwithstanding the lack of 
“sanctioned path” between the institutions, several characters that 
appear “naturally” connected with either institution become immersed 
in the culture of the other, as the novel progresses. Joelle van Dyne, 
graduate student in the film faculty of a prestigious local college and 
favoured screen actress of the late James Incandenza, submits to the 
“banal” teachings of Ennet House in order to overcome a drug 
addiction; late in the novel Hal Incandenza himself appears (while in 
withdrawal from marijuana) at the halfway house’s door. The gradual 
entwinement of the two (high/low) sets of characters represents one of 
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the novel’s most significant plot threads. (The other is the search for a 
master copy of the film “Infinite Jest,” about which I will have more to 
say in the final section of this chapter.) 
 
Wallace’s sympathies, moreover, seem to lie largely with the residents 
of Ennet House, however clichéd their mantras and cultural tastes may 
be. Like Bourdieu, Wallace (in Barbara Smith’s words) “reserves his 
most elaborate satire for the self-privileging grand bourgeois, hapless 
petit bourgeois, and “mis-recognitions” of intellectuals and academics” 
(Smith 198 note 20). Wallace’s academic characters typically put the 
learned discourses they have acquired in the service of evading moral 
questions; Ennet House residents, on the other hand, tend to confront 
such questions head-on—a task for which the AA teachings they 
imbibe are actively useful. For as Gately reflects, “It starts to turn out 
that the vapider the AA cliché, the sharper the canines of the real truth it 
covers” (446). Wallace openly celebrates the utility (or value) of the 
lachrymose or melodramatic—“stuff about heartbreak and people you 
loved dying and U.S. woe, stuff that was real” (592)—and highlights 
the reluctance of “sophisticated” cultural consumers to confront, 
through cultural texts or otherwise, those elements of human 
experience. 
 
The interspersion of “high” and “low” allusions in Infinite Jest (a 
strategy much beloved, as we have seen, by Joycean scholars) may also 
be read as contributing to Wallace’s evident desire to deconstruct, or 
simply deflate, inherentist accounts of high/low categories. Infinite 
Jest’s use of Ulysses is especially pertinent in this context.   
 
Just as numerous commentaries on Ulysses take Stephen and Bloom as 
emblematic of “the intellectuals and the masses” (to borrow John 
Carey’s title), two characters in Infinite Jest seem particularly 
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representative of the latter book’s high/low divide. For Stephen, we 
have Hal Incandenza, one of E.T.A.’s star pupils, who possesses traits 
learned or inherited from two parents of formidable brain power (Avril 
and James Incandenza), who also happen to be the school’s founders 
(Hal’s  film-maker father, James, is deceased by the time of the novel’s 
present-day). Everything about Hal—his breeding, his upbringing, his 
interests and preoccupations, are at age 17 thoroughly implicated in 
what Bourdieu calls the “value-inculcating and value-imposing 
operations” (Distinction 23) of school culture. His education results not 
only in an impressive set of tennis skills, but also a generalised, 
snobbish set towards “legitimate culture” (a flashback to Hal at age ten, 
for instance, describes him sporting a bow-tie, giving an exhaustive 
definition of “implore,” and declaring a precocious enthusiasm for 
Byzantine erotica (27-31)). Hal’s representative function is 
underwritten by a series of unconcealed allusions. Like Stephen, Hal is 
obstinately mourning for a deceased parent, and seems to be “playing 
the role” of Hamlet (to hammer home this point, we see him reading 
that text, in the Riverside Shakespeare edition (171)). Like many of the 
canonical allusions in Infinite Jest, the verbal slip that explicitly 
acknowledges Hal’s canonical provenance, casting him as a modern 
day Telemachus, is banal to the point of parody. Hal is clipping his 
toenails into a wastebasket, when he becomes overwhelmed by self-
consciousness: 
 
‘Launching the nail out toward the wastebasket now seems like an 
exercise in telemachry.’ 
  ‘You mean telemetry?’ 
  ‘How embarrassing. When the skills go they go.’ (249)   
 
The link between Infinite Jest’s other main protagonist, Donald Gately, 
and Leopold Bloom, is less direct. Twenty-nine year-old Donald Gately 
is a live-in staff member at Ennet House and a recovering Demerol 
addict. The product of a disadvantaged background, and a former 
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professional criminal, by the “Year of the Depend Adult 
Undergarment” Gately is an avuncular authority figure, struggling 
heroically to stay sober. Gately is the book’s most sympathetic 
“everyman” character, but as with Joyce’s Bloom, unlikely parallels are 
drawn between the humdrum character and canonical heroic archetypes. 
Gately is cast (again through a series of allusions) as something of a 
modern day Hercules (we learn that both he and Hercules, for example, 
have perfectly square heads (507)). 
 
Numerous other direct references to Ulysses – most of which could be 
well described as “picayune”50 – appear throughout Infinite Jest. Early 
in the book is placed a scene describing an interview between a young 
Hal Incandenza (in this “flashback” scene Hal is ten years old; as the 
book’s central protagonist, most of the events in the novel take place 
when Hal is 17) and his father, James, masquerading as a “professional 
conversationalist” (28). There is no narrator in this section (27-31); the 
narrative is instead rendered as if it were the transcription of an 
interview—focused on recording every word that passes between the 
two characters, and any other sounds that they make. Hence we are 
given the following description of James opening a can of soda and 
passing it to his son: 
 
  SPFFFT. ‘Here you are. Drink up.’ 
  ‘Thanks. SHULGSHULGSPAHHH … Whew. Ah.’ 
  ‘You were thirsty.’ (28) 
 
Joyce pays similarly close attention to onomatopoeia throughout 
Ulysses (Bloom’s cat does not “miaow” but “Mkgnao!” (U 45)); but 
this is most acutely the case in “Sirens,” which focuses on the music of 
events unfolding in the bar of the Ormond Hotel. The episode opens 
with the prose equivalent of a prelude, and, as Jeri Johnson puts it, 
                                                 
50
 Wallace is extremely fond of using obscure and idiomatic diction; he uses this word 
frequently in Infinite Jest. The OED defines “picayune,” which is of U.S. origin, as “2. 
colloq. A worthless or contemptible person; a trivial or unimportant matter or thing.”  
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maintains an intense focus on “received sound rather than […] 
conventional or standardized morphemes” (875). Interspersed 
throughout the noise, or aurally mimetic prose (“One rapped on a door, 
one tapped with a knock, did he knock Paul de Kock with a loud proud 
knocker with a cock carracarracarra cock. Cockcock” (232)) is a series 




This single “Tap” appears five times between pages 231-233; from 234 
their frequency and number increases, first becoming  
 




Tap. Tap. Tap. (235) 
 
—and so on. The source of this noise is not revealed until page 236: 
“Tap blind walked tapping by the tap the curbstone tapping, tap by tap.” 
The identification of the “blind stripling,” whom readers first 
encountered in the previous episode (“Wandering Rocks”), is, in an 
elaborate aural gag, preceded by the distinctive noise made by his cane 
as he wanders the Dublin streets before entering the Ormond Hotel to 
collect his misplaced tuning fork.51 We can now move back to Infinite 
Jest, where, as the description continues of Hal drinking, Wallace finds 
the time for an especially gratuitous allusion: 
 
‘I might have to burp a little in a second, from the soda. I’m alerting 
you ahead of time.’ 
‘Hal, you are here because I am a professional conversationalist, and 
your father has made an appointment with me, for you, to converse.’ 
      ‘MYURP. Excuse me.’ 
      Tap tap tap tap. 
                                                 
51
 This identification is made clearer on page 237: “Tap. Tap. A stripling, blind, with a 
tapping cane came taptaptapping by Daly’s window where a mermaid hair all 
streaming (but he couldn’t see) blew whiffs of a mermaid (blind couldn’t), mermaid, 
coolest whiff of all.” 
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      ‘SHULGSPAHHH.’ 
      Tap tap tap tap. (28) 
 
Hal continues to “Tap” intermittently on his soda can for the next 
several pages of Infinite Jest’s most onomatopoeic “episode,” leaving at 
least one reader feeling simultaneously amused and self-satisfied. There 
are many moments like this in Infinite Jest.52 An anonymous heroin-
addict’s first person account of a day of burglary and narcotics has 
similar canonical resonance, for the knowing reader:  
 
It was yrstruly and C and Poor Tony that crewed that day and 
everything like that. The AM were wicked bright and us a bit sick 
however we scored our wake ups boosting some items at a sidewalk 
sale in the Harvard Square […] we got the citizen to get in his ride with 
us and crewed on him good and we got enough $ off the Patty type to 
get straightened out for true all day (IJ 128-129) 
 
The above fragment of testimony53 quite obviously harks back to 
“Cyclops,” Bloom’s encounter with the xenophobic “Citizen” in a 
Dublin pub: 
  
So then the citizen begins talking about the Irish language and the 
corporation meeting and all to that and the shoneens that can’t speak 
their own language and Joe chipping in because he stuck someone for a 
quid and Bloom putting in his old goo with his twopenny stump that he 
cadged off of Joe and talking about the gaelic league and the 
antitreating league and drink, the curse of Ireland. (U 255) 
 
What to make of these allusions? Their core function seems to be 
simply to advertise their status as allusions, and in doing so, visibly 
satisfy another of the “high cultural” evaluative criteria that are 
prominently aired throughout the book. That is, Infinite Jest’s allusions 
to (ur-canonical) Ulysses seem related to Wallace’s efforts to construct 
a book that incorporates, in a very deliberate way (baring the device), 
                                                 
52
 It should also be noticed that Joycean allusions are common throughout Wallace’s 
oeuvre. For an extravagant example see the short story “Order and Flux in 
Northhampton.” 
53
 The opening sections of the book, especially the first 180 pages, consist of a series 
of fragments of dialogue and novelistic description, which first-time readers have no 
way of assembling into a coherent narrative.  
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virtually every characteristic of extant “cultural monuments” commonly 
put forward as indicative (signs) of their cultural value or literary 
achievement. “If you want literary allusions,” Wallace seems to say (to 
his impliedly high-culture-savvy audience) “then here they are.” 
Roughly the same thing could be said of Infinite Jest’s extravagant size; 
these are both elements of the book’s rhetoric of “high-ness,” of 
Wallace’s efforts to epitomise the “self-evidently valuable” literary text. 
 
The sense that Wallace’s use of allusions may be motivated more by a 
desire to de-naturalise, rather than endorse or participate in, “high 
cultural” evaluative discourses is heightened by another superficial 
resemblance to Ulysses that Wallace builds in to Infinite Jest. This final 
resemblance does not involve a feature that might traditionally impress 
literary scholars, but instead is based on the books’ parallel layouts, the 
way they are reproduced for their respective readerships. In Joycean 
literature, much has been made of the impossibility, for today’s readers, 
of reading anything other than a highly mediated version of Joyce’s 
text. Fredric Jameson has famously described Ulysses as “always-
already read,” while Joseph Brooker writes at length of the “unusual 
relationship [that] obtains between text, commentary, and reader” (60). 
The scholarly annotations that inevitably accompany any modern 
edition of Ulysses are the most obvious way that this “unusual 
relationship” is manifest on the printed page. Together with the simple 
fact of being published in Oxford or Penguin Classics paperback 
editions, Ulysses’ endnotes are signs of the book’s incorporation into 
the literary canon; they signify the book’s exalted status, its 
monumentality.  
 
Infinite Jest’s final two hundred pages are similarly devoted to 388 
numbered “Notes and Errata,” which contain everything from displaced 
chapters to chemical formulae. Unlike in Ulysses, these endnotes are, of 
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course, produced by the same writer who completed the main text: 
readers of Wallace’s book are obliged to flip between the main text and 
the endnotes with some regularity, to access what only occasionally 
seems to be important information for the overall scheme of the novel.54 
The use of footnotes and endnotes is a common feature across 
Wallace’s fictional and non-fictional oeuvre, but what seems distinctive 
about their use in Infinite Jest is that they give the novel the look of 
having been already analysed, incorporated within a scholarly discourse 
of appreciation and canonisation. The heading “Notes and Errata” 
certainly reinforces this impression, as does the faux-scholarly tone of 
many of the entries. Infinite Jest stands as an absurd simulacrum not 
simply of Ulysses as Joyce first had it printed, but of the canonised 
form in which that book is received by its contemporary readers.  
 
Both of these strategies (blatant allusions; faux-scholarly endnotes) read 
as instances of laying bare, exposing as such, the evaluative discourses 
or sociological mechanisms that produce the illusion of a distinct, 
organically evolving sphere of high/valuable culture. Make no mistake, 
Wallace’s book attempts to enter the university-based cultural economy 
of contemporary literary value; but the self-conscious way that Wallace 
both courts and gently mocks his audience of English majors seems 
very much in keeping with what I have accounted as a postmodern take 
on cultural value.     
                                                 
54
 Together, Wallace’s “Notes and Errata” constitute the book’s “most overtly 
metafictional device” (Boswell 120), and as such, they have generated a varied critical 
response. Marshall Boswell, author of the most substantial work of criticism on 
Wallace’s oeuvre, likens the use of endnotes to recent hyper-text fiction (19), stressing 
their disruptive function—the way they serve to interrupt the flow of an already non-
linear narrative. Thematic readings of Infinite Jest have taken Wallace’s use of 
endnotes quite differently. Both Catherine Nichols and Tom LeClair read Infinite 
Jest’s distended form as itself mirroring the book’s unifying obsession with the 
grotesque: LeClair’s suggestion that “Wallace has deformed his novel to be a gigantic 
analogue of the monsters—hateful and hopeful—within it” (“Prodigious” 37) is 
matched by Nichols’ estimation that the endnotes, “in the vein of carnival’s inversion 
of “high” and “low” bodily strata, blur the distinction between foot and head, errata 





Returning to Wallace’s Enfield, we see that the manner in which 
Wallace deconstructs the high/low dichotomy he sets up increasingly 
seems in tune with the mode of cultural critique associated with cultural 
studies—particularly, perhaps, with John Frow’s argument for 
“canonical (or “high”) and non-canonical (or “popular”) culture” to be 
understood “as practices of value rather than as collections of texts with 
a necessary coherence” (Frow 150). For the connections between texts 
and cultural products that Wallace proposes in Infinite Jest (between 
tennis, avant-garde film, mass entertainment and pharmaceuticals, for 
instance) are flagrantly incoherent—they are shown to depend on 
particular, ludic, ways of reading.      
 
Infinite Jest’s treatment of tennis—which takes on, in turn, “high” and 
“low” cultural associations—is a good place to begin explaining this 
point. 
 
By literally “elevating” tennis training (Enfield Tennis Academy, recall, 
is located on an imposing hillside) to sit alongside the modernised 
“trivium and quadrivium,” the game, in the first instance, takes on high 
cultural qualities for the academians; it becomes conducive to aesthetic 
description and analysis. The head coach at E.T.A., Charles Schtitt, was 
employed, we learn, precisely for his aestheticised take on the sport that 
James Incandenza held so dear:   
 
One of the reasons the late James Incandenza had been so terribly high 
on bringing Schtitt to E.T.A. was that Schtitt, like the founder himself 
(who’d come back to tennis, and later film, from a background in hard-
core-math-based optical science), was that Schtitt approached 
competitive tennis more like a pure mathematician than a technician. 
Most jr.-tennis coaches are basically technicians, hands-on practical 
straight-ahead problem-solving statistical-data wonks, with maybe 
added knacks for short-haul psychology and motivational speaking. … 
[Schtitt] knew real tennis was really about not the blend of statistical 
order and expansive potential that the game’s technicians revered, but 
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in fact the opposite – not-order, limit, the places where things broke 
down, fragmented into beauty. (81)  
 
While at E.T.A., students are encouraged to regard their tennis training 
in Arnoldian terms, as an exercise in the disinterested pursuit of 
perfection. Yet the sport’s claim to this exalted territory is tenuous, for 
as the narrator informs us, “students hoping to prepare for careers as 
professional athletes are by intension training also to be entertainers, 
albeit of a deep and special sort” (188). The very term students use to 
describe the professional tennis tour—“the Show”—acknowledges that 
the goal they all strive for (with varying degrees of seriousness) 
amounts to their becoming a spectacle for mass-market entertainment; 
“action photos in glossy print mags” (111). Wallace’s fiction shows the 
distinction between value “in itself” and value for a market is not 
sustainable; the extent to which tennis retains the transcendent, non-
utilitarian (or non-entertainment) value preached by E.T.A. staff-
members depends simply on which practices of value are brought to 
bear. 
 
From here it is a surprisingly short distance to Infinite Jest’s treatment 
of recreational drugs. Almost every character in the novel is addicted to 
at least one substance; the various battles with addiction Wallace 
describes are among the most affecting parts of Infinite Jest. Wallace’s 
treatment of drugs is not entirely emotive, however: the consumption of 
drugs sits alongside other behaviours of cultural consumption submitted 
to sociological-esque analysis. And while many Ennet House 
residents—uneducated, unreflective and unappealing—reinforce the 
stereotype that puts drug taking at one end of a spectrum of valuable 
consumption (at the opposite end of which could be, say, reading 





The idea of a single, all-encompassing spectrum or economy of cultural 
value is redolent of traditional axiology—the argument that the innate 
complexity of a text or cultural product (be it Shakespeare or wine) 
would determine its cultural value and give rise the cultural practices 
surrounding its consumption (aesthetic discourse and various forms of 
connoisseurship, for example). Central to cultural studies, by contrast, 
is the idea that the nature of an object or cultural text does not 
determine how it will be consumed: “low” cultural practices are 
submitted to (aesthetic) close reading by academics; academic attention 
is turned upon the evaluative discourses endemic to particular 
communities of consumers, which discourses come to be seen as 
functionally similar to high cultural/aesthetic discourse. The traditional 
devaluation by cultural academics of “low” cultural practices and texts 
for their “lack of complexity” (Leavisite denunciations of “mass 
culture” for example) is seen as a function of mis-applying criteria 
designed for the evaluation of high culture—an approach which also led 
academic readers to ignore the possible complexities being enjoyed by 
the audience(s) of those texts. Cultural studies is consequently 
renowned for correcting the Leavisite idea that associates “mass 
culture” with sheer audience gratification or mindless entertainment: 
the cultural equivalent of addictive narcotics.   
 
Infinite Jest seems to extend this sort of logic to cover drug 
consumption itself. For the hyper-educated youths of E.T.A., we learn, 
drug-taking, on one level, becomes simply another arena in which to 
display erudition and connoisseurship. Michael Pemulis, Hal’s school-
friend and drug-dealer, performs a sort of “close reading” on DMZ, a 
notorious and untested drug which he and his group of friends, 
throughout the novel, contemplate ingesting:  
 
The incredibly potent DMZ is apparently classed as a para-
methoxylated amphetamine but really it looks to Pemulis from his slow 
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and tortured survey of the MED.COM’s monographs more like more 
similar to the anticholinergic-deliriant class, way more powerful than 
mescaline or MDA or DMA or TMA […] DMZ resembling chemically 
some miscegenation of a lysergic with a muscimoloid, but significantly 
different from LSD-25 in that its effects are less visual and spatially-
cerebral and more like temporally-cerebral and almost ontological, with 
some sort of manipulated-phenylkylamine-like speediness whereby the 
ingester perceives his relation to the ordinary flow of time as radically 
(and euphorically, is where the muscimole-affective resemblance shows 
its head) altered. (170) 
 
As with the E.T.A. take on tennis, so with drugs: the mode of cultural 
consumption displayed by various “high cultural” characters in Infinite 
Jest consists in a capacity to break cultural products down into their 
constituent components, to discuss the relationship between form and 
content, to revel in complexity. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that many of the annotation-like endnotes in 
Infinite Jest are devoted to providing intricate pharmacological 
analyses. A passing reference to one character’s preference for 
“Demerol and Talwin” (55) generates this explanatory gloss (which 
also demonstrates Wallace’s hyper-attentiveness to technical jargon): 
 
12. Meperedine hydrochloride and pentazocine hydrochloride, Schedule 
C-II and C-IVa  narcotic analgesics, respectively, both from the good 
folks over at Sanofi Winthrop Pharm-Labs, Inc. 
 
a. Following the Continental Controlled Substance Act of Y.T.M.P., 
O.N.A.N.D.E.A’s hierarchy of analgesics/antipyretics/anxiolytics 
establishes drug-classes of Category-II through Category-VI, with 
C-II’s (e.g. Dilaudid, Demerol) being judged the heaviest w/r/t 
dependence and possible abuse, down to C-VI’s that are about as 
potent as a kiss on the forehead from Mom. (984) 
  
These medical analyses sit alongside other annotations that are more 
reminiscent of literary scholarship: a “filmography” of James 
Incandenza’s oeuvre, for example, shows an encyclopaedic 
meticulousness (985-993); we are referred to fictional scholarly articles 
(note 81 refers us to ‘Theory and Praxis in Peckinpah’s Use of Red,’ 
Classic Cartridge Studies vol. IX, nos. 2 & 3’); very occasionally, the 
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endnotes suggest allusions the text may be making—endnote 337, for 
instance, suggests a possible reference to the graveyard scene from 
Hamlet, “namely V.i. 9.” (1076).  
 
Barbara Smith argues that “pace the more naïvely ambitious claims of 
‘empirical aesthetics’” (52), measures such as “structural complexity” 
or “information richness” cannot operate as “objective measures of 
aesthetic value” (52).55 Wallace’s implicit comparison of aesthetics and 
pharmacology may be read as an affirmation of this point. Both drugs 
and texts, he suggests, may be subjected to learned analysis and thereby 
“monumentalised”; both are consumed/ingested according to personal 
tastes and, depending on an individual’s identity (in the case of drugs, 
Wallace frequently refers to individuals’ biochemical “hard-wiring”) 
produce feelings of pleasure or displeasure, even euphoria or bliss. All 
this should not be read as an argument by Wallace that cultural texts 
and pharmaceuticals are necessarily of equal value (Wallace’s depiction 
of drug addicts dwells on their abjection); but their juxtaposition does, 
in my reading, amount to a suggestion, broadly congruent with post-
axiological arguments, that the evaluative criteria traditionally 
(institutionally) used to distinguish between “high” and “low” cultural 
practices cannot provide an objective, ‘reliable’ index of cultural value.   
 
The Discourse of the Great Divide 
     
So far this seems, by and large, to suggest that Wallace’s work is fully 
congruent with relativist accounts of cultural value—and that Wallace’s 
project is primarily negative or critical: intent on exposing the 
social/discursive foundations of canonical accounts of what makes 
cultural products/texts valuable. We have seen that Infinite Jest 
provides many thoughtful and entertaining considerations (even 
                                                 
55
 The reasons for this have been well traversed and include the fact that the very 
perception of “complexity” will vary between particular viewers or communities of 
viewers; “complexity” cannot be thought of as an intrinsic quality.  
  
Cooke 112 
deconstructions) of the evaluative categories and discourses cultural 
consumers employ. Moreover, Wallace’s strategies, and the overall 
style and mood of the book, read as archetypical instances of 
postmodern artistry: a deliberate fusion of “high” and “low” culture, 
with the apparent intention and effect (as explained by Andreas 
Huyssen, among others) of declaring such cultural divides to be 
outmoded.     
 
In this section I wish to consider another aspect of Wallace’s work that 
jars with the evidently relativistic thrust of what I have so far described. 
Notwithstanding Infinite Jest’s pervasive undermining of traditional 
criteria of value, the book also discloses Wallace’s evident 
determination that evaluative inquiry should not therefore be cast aside: 
Infinite Jest pays serious attention to the question of what constitutes, or 
should constitute, a valuable cultural product, and struggles to elucidate 
grounds (or criteria) for those evaluative commitments.  
 
I have mentioned that Wallace’s attention to drug taking in Infinite Jest 
does not equate to an endorsement of the practice; rather, it serves as an 
extreme and implicitly disvaluable context in which Wallace can 
observe and comment upon particular practices of consumption and 
evaluation. Meanwhile, Wallace’s drawn-out depictions of addicts in 
various states of self-destruction or rehabilitation seem to make it plain 
that there are good, pragmatic reasons for mainstream culture’s 
stigmatisation of the practice (as “lowly”).  
 
A similar strategy seems to lie behind Infinite Jest’s consideration of 
mass market entertainment, that “stratum” of cultural production with 
which contemporary (postmodern) fiction has such an ambiguous 
relationship, and which occupies such a central position in narrative 
accounts of what makes postmodern literary culture distinctive. Infinite 
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Jest depicts, in “Interlace TelEntertainment,” a seemingly self-
contained cultural domain in which the features of “mass culture” most 
often cited by those willing to offer essentialist definitions of “mass 
culture” as a category are re-aired and exaggerated. Thus, we learn that 
despite the new media’s potential to expand viewer choice (because 
rather than being broadcast, viewers can select at will from thousands 
of possible products), consumers’ actual choices remain (the sense is: 
depressingly) predictable: 
 
No more Network reluctance to make a program too entertaining for 
fear its commercials would pale in comparison. The more pleasing a 
given cartridge was, the more orders there were for it from viewers; and 
the more orders for a given cartridge, the more InterLace kicked back to 
whatever production facility they’d acquired it from. Simple. Personal 
pleasure and gross revenue looked at last to lie along the same demand 
curve, at least as far as home entertainment went.” (417) 
 
The implicit suggestion here, and elsewhere in Wallace’s representation 
of on-screen “mass” entertainment, is that the nature of the pleasure 
such products are capable of producing is, if not simply an intrinsic 
property of that cultural product, then at least quantifiable or predictable 
(like a drug…). This is problematic for several reasons, not least of 
which being its apparent consistency with early 20th century (very un-
postmodern) accounts of cultural value which were designed to 
denounce the mass cultural in favour of the more complex, civilisation-
sustaining experiences that “genuine literature” (etc) could provide.56 
                                                 
56
 Take, for example, Steven Connor’s summary of I. A. Richards’ consideration of 
what constitutes valuable cultural consumption:  
 
Bad art, says Richards, is characterized by its tendency to provide instant 
gratification and to encourage fixation upon stock responses and received 
ideas, rather than to encourage the ironic, impersonal play of judgement. In the 
way of such arguments, Richards’ relative scale of evaluation for good and bad 
art quickly turns into a way of distinguishing art from non-art, this latter 
identified paranoically in the forms of mass culture and especially the cinema. 
The distinctions between immediacy and complexity, childishness and 
maturity, culture and art, all enforce an absolute distinction between pleasure 






Elsewhere Wallace’s narrator catalogues the all-pervasive spread of the 
O.N.A.N.’s digital media: 
 
Half of all metro Bostonians now work at home via some digital link. 
50% of all public education disseminated through accredited encoded 
pulses, absorbable at home on couches. One-third of those 50% of 
metro Bostonians who still leave home to work could work at home if 
they wished. And (get this) 94% of all O.N.A.N.ite paid entertainment 
now absorbed at home: pulses, storage cartridges, digital displays, 
domestic décor – an entertainment-market of sofas and eyes. 
Saying this is bad is like saying traffic is bad, or health-care 
surtaxes, or the hazards of annular fusion: nobody but Ludditic granola-
crunching freaks would call bad what no one can imagine being 
without. (620)  
 
Wallace is plainly of the view that this is bad—that there is a 
malevolent aspect to this form of “mass” culture (which plainly stands 
as an exaggerated proxy for real-world U.S. television culture) which 
contemporary cultural critics are reluctant or unable to attend to. The 
numerous depictions of O.N.A.N.ites relaxing before “formulaic” 
entertainments that (apparently) demand little intellection on the part of 
the viewer, for example, seem designed to point up those 
entertainments’ potentially insalubrious effects. (A mediascape 
dominated by “all-in-one consoles, Yushityu ceramic nanoprocessors, 
laser chromatography, Virtual-capable media cards, fiber-optic pulse, 
digital encoding, killer apps” (620) is also rife with “carpal neuralgia, 
phosphenic migraine, gluteal hyperadiposity, lumbar stressae” (620).)  
 
But what is bad? Wallace’s apparent willingness to devalue the 
aforementioned modes of cultural consumption is complicated by (1) 
his reluctance to repeat the “ludditic” dismissal of those developments 
alluded to above, and, surely, (2) his evident problematisation of the 
categories (such as “high art” and ‘mass entertainment’) that would 




Ultimately, I wish to suggest, Infinite Jest’s consideration of televisual 
culture is metafictional—targeted at the response of (self-defined) 
artists to televisual culture, more so than at television itself. It is also 
here that Wallace’s work most clearly responds to the critical narrative 
of postmodernism’s dismantlement of a “great divide” between valid art 
and mass culture. To begin explaining this point, it will be helpful to 
turn here to an essay published by Wallace in 1993, “E Unibus Plurum: 
Television and U.S. Fiction,”57 which represents the author’s most 
direct and prescriptive consideration of contemporary fiction’s response 
to (or fusion with?) “mass” culture, before tracing how that essay’s 
argument resurfaces in Infinite Jest.    
 
Numerous critics have treated “Television and U.S. Fiction” as, in 
effect, a manifesto statement. As is typical for an essay of this kind, it 
sees Wallace position his work in relation to that of his most significant 
predecessors, giving a single-strand narrative of developments in 20th 
century U.S. literature, for which his own work—with its particular 
preoccupations and arguments—is presented is a logical ‘next step’. 
The essay is marked by a quasi-avant-gardist belief that the ills of a 
culture (in this case the impossibly expansive “U.S. culture”) can be 
diagnosed, and that a suitably equipped artist (Wallace himself) might 
chart a path towards that culture’s redemption. At the core of the essay, 
Wallace posits a complex “pas-de-deux” between television and 
contemporary U.S. fiction, beginning, in parallel with Andreas 
Huyssen’s narrative, with the post-war American tendency to “open up 
the realm of high art to the imagery of everyday life and American mass 
culture” (Huyssen 60): 
 
About the time television first gasped and sucked air, mass popular U.S. 
culture seemed to become High-Art-viable as a collection of symbols 
                                                 
57
 The essay was first published in 1993 in The Review of Contemporary Fiction; I 
quote from the version published in a collection of Wallace’s “essays and arguments”: 
A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again (1997). 
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and myth. The episcopate of this pop-reference movement were the 
post-Nabokovian Black Humorists, the Metafictionists and assorted 
franc- and latinophiles only later comprised by “postmodern.” The 
erudite, sardonic fictions of the Black Humorists introduced a 
generation of new fiction writers who saw themselves as sort of avant-
avant-garde, not only cosmopolitan and polyglot but also 
technologically literate, products of more than just one region, heritage, 
and theory, and citizens of a culture that said its most important stuff 
about itself via mass media. In this regard one thinks particularly of the 
Gaddis of The Recognitions and JR, the Barth of The End of the Road 
and The Sot-Weed Factor, and the Pynchon of The Crying of Lot 49. 
(Supposedly 45) 
 
The opening sections of Wallace’s essay see the author stridently 
defending the irruption of television/mass media into the world of 
literary fiction as an inevitable and artistically necessary development; 
and dismissing out of hand much of the then-published television 
criticism (which he describes as “often even cruder and triter than the 
shows the critics complain about” (27)). Driving home this point, 
Wallace dwells on the complexity and ingenuity (even self-
referentiality) of several television programmes. 
 
However, as with Infinite Jest’s InterLace, Wallace does not shy away 
from making forthright value judgements. The following excerpt, 
couched in explicitly high/low terms, shows Wallace at his least subtle:     
 
It is of course undeniable that television is an example of Low Art, the 
sort of art that has to please people in order to get their money. […] TV 
is the epitome of Low Art in its desire to appeal to and enjoy the 
attention of unprecedented numbers of people. But it is not Low 
because it is vulgar or prurient or dumb. Television is often all these 
things, but this is a logical function of its need to attract and please 
Audience. And I’m not saying that television is vulgar and dumb 
because the people who compose Audience are vulgar and dumb. 
Television is the way it is simply because people tend to be extremely 
similar in their vulgar and prurient and dumb interests and wildly 
different in their refined and aesthetic and noble interests. It’s all about 
syncretic diversity: neither medium nor Audience is faultable for 
quality. (37)     
 
The emphasis here on the intrinsic properties of television (“Low 
Art”)—which is experienced in fundamentally the same way, he avers, 
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by the totality of that media’s audience—would be summarily 
dismissed by any practitioner of cultural studies. So too would the 
lengthy exposition of the “passive, addictive TV-psychology” (52) that, 
for Wallace, lies at the heart of “U.S. culture”. 
 
But Wallace’s account of the interaction between television and fiction 
(as two halves of the high/low divide he posits) is more interesting. His 
first step is to attribute an evaluative, oppositional motive to the 
“marriage between High and Low culture” (42) effected by the 
aforementioned ‘original’ postmodernists: Wallace sees this as an 
artistic strategy involving the use of intentional irony to comment on 
contemporary social mores. (Those writers’ incorporation of mass-
media images and techniques thus comes to be seen as more closely 
resembling what Joyce scholar R. B. Kershner described, in the context 
of modernist writers, as “ironic documentation” rather than simply 
fusion/approval/rapprochement.) Moreover, for Wallace, the intention 
to critique (and, presumably, through that critique, to 
define/essentialise) “popular culture” persists in the U.S. fiction of his 
contemporaries: “The use of Low references in a lot of today’s High 
literary fiction […] is meant (1) to help create a mood of irony and 
irreverence, (2) to make us uneasy and so “comment” on the vapidity of 
U.S. culture, and (3) most important, these days, to be just plain 
realistic” (42-43). 
 
The sting in Wallace’s argument comes when he goes on to suggest that 
contemporary fiction’s attempts to critique “popular culture” via time-
honoured postmodern techniques (the ironic fusion/interspersion of 
popular- and high- culture) have become non-viable: both hollow and 
redundant. The reason Wallace gives for this is thoroughly Adornean: 
televisual/popular culture has itself appropriated those “postmodern” 
techniques (and especially what Wallace sees as a typically postmodern 
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mood of jaded irony), rendering impotent fictionists’ best attempts to 
maintain an aloof/superior domain of critical art: 
 
And this is why the fiction-writing citizen of our televisual culture is in 
such very deep shit. What do you do when postmodern rebellion 
becomes a pop-cultural institution? For this of course is the second 
answer to why avant-garde irony and rebellion have become dilute and 
malign. They have been absorbed, emptied, and redeployed by the very 
televisual establishment they had originally set themselves athwart. 
(68)  
 
Flippancy aside, the affinities between Wallace’s distinctive narrative 
and more conventional accounts of postmodernism as the ‘end of the 
road’ for the Culture vs culture industry saga are very marked. 
(Huyssen for instance similarly declares the “obsolescence of 
avantgarde shock techniques” by pointing to “their exploitation in 
Hollywood productions” which “reaffirm perception rather than change 
it” (15).) Also obvious here is the extent to which traditional “high”/ 
“low” categories organise Wallace’s thinking on cultural value (these 
are, for Wallace, real-world categories whose comparative value can be 
the subject of meaningful discussion, even if doubts exist about those 
categories’ integrity). At the same time, Huyssen’s view that an 
absolute distinction between high art and mass culture “no longer seems 
relevant to artistic or critical sensibilities” (197) is clearly endorsed in 
Wallace’s work. Wallace does not seek to resolve the cultural crisis he 
identifies by reimposing, with renewed severity, the simple hierarchies 
of the past. 
 
The solution Wallace does offer veers away from the discourse of the 
great divide and concentrates instead on exposing the obsolescence of 
irony as a form of social critique. This has been well traversed by critics 
and is not especially germane for my current purposes.58 However, 
                                                 
58
 Marshall Boswell provides a typical example of such criticism, which is directly 
informed by Wallace’s essay: 
  
Cooke 119
Wallace’s determination to offer some way to prevent the total erosion 
of the distinction between (in inherentist terms) valuable and debased 
cultural production is all-important, for my purposes. In this regard 
Wallace might again be compared with Huyssen, for whom the end of 
“the great divide” (and critics’/artists’ consequent inability to call on 
traditional criteria for establishing cultural value) does not mean the end 
of critics’/artists’ ability (or, indeed, duty) to chart a valuable course for 
culture-as-a-whole. 
 
In accordance with the post-great-divide thrust of his study, Huyssen’s 
valuable culture is neither “high” nor “mass” but results from a 
“progressive” fusion of the two. But the fusion is fraught with danger: 
artists must not, for instance, contribute to “the aesthetization of 
commodities […] which totally subjugate[s] the aesthetic to the interest 
of capital” (158). The task seems to be to disclose the continuity of 
categories “art” and “commodity” while continuing to preserve some 
ideal of “art-qua-art.”  But how can a writer possibly hope to achieve 
the one without eroding the other? Post-axiological thought, as we have 
seen, is antagonistic to the idea that “mass”ness can be thought of as a 




Late in his T.V. essay, Wallace suggests, despondently, that no end to 
the cultural malaise he identifies will be forthcoming “so long as no 
sources of insight on comparative worth, no guides to why and how to 
                                                                                                                                   
Wallace’s work, in its attempt to prove that cynicism and naivete are mutually 
compatible, treats the culture’s hip fear of sentiment with the same sort of 
ironic self-awareness with which sophisticates in the culture portray “gooey” 
sentimentality; the result is that hip irony is itself ironized in such a way that 
the opposite of hip irony—that is, gooey sentiment—can emerge as the work’s 
indirectly intended mode. For if irony, as Wallace explains in “E Unibus 
Pluram,” is a means of “exploiting gaps between what’s said and what’s 
meant, between how things try to appear and how they really are,” then 
Wallace uses irony to disclose what irony has been hiding. (Boswell 17) 
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choose among experiences, fantasies, beliefs, and predilections, are 
permitted serious consideration in U.S. culture” (75-76). So far my 
characterisation of the “guide to value” one might read in Infinite Jest 
has focused on its apparent willingness to devalue particular cultural 
behaviours (drug-taking and the excessive consumption of on-screen 
entertainments) on a pragmatic level. In this final section, I wish to 
dwell on the book’s (metafictional) consideration of what might, in a 
contemporary setting, constitute valuable cultural production. The 
question is self-implicating: how can Infinite Jest itself make a claim to 
possess cultural value notwithstanding its author’s critical (broadly 
post-axiological) take on the evaluative verities of the past? (It is 
noteworthy that this is not couched as value-for; I expand on this point 
below.)  
 
The creative exploits of James Incandenza lie at the centre of this aspect 
of Infinite Jest. Though deceased by time of the novel’s “present day,” 
Incandenza casts a long shadow over the lives of the inhabitants of 
O.N.A.N. As a physicist, Incandenza invented the (absurd)59 energy 
production system upon which the O.N.A.N.’s viability depends; he 
also contributed to the development of the technology that lies behind 
O.N.A.N.’s prolifically successful home entertainment network—
Interlace.  Incandenza was a competitive tennis player, and founded 
E.T.A. to institutionalise his idiosyncratic sporting and pedagogical 
interests. Later in life, quite unexpectedly, Incandenza changed careers 
yet again to become an art-producer, making “documentaries, 
technically recondite art films, and mordantly obscure and obsessive 
dramatic cartridges, leaving behind a substantial […] number of 
completed films and cartridges, some of which have earned a small 
academic following for their technical feck and for a pathos that was 
                                                 
59
 = annular fusion: “a type of fusion that can produce waste that’s fuel for a process 
whose waste is fuel for the fusion” (573). 
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somehow both surreally abstract and CNS-rendingly melodramatic at 
the same time” (64). Like Wallace himself (as described earlier by Dave 
Eggers), Incandenza is described as a genius possessed of an “epic” 
artistic ambition—one who operates in maximums, extremes.60 
 
We can already see that in Incandenza’s work many of the diverse 
cultural interests traversed in Infinite Jest are brought together—a 
collision of entertainment, scholarship, the scientific and the aesthetic. 
The films, which readers encounter primarily through various 
characters’ accounts of them, seem to dramatise the tensions or 
disjunctions between the various strands of Incandenza’s creative 
exploits. Incandenza, we learn, “came at entertainment more from an 
interest in lenses and light” (1026, note 45) and worked, initially at 
least, in a filmic idiom that was “self-consciously behind the times, 
making all sorts of heavy art-gesture films about film and 
consciousness and isness and diffraction and stasis et cetera” (1027). 
The resulting films (as described here by anonymous scholarly 
“filmographers”) are indeed “mordantly obscure,” e.g.: 
 
Kinds of Light. B.S. Meniscus Films, Ltd. No cast; 16 mm.; 3 minutes; 
color; silent. 4,444 individual frames, each of which photo depicts light 
of different source, wavelength, and candle power, each reflected off 
the same unpolished tin plate and rendered disorienting at normal 
projection speeds by the hyperretinal speed at which they pass. (986) 
 
We learn of Incandenza’s aesthetic manifestos, including one for 
viewer-hostile “anticonfluentialism.” Here his film-making seems 
determinedly “high” cultural—that is, designed to be consumed and 
valued exclusively by a small (non-”mass”) audience, the intelligentsia.  
 
However, if fragments of testimony from the deceased auteur and those 
who knew him are to be believed, Incandenza also aspired to create 
                                                 
60
 Hal describes him as “a father who lived up to his own promise and then found 
thing after thing to meet and surpass the expectations of his promise in” (173). 
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works that would entertain and move a wider audience. We learn of a 
“commercial” period in the film-maker’s oeuvre, and that he himself 
“referred to the Work’s various films as ‘entertainments’” (743). 
(Underlining the apparent unlikelihood of this, we also learn that “[h]e 
did this ironically about half the time” (743).) The impression we are 
left with, through various half-remembered and contradictory accounts 
of the auteur’s intention(s), is of a cultural producer whose output sits 
awkwardly (or swings wildly) between academy-art and mass 
entertainment. There are obvious parallels to be drawn with Wallace’s 
own situation as an artist seeking to define his output in relation to 
“high” cultural achievements of the past, while at the same time 
accepting the necessary imbrication of his work with contemporary 
“mass” culture.61 
 
The tragedy for Incandenza, though, is that neither his rarefied films nor 
his ostensible “entertainments” succeed at becoming valued by their 
intended audience (at least during the auteur’s lifetime). Accounts of 
various audiences’ indifferent responses to his films often coincide with 
details of the auteur’s descent into alcoholism; for example: 
 
soon after the InterLace dissemination of The Man Who Began to 
Suspect He Was Made of Glass, […] [Incandenza] emerged from the 
sauna and came to Lyle all sloppy-blotto and depressed over the fact 
that even the bastards in the avant-garde journals were complaining that 
even in his commercially entertaining stuff Incandenza’s fatal Achilles’ 
heel was plot, that Incandenza’s efforts had no sort of engaging plot, no 
movement that sucked you in and drew you along. (375)62    
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 And in Wallace’s case, I would note, feeling unconstrained from publishing in non-
”literary” publications (magazine articles for example). 
62
 Here readers of Infinite Jest are directed to its 145th endnote: “E.g. see Ursula 
Emrich-Levine (University of California-Irvine), ‘Watching Grass Grow While Being 
Hit Repeatedly Over the Head With a Blunt Object: Fragmentation and Stasis in 
James O. Incandenza’s Widower, Fun with Teeth, Zero Gravity Tea Ceremony, and 
Pre-Nuptial Agreement of Heaven and Hell,’ Art Cartridge Quarterly, vol. III, nos. 1-
3, Year of the Perdue Wonderchicken.” 
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Another oft-voiced complaint is that the films’ metafictional (or 
metafilmic) focus prevents them from meeting most consumers’ 
expectations of representational art:63  
 
More like the work of a brilliant optician and technician who was an 
amateur at any kind of real communication. Technically gorgeous, the 
Work, with lighting and angles planned out to the frame. But oddly 
hollow, empty, no sense of dramatic towardness – no narrative 
movement toward a real story; no emotional movement toward an 
audience. Like conversing with a prisoner through that plastic screen 
using phones, the upperclassman Molly Notkin had said of 
Incandenza’s early oeuvre. Joelle thought them more like a very smart 
person conversing with himself. (740) 
 
All told, Incandenza’s filmic output assuredly does not stand as an 
example, endorsed by Wallace, of successful/valuable artistic 
endeavour. Instead the films seem to serve as examples of artistic 
failures, the discussion of which (by various characters) allows space 
for Wallace to traverse some of his own thoughts on what cultural 
producers should strive to achieve. 
 
Of Incandenza’s films, one stands out as being especially central to the 
overall scheme of Infinite Jest and the “guide to value” I take to be 
imbedded within it. I refer to the film “Infinite Jest,” which gives its 
name to Wallace’s book and is the last film Incandenza completes 
before his suicide. The provenance of the film is shrouded in mystery: 
readers are presented with several conflicting accounts of the auteur’s 
intention during his final, frenzied, period of creativity. For my 
purpose, it is important to emphasise that the production of “Infinite 
Jest” seems to spring from Incandenza’s singular determination to 
silence all his critics, to produce a “perfect” work whose value is 
unquestionable. 
 
                                                 
63
 Wallace has written at length about what he sees as the pitfalls of metafiction; see 
for example the novella, itself metafictional, “Westward the Course of Empire Takes 
Its Way” in his short story collection Girl with Curious Hair.   
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Incandenza’s success in this task is thoroughly ambivalent. An 
important premise of Wallace’s book is that, through persistence and 
technical ingenuity, Incandenza succeeds in creating the perfect 
entertainment. The mysterious cultural artefact he leaves behind is so 
gratifying that viewing it becomes an ultimately deadly addictive 
pleasure: the viewer henceforth has no interest in anything other than 
repeating the experience. If “lowness” is equated simply with audience 
gratification, then “Infinite Jest” can be seen as the logical apogee of 
“low” culture: “Too Much Fun for anyone mortal to hope to endure” 
(238). So potent is the film that throughout the novel a shadowy 
Quebecois terrorist organisation searches for a master copy with which 
to hold the U.S. nation to ransom; hoping to thwart them is the U.S. 
secret service (“the Office of Unspecified Services”). “Infinite Jest” 
resurfaces (with deadly consequences) several times in the book, but for 
the most part, readers learn about the nature and content of the film 
only through rumour. Overheard banter at a graduate film-school party, 
for example: 
 
‘— way it can be film qua film. Comstock says if it even exists it has to 
be something like an aesthetic pharmaceutical.  Some beastly post-
annnular scopophiliacal vector. Suprasubliminals and that.’ (233) 
 
[…] ‘See that it’s doubtless just high-concept erotica or an hour of 
rotating whorls. Or something like late Makavajev, something that’s 
only entertaining after it’s over, on reflection.’ (233) 
 
Joelle van Dyne, who starred in the film (though she has “never seen 
the completed assembly of what she appeared in” (238)), provides a 
slightly more definite description:  
 
the camera [was] bolted down inside a stroller or bassinet. I wore an 
incredible white floor-length gown of some sort of flowing material and 
leaned in over the camera in the crib and simply apologized. […] The 
camera was fitted with a lens with something Jim called I think an auto-
wobble. Ocular wobble, something like that. […] I don’t think there’s 





It is not important for me to pin down precisely the nature of “Infinite 
Jest”’s irresistible appeal. My interest in the conceit instead derives 
from its relation to the broader discussion of cultural value that runs 
throughout the book. The monumental film that gives its name to 
Wallace’s monumental book provides a complex focal point in this 
respect. For “Infinite Jest” succeeds in crystallising the essence of 
entertainment—this much, indeed, is perhaps implicit in the shorthand 
name given to the film by several secret agents (complete with definite 
article): “the Entertainment.” This premise provides several avenues for 
Wallace to toy (as is his wont) with received ideas about art vs 
entertainment, another “high”/ “low” binary; it also shows very clearly 
the stripe of logic that, in my reading, lies at the heart of Wallace’s 
thinking on cultural value.   
 
First we might note that the ultimate entertainment Wallace posits bears 
little resemblance to those products typically adduced as sheer 
“entertainments”.64 Incandenza’s film is not “formulaic” or clichéd, but 
is formally ambitious, accomplished, complex. It is entertaining despite 
the fact that it is (in line with the peculiarly static type of art-film 
Incandenza had previously produced) “an olla podrida of depressive 
conceits strung together with flashy lensmanship and perspectival 
novelty” (791). All this might be read in light of Wallace’s views 
(expressed in his T.V. essay, for instance) about the naivety of cultural 
critics who write off “entertainments” they do not value for their lack of 
sophistication.65 
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 Compare, for example, the type of film being snobbishly dissected at the graduate 
film school party mentioned earlier: ““You know those mass-market cartridges, for 
the masses? The ones that are so bad they’re somehow perversely good? This was 
worse than that” (232). 
65
 We could also compare another of Wallace’s forays into (something like) cultural 
studies, the book-length essay he co-authored with Mark Costello, Signifying Rappers: 
Rap and Race in the Urban Present (1989). Wallace suggests that rap manifests to 




Another way of looking at the film, though, is reminiscent of Wallace’s 
take on pharmaceuticals, or television: although it succeeds in some 
sense as an entertainment, it is nevertheless, we are given to understand, 
not valuable. “Infinite Jest” thus provides another reminder of 
Wallace’s evident view that complexity/sophistication is not a 
necessary index of cultural value; at the same time, it seems a case is 
being made for the necessity of distinguishing pleasure from value.66 
The implicit argument seems to run along lines we encountered in 
Wallace’s T.V. essay: the product is sophisticated and undeniably 
entertaining, but its effect—in the case of “Infinite Jest” an enslaving 
addiction leading to death by inanition—is such that we as readers are 
invited to accept the wisdom of labelling it, simply, bad.  
 
Positing “Infinite Jest” as a universal maximum of cultural pleasure 
also demonstrates Wallace’s reliance on a type of thinking that comes 
straight from classical axiology.  
 
                                                                                                                                   
condemned—if taken literally—as exhortations to violence or misogyny), due to 
ignorance of, or a deliberate refusal to consider, rap’s own formal restrictions and 
generic demands. Quoting T. S. Eliot’s “Reflections on Vers Libre” as an epigraph, 
Wallace emphasises that to be successful, a rap lyric must work against the severely 
restrictive formal requirement of fitting rhymed couplets into a metric structure 
dictated by a driving drum beat (97). Throughout, Wallace revels in the paradox of 
writing a literary essay about an art form socially designated as sub-literary, and 
points out the social determinants (rather than inherent differences) that distinguish 
rap from the cultural products made by and for “the cold corridors of Real poetry and 
Serious Appreciation” (100-101).  
66
 Steven Connor’s chapter “Pleasure of Value, Value of Pleasure” gives a useful 
account of the ways in which the quality of the pleasure taken from different cultural 
experiences has been taken by critics to determine the value of the texts that, on this 
view, produce such experiences. At the centre of Connor’s chapter is a distinction 
between theorists who see pleasure and value as distinct, whom Connor terms 
“moralists,” and “hedonists” who maintain that value and pleasure are directly 
proportional. Bourdieu’s characterisation of Kant’s account of aesthetic pleasure—
that is, as a denial of sensual pleasure so thorough as to constitute a “pleasure purified 
of pleasure”—would place Kant firmly in the former camp. Connor, however, is 
characteristically dissatisfied with this binary (pleasure and value as either distinct, or 
the same), noting that all “attempts to distinguish value from pleasure tend to end up 
with a distinction between fundamentally different forms of pleasure” (35). 
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At the heart of post-axiological thought on value is a conviction that it 
is meaningless to speak simply of the value of a cultural object, as if 
value was a property of that object rather than a function of that object’s 
place within a particular economy of value.  As Barbara Smith 
repeatedly emphasises, the recognition of this diversity (or potential 
diversity) of evaluative practices has, in traditional axiology, usually 
been treated as a difficulty to be overcome. Rather than accepting and 
describing evaluative diversity, axiological arguments would attempt to 
construct an “irrefutable” axiological Venn diagram by locating  
 
some set of interests and perspectives which transcend all particularity, 
which belong to all human beings by virtue of the fact that they are 
human, and which, when known and duly acknowledged would 
necessarily take priority over—subsume, absorb, or neutralize—all 
otherwise individually different interests and perspectives. (Smith 
178) 
 
In Wallace’s fiction any individual who views “Infinite Jest” is equally 
at risk, regardless of constitution, educational background or class 
membership. Particularity duly transcended, all talk of value being 
contingent on particular practices and discourses of value can be set 
aside; and Infinite Jest’s evaluative investigations do give way to moral 
quandaries (if such an entertainment did exist, what reasons could be 
offered for resisting the temptation to view it?—and so on). As a 
conceit, “Infinite Jest” is a gesture towards constructing an economy of 
value that is universal in scope—Wallace seemingly attempts, like the 
numerous failed post-axiologists Smith critiques in her book, to provide 
“commonsense” grounds for why it ought to be possible to speak of the 
value of particular cultural products (by acknowledging but seeking to 
transcend—via extreme case study—the relativist critique of such 
thinking).67 We can again compare Wallace’s television essay, in which 
the author attributes television’s success to its ability to target people’s 
                                                 
67
 “Infinite Jest” as an axiological device could be compared with the arguments for 
“why relativism must have limits” that Smith examines and dismisses in 
Contingencies of Value. 
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fundamentally similar “vulgar and prurient and dumb interests”. This 
echoes modernism’s now notorious comparisons of “mass” and “high” 
cultural consumption as natural opposites, which Steven Connor puts, 
aptly, in Freudian terms:68 “mass” culture’s “instantaneous 
gratifications, its immediate discharges of unpleasurable tension” (38) 
are compared with “life-affirming” “high” culture: “the forms of 
equilibrium it achieves take longer, and involve more delay and 
resistance” (38). 
 
Infinite Jest’s rhetoric of value assertion, its self-implicating “guide to 
value”, does not consist in a simple rehashing of that traditional 
distinction. For Wallace’s awareness of something like Bourdieu’s 
social critique of aesthetic judgement—which would attribute the 
ability of the socially privileged to “detect” and value “high” culture’s 
“forms of equilibrium” to the workings of evaluative discourse—is writ 
large (consider its knowing invocation of the “canon effect,” for 
example). But the “Infinite Jest” conceit, gesturing as it does towards 
the idea that the experience and value of a cultural text may not be 
entirely contingent upon culturally specific practices and discourses of 
value, shows Wallace’s reluctance to abandon the idea that the value of 
certain cultural products may be thought of as an intrinsic property of 
those products. Infinite Jest’s implicit claim to cultural value is 
organised in opposition to these exemplars of disvalue (for example: the 
book is entertaining and complex but, unlike “Infinite Jest”—or 
television, as Wallace describes it—demands active rather than passive 
consumption). Self-consciously targeted at English majors though it 
may be, Infinite Jest’s universalising gestures show that the 
problematisation of “high”/ “low” categories that characterises a certain 
postmodern literary discourse does not necessarily equate to a happy 
                                                 
68
 The repeated references to “Infinite Jest”’s success being based on an appeal to the 
inner (pre-Oedipal) infant clearly invoke this Freudian discourse—but an investigation 
of this is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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abandonment of the evaluative logic synonymous with past forms of 








There is no escape from the discourse of value, and no escape from the 
pressure and indeed the obligation to treat the world as though it were 
fully relational, fully interconnected. (Frow 131)  
 
This thesis has submitted to critique the narrative of modernism’s 
“great divide” between “high” and “mass” culture (or its variant terms) 
giving way to postmodernism’s dismantlement of the same—especially 
the notion, implicit in various versions of this narrative, that the 
evaluative practices, or habits of argument, of contemporary cultural 
critics and producers are uniformly less problematic than those of their 
modernist counterparts. The method I have pursued in this task has not 
been simply to attempt to thwart the narrative via case study (i.e. 
showing that Ulysses, institutionally defined as a modernist text, seems 
to display an enlightened understanding of “mass” or “popular” culture, 
whereas Infinite Jest, a text institutionally defined as post-modernist, 
seems ultimately to rehearse the other-defining moves commonly 
associated with modernism). That approach certainly has been taken by 
Joycean critics—seeking to vaunt the value of Joyce’s work by 
extolling the progressive values it contains—as my third chapter 
explains. My own approach, by contrast, has been to step back from the 
discourse of “high” and “low” culture that this narrative depends upon. 
 
The post-axiological understanding of “high”/ “low” terms holds that 
these cannot refer to objectively existing categories whose value and 
characteristics can be subjected to meaningful discussion. John Frow’s 
argument for the category of “mass” (or “popular”) culture to be 
thought of “not as a sociological given but as, precisely, a category 
constructed within a historical system” (19) applies equally to the 
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category “high” culture; and in both instances, the evaluative discourses 
that give these categories their illusory coherence can be thought of as 
the preserve of institutions of higher education: universities. Academics 
bring the categories into being in their very attempts to understand the 
relationship between “high” and “low” culture: quite apart from 
explicitly evaluative statements (“popular culture is good” etc), the 
perception of the cultural field that such statements disclose is itself the 
product of evaluative discourse or “regimes of value.” In line with this 
understanding of cultural evaluation, practitioners of cultural studies 
may be criticised for seeking to effect simple hierarchy reversals—in 
Connor’s words, “tak[ing] the negative definitions of mass culture 
offered by modernism and revers[ing] its valencies” (48)—without 
considering the status of such hierarchies in the first place. 
 
In their “encyclopaedic” construction, Ulysses and Infinite Jest both 
respond (or can be configured so as to respond) to the university-centric 
discourse that divides culture into “high” and “popular” halves. This 
thesis has demonstrated the persistence of that discourse both in 
criticism (Joyceans’ readings of Ulysses as somehow enacting a 
particular relationship between “high” and “popular” culture) and 
representation (my own partial reading of Infinite Jest shows the 
enduring relevance of “high”/ “low” categories for at least one cultural 
producer seeking to make sense of the culture he is immersed in). The  
fact of that persistence suggests its continued appeal as a metaphor 
through which to understand “relations of cultural value”—but this 
appeal, like that of the enormous, time-demanding, “complex” books 
themselves, is probably now limited to a particular “niche market” of 
English majors (or, at least, those with a university education).69 It is 
                                                 
69
 That Ulysses and Infinite Jest now occupy this niche is of course the result of very 
different processes: Ulysses was processed through high cultural institutions, which 
sanctioned the book, rendered it consumable, and created the market demand and 
value necessary for it to be viably mass reproduced; Infinite Jest, conversely, was 
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not the task of post-axiological critique to expunge these categories 
from critical or literary discourse on the grounds that they are 
“illusory”; only to stress, self-consciously, the critical discourse, and 
the particular interests, that give this metaphor its value for a particular 
community of consumers. 
 
The failure of the Joycean critics of chapter 3 to submit their musings 
on the relationship between Ulysses and “popular culture” to this sort of 
self-conscious critique is what lies behind some of their more 
immoderate claims. Derek Attridge’s suggestion, echoed by numerous 
other critics, that appealing to the book’s “popular” rather than its 
“esoteric” allusions ought to provide a rejoinder to broad-brush charges 
of elitism (directed, impliedly, at both Joyce and Joyceans) stands out in 
this regard. Contra Attridge, a consideration of factors that may lie 
behind Ulysses’ value for the “niche market” posited above would point 
to the text’s institutional status, and to its complexity (such that it is 
likely to be valued by those who possess the sort of literacy taught and 
rewarded through a humanities education). Being upfront about those 
specific interests would seem to me to be infinitely preferable to the 
course Attridge adopts, which amounts to an attempt to universalise the 
text’s value by locating (in its “popular” allusions; and by making it 
“part of what is most valuable in popular culture” (26)) some “quality” 
that might appeal to a more expansive group of consumers. Despite the 
way Attridge and other Joyceans use the concept, “popular” cannot be 
understood as a synonym for universality—it is instead a category that 
has a particular, contingent, meaning within a literary/academic 
discourse. 
 
                                                                                                                                   




Infinite Jest, as well as demonstrating the persistence of “high”/ “low” 
categories in contemporary “literary fiction” (which might be defined 
pragmatically as those works published in the “quality imprints” of 
various publishing houses), discloses an awareness of critical arguments 
calling into question the integrity of the categories. For instance, its 
knowing invocation of signifiers of cultural value (allusions, 
monumentality, canonisation) sits alongside its satirical treatment of 
“high” cultural consumers to suggest a certain dissatisfied awareness of 
the processes through which particular values become institutionalised. 
But Wallace seems to take that awareness, and his vast cultural range, 
to authorise a “guide to value” that purports to transcend economy, 
discourse, “evaluative regime.” Wallace’s efforts in this regard could be 
understood simply as an attempt to inject moral questions into a modish 
idiom.70 However, the search Wallace undertakes is also consistent with 
the discourse of the dismantlement of the great divide that Huyssen 
posits—placing “progressive” critics and (implicitly university-
educated) cultural producers centre-stage to chart a valuable course for 
culture-as-a-whole.   
 
Thus, in very different ways (though they do respond to the same 
discourse of cultural periodisation), my readings of Infinite Jest and 
Joycean criticism show that the rhetorical claims by producers and 
critics to have moved decisively beyond the self-privileging evaluative 
logic of modernism (claims often made through discussion or 
representation of “high” / “low” categories being disrupted) are, if not 
disingenuous, then certainly contestable at the level of argument. 
 
                                                 
70
 Pankaj Mishra’s review of Wallace’s final essay collection, 2006’s Consider the 
Lobster, in the New York Times, is entitled “The Postmodern Moralist.” “Reading 
David Foster Wallace's new collection of magazine articles,” Mishra writes, “you 
could be forgiven for thinking that the author of such defiantly experimental fictions 
as "Infinite Jest" (1996) and "Oblivion" (2004) has been an old-fashioned moralist in 
postmodern disguise all along.” Mishra’s suspicion is, in one sense, borne out in my 
reading of Infinite Jest. 
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It is possible to suggest one further reason why “high”/ “low” discourse 
typically jars with the edicts of recent thought on cultural value. 
Making use of such categories to understand cultural value in a post-
great-divide context (i.e. where it is broadly acknowledged that the 
simple hierarchy they suggest does not represent a reliable guide to 
value) creates considerable difficulties for those most likely to be doing 
so—cultural intellectuals, in the broadest sense of the term. For in 
contemporary usage, the “high” / “popular” binary seemingly offers 
numerous opportunities for intellectuals to define that with which they 
do not identify or side with (the idea of “high” cultural experience 
being elitist and exclusionary, for instance), but no ready way of 
contemplating their own particular interests and agendas. John Frow 
writes of “that pretence of universality – the pretence of the absence of 
position – which lends such a false glow of transparency to academic 
writing” (131). Defining that position would seem to necessitate a more 
complex understanding of the “social organization of culture” than 
much of the “high” / “low” discourse traversed in this thesis would 
allow. Self-consciousness of this ilk may be the only way of reconciling 
university-centric narratives of the relationship between “high” and 
“popular” or “mass” culture with the core requirement of contemporary 
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